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There has been a concern both in policymaking and scholarly work on youth political participation 
since youth voter turnout in elections showed a tendency to decline together with political party 
membership. Voter participation and public attitudes appear to be different among Erasmus 
students, with recent data showing that they had higher levels of voter turnout in European elections 
and significant levels of political engagement. In particular, available data shows that both in Spain 
and Italy, there has been a steady increase in student participation in the Erasmus Programme 
and higher youth voter turnout in European elections. Hence, the choice of this two Member States 
of the European Union (EU), which share various common characteristics, as case studies of this 
dissertation. Whilst the Erasmus programme role in students’ lives has been previously studied, 
there is still research ground to explore when it comes to political participation of students who 
have joined the exchange programme. Thus, the present work endeavoured to understand how the 
Erasmus Programme and political participation of young people has evolved in Spain and Italy 
between de 1980s until 2019, and the significance of such evolution. 
This dissertation starts by going through the history and development of the Erasmus Programme 
from its origins to 2019. It then provides the description of the evolution of the international 
exchange programme in Spain and Italy followed by how youth political participation has evolved 
in both countries. Finally, Chapter Four provides a comparative analysis of Spain and Italy regarding 
the Erasmus Programme and youth political participation.  
This study outlines that the global financial crisis might have pushed young people to political action 
expressed through protest movements. Indeed, youth in general has shown a tendency towards 
non-institutionalized forms of political participation and higher levels of abstention in elections. As 
for Erasmus students, they tend to have positive associations with the EU, higher interest in EU 
elections and higher voter turnout in them. Nevertheless, they do still engage in other forms of 
political participation, which are less institutionalized. Overall, young people have been searching 
for a different direction in politics and this is also noticeable in Erasmus participants who seek for 
more rights as EU citizens. 
 







Tem havido uma preocupação tanto na elaboração de políticas como na elaboração de trabalhos 
académicos sobre a participação política dos jovens desde que a afluência às urnas dos mesmos 
nas eleições registou uma tendência decrescente, juntamente com a filiação em partidos políticos. 
A participação eleitoral e as atitudes públicas parecem ser diferentes entre os estudantes Erasmus, 
com dados recentes a demonstrar que estes tiveram níveis mais elevados de participação eleitoral 
nas eleições europeias e um envolvimento político mais significativo. Em particular, os dados 
disponíveis mostram que, tanto em Espanha como em Itália, tem havido um consistente aumento 
da participação dos estudantes no Programa Erasmus e uma maior afluência às urnas por parte 
destes jovens nas eleições europeias. Daqui resultou a escolha destes dois Estados-Membros da 
União Europeia (UE), que partilham várias características comuns, como estudos de caso desta 
dissertação. Embora o papel do programa Erasmus na vida dos estudantes tenha sido previamente 
estudado, ainda há muito para explorar no que toca à participação política dos estudantes que 
aderiram ao programa de intercâmbio. Assim, o presente trabalho procurou compreender como o 
Programa Erasmus e a participação política dos jovens evoluíram em Espanha e Itália entre 1980 
e 2019, e que significado esta evolução tem. 
Esta dissertação começa por percorrer a história e o desenvolvimento do Programa Erasmus desde 
a sua origem até 2019. Em seguida, fornece a descrição da evolução do programa de intercâmbio 
internacional em Espanha e Itália, e de como tem sido a participação política dos jovens em ambos 
os países. Por fim, o Capítulo Quatro fornece uma análise comparativa entre Espanha e Itália no 
que diz respeito ao Programa Erasmus e à participação política dos jovens.  
Este estudo demonstra que a crise financeira global poderá ter pressionado os jovens na direção 
de uma ação política expressa através de movimentos de protesto. De facto, os jovens, em geral, 
têm demonstrado uma tendência para formas não institucionalizadas de participação política e 
níveis mais elevados de abstenção nas eleições. Quanto aos estudantes Erasmus, estes tendem a 
ter associações positivas com a UE, maior interesse nas eleições da UE e maior afluência às urnas. 
Ainda assim, dedicam-se também a outras formas menos institucionalizadas de participação 
política. Em geral, os jovens têm procurado uma direção diferente na política e isto também se 
pode verificar nos participantes Erasmus que procuram mais direitos como cidadãos da UE. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s, Europe was going through a period characterized by 
economic stagnation and a low voter turnout in the direct elections to the European Parliament 
(European Parliament: Facts and Figures, 2014). During this time, there was lack of support among 
young people for the European Communities (Feyen, 2013). Thus, in June 1985, in the Milan 
European Council, it was established that further development of the European project could only 
be achieved with greater involvement of young people. To accomplish this, the Adonnino 
Committee was created to present proposals to tackle the issues connected to European youth. 
This Committee early on decided that action should be taken to encourage exchanges of young 
people between Member States (Report by the Committee on a People’s Europe submitted to the 
Milan European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 June 1985), 1985). At this moment, the groundwork is 
made to allow the launch of the Erasmus Programme two years later (Feyen, 2013).  
As Feyen noted, in 1985, the European Commission (EC) publishes its proposal on the 
Erasmus Programme, which is soon supported by other European institutions, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. After almost a year of negotiation, a proposal 
was presented to the Ministers of Education who adopted articles 128 and 235 concerning the 
Erasmus Programme in 1986. Finally, on the 14th of May 1987 in Brussels, the twelve Education 
Ministers within the Council agreed on adopting the Erasmus Programme, which went into effect 
on the 1st of July 1987. In 2017, the Erasmus Programme celebrated its 30th anniversary, having 
welcomed before its most recent version the Erasmus+, which was active between 2014 and 2020 
(European Commission, Erasmus+ Programme Guide, 2019). With its developments and larger 
scope, the Erasmus Programme became a concept that spread outside European borders. With 
this, Erasmus Mundus was born, a programme that promotes mobility of individuals and focuses 
on the increase of quality European universities and fosters the values of equity, human rights, and 
social justice (Lloyd, 2013). In our chosen timeline (1980’s to 2019) we were able to analyse the 
history of the Erasmus Programme until the present, understanding how it began and its different 
expansions until Erasmus+ and its role in the education field. By opting for this timeline, we were 
able to have an overview of the origins of the Erasmus Programme until 2019, understanding its 
evolution and expansion to different fields. With this timeline, we were also able to go through the 
political, social, and economic development in Spain and Italy, particularly the impact the period 
post-2008 crisis had in youth public attitudes and political participation in both countries. By looking 
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over the background of young people in Spain and Italy, we could analyse the possible influence of 
this on their public attitudes and political participation.   
As the Erasmus Programme developed and served more and more participants, Member 
States such as Spain and Italy faced the consequences of the economic crisis, which erupted in 
2008 and led both countries governments to apply stiff measures to tackle it (Pirro and Kessel, 
2018). In Italy, the crisis represented the final step of a decline for the country, which began after 
the recession 1992-93 (Tridico, 2012). As for Spain, the country enjoyed in the 1990s until 2007 
an incredible economic growth, with an unemployment rate which kept lowering, but this ‘Golden 
Decade’ of the Spanish economy came to an end with the international financial crisis (Élteto, 
2011). By 2010, the Spanish government had to change its fiscal policy to cope with the crisis, at 
the same time, international markets lost their confidence in Spain and other Southern European 
countries (ibid.).  
During this time the NEET (“Not in education, employment or training”) became in 2011 
20% of Spanish citizens between the ages of 15 and 29 belonged to it. Even those with higher 
education increased their numbers in this generational group by 69% (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and 
Guío, 2014). The crisis also showed its impact on youth employment in Italy, since 2011, more 
than 40% of young workers have spent more than one year unemployed (Dolado J. J., 2015). 
Moreover, the financial and economic crisis provoked a change in the way Italians viewed Europe, 
breaking the trust they had in Europe as a source of prosperity and economic growth (Mauro, 
2014). In addition to this, political parties were unable to represent their voters fully. This became 
evident after the start of the 2008 crisis, in which governments had to satisfy voters’ demands and 
their EU partners, EU institutions and international financial organizations (Bosco and Verney, 
2012). By May 2011, a social movement known as 15-M started in Spain, which protested the 
political elites, the economic situation and how Spanish democracy operated (Puig, 2011). While 
in Italy, the political scene was of instability in the national party system due to corruption and 
scandals, this also came with an increase of power of populist forces, which started questioning 
the European project (Hopkin, 2012).  
Looking from a young people’s perspective, when it comes to the EU, they perceive its 
values and institutions as distant from them, which puts at stake attempts to increase civic and 
political engagement (Villano and Bertocchi, 2014). This is particularly relevant when considering 
that public attitudes over mass political behaviour have been responsible for shaping and 
constructing European integration (Gabel, 1998). Nonetheless, it should be noted that both in Italy 
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and Spain there has been a steady increase in student participation in the Erasmus Programme 
(Figure 2 and Figure 3), which has also come with a higher voter turnout when analysing the 
available data of the youth (18 to 24 years old) in Spain and Italy in European elections (Figure 8). 
At this point, we should highlight that youth political participation has shown to express itself in 
different ways, not just through the ballot, non-participation in elections could have multiple 
interpretations (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). Hence, political participation 
can entail all political activities in which a citizen can take part to try to influence decision-making 
(Grasso, 2018). 
Moreover, it should be considered that politics can involve both formal participation and 
social empowerment (Favell, 2010). Thus, we will attempt to analyse the evolution of the Erasmus 
Programme during their studies and political participation of young people, in European elections, 
behind a background marked by high youth unemployment and the rise of populist movements. 
To do so, we will base our work on the following research question: how the Erasmus Programme 
and political participation of young people have evolved in Spain and Italy, and what is the 
significance of this? 
 
Relevance of the research  
On the 14th of May 1987 in Brussels, the twelve Education Ministers within the Council 
agreed on the adoption of the Erasmus Programme, which came into effect on the 1st of July 
1987. This was considered a milestone for young people and the European Community (Feyen, 
2013). The first generation of programmes had the goal to boost European features in learning 
prospects. At the start of the 2000s, there was a greater investment in different fields, such as 
lifelong learning and adult education (Ertl, 2003). By 2017 on the 30th anniversary of the Erasmus 
Programme, its most recent version was introduced, Erasmus+, which focused on equity, 
prosperity and social inclusion which went beyond the European borders (Erasmus+ Programme 
Guide, 2019). 
As Erasmus evolved to become increasingly seen as an essential investment in the future, 
as it was pointed by the former President of the EC Jean-Claude Juncker, the crisis of 2008 echoed 
throughout Europe (30 years of 'Erasmus' exchanges abroad: Commission launches mobile 
application to mark anniversary, 2017). The recession post-2008 was characterised by high 
unemployment rates in Spain, which mostly affected the middle class who either lost their job or 
saw a considerable reduction of their income, this created a climate of indignation also connected 
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to the corruption which was exposed in politics and the financial system (Zarzalejos, 2016). As for 
Italy, the crisis of 2008 represented the last moment of a long decline which had begun in the start 
of the 1990s (Tridico, 2012). The Italian economy suffered from the crisis and public confidence 
in the effectiveness of the European common currency was shaken (Jones, 2009). 
The climate of crisis and its repercussions lead to social unrest and protests in Spain in 
2011, seen as the response of young people to what was happening in their country (Jover, 
Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). Indeed, Spanish youth showed outrage and distrust towards 
their democratic institutions; this translated in the formation of the 15-M movement as a path to 
search for a political alternative (ibid.). A similar trend was felt in Italy, where the negative economic 
performance endured for an extended period of time, this compromised the trust in politics and 
parties; consequently, there was cabinet instability (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014). Abstention was 
used during this period as an expression of discontent with the whole political system, but many 
young people who were also dissatisfied preferred to cast their ballots for radical insurgent parties 
such as the Five-Star Movement (ibid.). It should be acknowledged that the crisis might have been 
in itself a catalyser for youth political action, mainly through protest movements, yet they appear 
to attract a small number of participants, who tend to be ignored by mainstream political parties 
and politicians as they are unlikely to vote (Grasso, 2018).  
Voter participation and public attitudes appear to be different among Erasmus students. The 
Erasmus Student Network (ESN) Survey 2019 showed that they had higher levels of voter turnout 
in European elections and significant levels of political engagement through activities such as public 
debates and demonstrations (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). Taking this 
context as a whole, from the evolution of the Erasmus Programme, the crisis in Southern Europe 
and youth voter participation and attitudes, we should attempt to understand the significance of 
their evolution, if there have been substantial changes and what could be the consequences of 
these occurrences. Through an analytical and in-depth reading of these events, we might be able 
to take on a greater reflection on the Erasmus Programme and youth political engagement in 
society and what role they have played in the construction of the European project.  
 
Objectives 
The main purpose of the present investigation is to understand the significance of how the 
Erasmus Programme and political participation of young people have evolved in Spain and Italy. 
To study the evolution of the Erasmus Programme, we based our work on primary sources such 
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as the Eurobarometer and Erasmus Student Network studies together with scholarly works on the 
subject. Thus, this research attempted to comprehend the evolution of the Erasmus Programme, 
an exchange programme which from its start has stimulated the mobility of students within the 
European Union (EU) (Proposal for a Council Decision adopting the European Community Action 
Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus), 1986); and on current days it has 
extended itself from beyond European borders, being now a concept known throughout the world 
(Pinto, et al., 2018). The latest version of the Programme, named Erasmus+, counted with an 
overall budget of 14.774 billion euros and already between 2012-2013 new records were achieved 
in terms of people who joined Erasmus, there were a total of 268 143 students benefitting from 
Erasmus grants to go abroad to study and train (Erasmus 2012-13: the figures explained, 2014).  
Both Italy and Spain have seen a positive evolution regarding incoming and outgoing 
participants in the Erasmus Programme from the academic year 2004/2005 to 2017 (Figure 2 
and Figure 3). Spanish universities have been investing in their internationalisation, boosting 
support for outgoing students and increasing worldwide attractiveness of Spanish higher education 
institutions (Valle and Garrido, Movilidad de estudandiantes universitarios: es España atractivo para 
los estudiantes Erasmus?, 2009). In the Italian case, the country has proven to be one of the major 
players in intra-EU student mobility (Pietro and Page, 2008). However, its higher education system 
is one of the most traditional in Europe, and there have been some incentives to increase its 
international facet (Lindberg, 2009). Even though there is academic research and output on the 
origins of the Erasmus Programme, accounting of its participants was only found from the 
academic year of 2004/2005, limiting our analysis in some aspects.  
Considering youth political participation, the academic work has shown that the turnout in 
elections has declined together with political party memberships, being these the most formal and 
institutionalized forms of participation (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). The 
reasons for this can vary, from the perceived inability of political representatives to address issues 
which concern the youngest sector of the population, from the youth not being able to see what 
formal politics can offer them, choosing other forms of engagement, such as demonstrations (ibid.) 
instead. This trend of non-institutionalized ways of political participation was observed in Spain and 
Italy; student movements arose during the time of economic crisis (2008 and 2010) around the 
concepts of precarity, youth and anti-austerity discourse (Zamponi and González, 2016). In general, 
young people have been disappointed with the traditional forms of political participation. There 
have been debates and concerns led both by scholars and policymakers on youth’s apathetic 
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attitudes on their engagement in the established political system (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 2010). 
Overall youth voter turnout in Spain and Italy was only found for 2009, 2014 and 2019 in the 
Eurobarometer (Figure 8). Until those years, there was no breakdown of voters' profile (age, gender, 
profession, etc.).  
When approaching specifically youth political participation and public attitudes of Erasmus 
students from Spain and Italy, we were only able to incorporate in this investigation mainly two 
studies, the ‘Erasmus Voting Assessment’ (EVA) from 2014 and the ESN Survey 2019, which have 
both showed how Erasmus participants have greater intentions to vote in European elections and 
do so. In fact, during the 2014 European elections, 81% of EVA respondents who had completed 
their stay abroad admitted in voting on those elections (Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). 
In the following European elections, students who had participated in an EU funded exchange 
programme gave higher importance to EU elections (60,69%), had greater intentions to vote in 
them (76,18%) and had a greater turnout in the European elections of 2019 (71,20%) (Banet, 
Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019).  
Although there was a lack of data from primary sources such as the Eurobarometer and 
ESN Surveys, this last studies only in 2019 dwelled in political participation and engagement, the 
fundamental objectives of the present investigation were still carried out, since we were able to 
understand the significance of both the evolution of the Erasmus Programme in general and in 
Spain and Italy, as well as the changes in youth political engagement in Spain and Italy and what 
role education and mainly the Erasmus Programme has played in this.  
 
Literature Review 
Public attitudes can shape the process of European integration, this became most evident 
during the Danish 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, but they can also cast influence in 
EU politics through lobbying, public protests, and elections (Gabel, 1998). Indeed, two mechanisms 
have been responsible for building up a dynamic European public sphere, the increased 
communication within European political institutions or an increasing institutional environments, 
and the increase in people’s attention and awareness of the European political communication 
(Trenz and Eder, 2004). Through the Maastricht Treaty, public legitimacy was intended to become 
an integral part of European strength, compelling institutional and political actors to consider in 
their strategies and decisions the public’s opinion and possible reactions. In case the public 
remains indifferent to European political actors' actions, it is a part of their role to seek how to 
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engage the public in their activities, allowing for multilevel governance. According to Trenz and Eder 
“This moves the social learning of an elite community toward the collective learning of institutions 
and their counterparts in civil society.” (ibid.: 2004, p.16). Thus, the deepening of democracy in 
the EU could be a process, which unfolds together with greater integration and it should be noted 
that in addition, “The growing public perception of the EU appears to be important to this 
democratic expansion and convergence, as is the role of the institutions in performing European 
governance and encouraging communication and discourse” (ibid.: p. 20). This shall not be a 
straightforward process; the normative principles of participation and transparency within the EU 
might be often broken, but these steps backwards can intensify communication and protest and in 
this way creating the necessary conditions for democracy (ibid.).  
Thus, public attitudes have become an important component of European integration, but it 
should be noted that EU citizens vary in their support for European integration (Gabel, 1998). In 
the late 1990s, five possible theoretical explanations for public attitudes toward European 
integration were developed, which are as it follows: Cognitive mobilization (high cognitive 
mobilization allows citizens to identify with a supranational political community, such as the EU); 
political values (support for European integration is related with value positioning concerning 
economic and political topics); utilitarian model (EU citizens with diverse socioeconomic situations 
experience different costs and benefits from integrative policies), class partisanship (citizens adopt 
attitudes toward integration which reflect the position of the party they support) and support for 
Government (citizens project their assessments of the party of their national leader onto integration) 
(ibid.). This model has been used for the purpose of this research as a theoretical framework. 
Studies conducted related to these theories have results that point out for strong support for the 
utilitarian hypothesis, meaning that support for integration was positively related to the level of 
human capital and financial capital and residency in an intra-EU border region (ibid.). According to 
Gabel, it should be highlighted that citizen's support for integration could be flexible, on the one 
side the cognitive mobilization and political values theories propose that a citizen's support for 
integration is based on personal political characteristics, on the other side, the different theories 
suggest citizens could change their support for integration depending on specific factors, such as 
the support for the governing party (ibid.).  
There was observed a public opinion and political elite divide concerning European 
integration, which showed that elites tend to be more favourable to it, exposing a gap between 
elites and the public (Hooghe, 2003). According to Hooghe, it should be noted that elites and the 
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public searched for different things from Europe. Nonetheless, elites were still more enthusiastic 
concerning European integration than is the public, this could be related to the fact they were more 
satisfied with the basic rules of the EU, “Elites desire a European Union capable of governing a 
large, competitive market and projecting political muscle; citizens are more in favour of a caring 
European Union, which protects them from the vagaries of capitalist markets.” (ibidem.: p. 296).  
 
Attitudes towards the EU are connected to political participation which could be understood 
as “is made up of all those political activities that citizens can become involved in as they to attempt 
to influence political decision-making”, these activities could be more conventional and mainstream 
or confrontational and unconventional, in any way political participation is considered as a 
fundamental part of democracy since it ensures effective representation (Grasso, 2018 p. 181). 
Political participation is not a frozen concept and there have been considered three basic forms of 
it, which are as it follows, institutional politics (elections, campaigns and party membership), 
protest activities (demonstrations and new social movements) and civic engagement (associative 
life, community participation, voluntary work) (Kovacheva, 2005). 
There has been international debate over the topic of youth’s political participation in which 
it has been expressed the concern of young people’s lack of political engagement simply in electoral 
politics; it has been believed that this is due to little knowledge and interest on the subject (Harris, 
Wyn, and Younes, 2010). In fact, “while young people are less likely to engage in some 
conventional activities, they are more likely to be involved in extra-institutional modes of political 
engagement and online activism” (Grasso, 2018 p. 182). Many young people do have social and 
political concerns. Still, they do not participate in traditional modes since they do not feel 
represented, “they continue to value recognition by the state and continue to appreciate rational, 
discursive, deliberative democracy.” (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 2010 p. 28). Indeed, they take on 
more individualized and everyday practices to shape society. Ordinary ways are used to act upon 
their political and social concerns, which should be considered when approaching new participatory 
styles (ibid.). Thus, young people showed to be neither profoundly political apathetic nor at the 
forefront of new political styles, but it should be acknowledged that more recently social movements 
such as ‘Fridays for Future’ had young people in their leadership, “Anxious about their future on a 
hotter planet and angry at world leaders for failing to arrest the crisis, masses of young people 
poured into the streets on every continent on Friday for a day of global climate protests. Organizers 
estimated the turnout to be around four million in thousands of cities and towns worldwide. It was 
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the first time that children and young people had demonstrated to demand climate action in so 
many places and in such numbers around the world.” (Sengupta, 2019).  
While some truly do not have an interest in representative politics, many would like to be a 
part of the processes of deliberation within the structures of democracies, which currently tend to 
marginalize the youth (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 2010). Youth political action goes beyond political 
institutions and non-governmental organizations; it also happens through involvement in looser 
networks, friendship circles and individual action, the Internet has also presented itself to be 
another resource for youth participation (Kovacheva, 2005). Additionally, “under the conditions of 
decentralisation and globalisation, political actions are not actions directed towards the nation-state 
but also towards smaller and wider constituencies – towards regional and local communities, as 
well as those at European and global level.” (ibid.: p. 26).  
On political marginalization, some differences should be considered between employed and 
unemployed youth, those without a job tend to have more radical political attitudes, but there are 
few revolutionaries among the youth (Bay and Blekesaune, 2003). In general, unemployed youth 
have less political confidence and are less satisfied with how democracy works because of their 
disappointment with the authorities handling their employment situation (ibid.). Indeed, during 
times of crisis young people are taking up new forms of political participation across Europe, even 
if voting is still the most common activity, youth increasingly joins alternative modes such as 
protests and boycotts, they tend to be connected to social movements (Grasso, 2018). Also, the 
developments in digital technology have changed the way young people express themselves and 
participate politically, “[technology] has encouraged young people to construct their own sense of 
community through the internet often based around identity politics and campaigning around 
issues surrounding the politics of recognition” (ibid.: p. 189). In fact, young people through news 
ways of political participation, have shown their preference for single-issue campaigns (ibid.).  
As political participation is one of the central parts of democracy, it has been assessed that 
young people appear not to show a homogenous profile concerning their attitudes and behaviours 
on EU elections, “The electoral process to choose representatives for the European Parliament 
wakes no special interest among the European youth” (Díaz, 2008 p. 181). It should be highlighted 
that participation patterns vary throughout Europe during the same electoral process, and as pro-
European associations of young people increase, by this is understood interest in issues connected 
to the EU, participation in European Parliament (EP) elections is higher too (ibid.). Both scholars 
and policy-makers have placed high hopes in exchange programmes to increase European support 
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across borders (Kuhn, 2012). However, such programmes like the Erasmus tend to include higher 
education students who are already favourable to the EU, also even people who do not take part 
in university studies if they are involved in transnational networks and mobility they are still prone 
to support the EU just the same (ibid.). Nonetheless, “models, transnational practices have a 
strong, positive and highly significant effect on both European self-categorization and attachment 
to Europe.” (ibid.: p. 1006). The lack of impact of the Erasmus Programme on its participants 
could be connected to the already strong presence of Europe in the lives of students, but by 
studying abroad, there is the possibility of new layers on the already existing view of Europe 
amongst students (Mol, 2013). In general, “from their experiences abroad and through their social 
interaction, mobile students from EU states appropriate Europe as a personal project, in which the 
social predominates over the political.” (ibid.: p. 220). Indeed, the Erasmus Programme has had 
as one of its goals to promote interactions between Europeans, and while joining it no immediate 
profound changes can be detected in its students after an academic year, longer interactions 
between Europeans could change this (Sigalas, 2010).  
Through mobility in Europe citizens could be legitimising the ‘post-national’ European 
project, fulfilling the notion of freedom of movement, and defocusing from party politics (Favell, 
2010). In fact, conventional models of political participation might not cover the entirety of ways 
young citizens are having an impact on their societies, “so much more can be said about their 
active engagement as residents, consumers, parents, and gentrifiers in the cities they have chosen 
to live in” (ibid.: p. 213). Indeed, young people feel alienated from formal politics, translated 
generally in voting and party membership, even though they are still broadly interested in politics, 
even though they tend to think that their elected representatives appear not to listen to them 
(O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). Thus, when analysing lack of youth political 
participation, it should be acknowledged that the reasons for this are varied and go beyond from 
simple lack of interest (ibid.). Therefore, indifference expressed in youth does affect voter turnout, 
“if the outcome would make no difference, and voting involves costs, the rational citizen would not 
vote” (Brody and Page, 1973 p. 2).  
Young Europeans have distanced themselves from parties and politicians and have engaged 
more in issue-based forms of participation; this could be due to the fact politicians, parties and 
policymakers have been incapable or reluctant to adapt to the changing times, as a consequence, 
there is a thin relation between young citizens and their representatives (Sloam, 2013). As pointed 
out before, young people prefer non-institutionalised forms of engagement, “displaying a badge or 
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sticker and taking part in demonstrations, are less common than petitions, but are dominated by 
the young.” (ibidem.: p. 852). According to Sloam, this was particularly evident during 2011 mass 
students’ demonstrations throughout Europe. During this time, it was expressed by the youth a 
desire for something remarkably distinct than what they were experiencing; this meant more 
transparency in politics, a higher user of direct democracy, the end of austerity measures imposed 
during the financial crisis and instead higher investments to increase youth employment, greater 
State regulation on big corporations and implementation of measures to end socio-economic 
inequalities (Sloam, 2014). A lot of this was because the context post-2008 crisis was of a ‘risk 
society’ with an ever-changing labour market and the unlikely case to find a ‘job for life’ for many 
(ibid.). Feeling unheard and unable to identify with their political representatives, youth turns for 
non-institutionalized forms of political participation. Even if voting is still the most common political 
activity, there has been detected throughout Europe low youth voter turnout in elections (ibid.). Two 
dangers could appear in this situation, the disconnection of youth from electoral politics, being the 
vote key for the maintenance of democratic institutions, and fewer contact activities with 
democratic issues that affect citizens’ everyday lives (Sloam, 2013). Overall, one might say that 
“youth participation in politics has changed rather than declined” (ibid.: p. 851).  
 
Research Gap and Added Value 
In literature and the field of policymaking, there has been a concern about youth political 
participation, which has seen both a decline in turnout in elections and political parties’ 
membership, due to this recent studies have described the youth as politically apathetic or inactive 
(O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). There could be different reasons for this, 
such as the political representatives' incapacity to tackle the issues that concern young people or 
politicians’ inability to find strategies for politics to become a crucial part of their lives (ibid.). 
Furthermore, young people were disproportionally affected by the 2008 global financial crisis. Due 
to the particular time in their lives they are, together with entering for the first time in the labour 
market, the challenging context they faced made a significant impression on them (Grasso, 2018). 
This was also the case in Spain and Italy, where their labour markets experienced high 
unemployment levels with increased poverty and inequality (Addabbo, García-Fernández, Llorca-
Rodríguez, and Maccagnan, 2011).  
From the very start of the Erasmus Programme had as its main goal to stimulate mobility of 
students between universities. With time its scope increased to different educational fields, together 
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with more participants and higher budgets, leading to approximately 5 million higher education 
students joining, this meant studying abroad and joining the social life in a different country (Banet, 
Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). In a particular time where many throughout Europe 
are questioning the added value of the EU on the aftermath of a severe crisis, it is relevant to 
understand how Erasmus students assess the European project and engage politically (ibid.) 
Indeed, it has been shown that taking part in the Erasmus programme can increase employability 
and make its participants more active citizens (Pinto, et al., 2018).  
However, throughout our research, we came to understand that this only became a recent 
concern both in academic studies and in reports conducted by Eurobarometer and the ESN. Thus, 
in our work, we have attempted to make a broader reflection of the significance of the evolution of 
the Erasmus Programme and youth political engagement. Within the scope of our investigation, we 
have understood fundamentally that the Erasmus Programme has increased its presence on young 
people’s lives, who saw an added value on joining the exchange programme European 
Commission, Erasmus 2012-13: the figures explained, 2014). Moreover, according to the ESN 
Survey of 2019, Erasmus students viewed EU elections as of great importance and showed this by 
having high turnout levels in 2019. They also engage politically in other activities such as public 
debates and signing petitions (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019).  
Indeed, young people still participate in politics, but they tend to show a preference for non-
electoral forms of participation (Sloam, 2013). The crisis could have been a catalyst for youth 
political action with an increase in protest movements that rose against austerity and spending 
cuts in social services (Grasso, 2018). As young people’s lives in Europe have become more 
precarious economically (Sloam, 2014), the Erasmus Programme and the EU in itself appear to 
be a beacon of hope, with high levels of satisfaction with the exchange programme (Erasmus 2012-
13: the figures explained, 2014) and positive associations between the EU and economic prosperity 
(Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). 
In this way, we attempted to bring the available literature together with data to understand 
the significance of young people joining Erasmus and their political behaviour. Indeed, the 
engagement of mobile European citizens in other ways besides conventional politics ones could 
represent a new way of politics (Favell, 2010). Thus, as European democracy evolves together with 
its increasingly international and mobile youth (ibid.). Erasmus students have shown to seek to 
expand their rights as EU citizens actively, and as pointed out previously, they also have high levels 
of turnout in EU elections (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). While the Erasmus 
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programme role on its participants’ lives has been explored in the literature in different lenses, 
there is still room for further research, especially on the political participation of students who join 
the exchange programme.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
As indicated by this work's research question, the main concern is to analyse the evolution 
of the Erasmus Programme and political participation of young people in Spain and Italy between 
the 1980s and 2019. Considering that political participation will be examined, Eurobarometer will 
be one of the platforms and tools used to collect data together with ESN surveys and other 
researchers conducted by European Institutions, such as the EC. Mixed-methods, quantitative and 
qualitative, will be used to try to achieve a full understanding of the phenomenon proposed to be 
studied. As demonstrated by Driscoll et al. (2007: 26), “The qualitative data provide a deep 
understanding of survey responses, and statistical analysis can provide a detailed assessment of 
patterns of responses.” (Driscoll, Appiah-Yeboah, Salib, and Rupert, 2007, p. 26). Mix-method 
research design offers more interesting and possible appropriate means of addressing different 
research purposes in EU studies (Lynggaard, Manners, and Löfgren, 2015). 
The methodology also includes process tracing, which in its core analyses reality in terms of 
time, timing and sequences, focusing on the changing features and transformation of events with 
their related connections, “which is potentially very effective for both comparative analysis and 
case studies” (Morlino, 2018, p. 89). This goes accordingly to apply mixed-methods, which are 
used in process tracing description, official documents, memoirs, mass surveys and interviews 
(ibid.). The emphasis in this research design is on the different interactions and changing contexts, 
in our case, the Erasmus Programme's evolution through time together with political participation 
of the young people who join the exchange programme (ibid.). Following Morlino’s work, one of the 
strategies that might be adopted in process tracing, which we will use during our work, is detailed 
narrative by presenting a highly specific story, the one of the Erasmus Programme and youth 
political participation in Spain and Italy in the setting of crisis and shifting contexts.  
We use Gabel’s (1998) work to understand public attitudes towards the EU and investigate 
Erasmus students' available data to try to comprehend what influenced their views on the EU. 
Moreover, by choosing to use comparison, “the analysis of more than one case permits the testing 
of different explanations and the establishment of more cogent and well-argued grounds for 
preferring one explanation (or explanations) to others” (Morlino, 2018, p. 20). Also, by using 
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process tracing, a comparable case strategy, we were able to obtain additional evidence about 
possible causes and effects, in the context of this research, the potential role of the Erasmus 
Programme in youth’s political participation (Levy, 2008).  
As our case studies, we have chosen Spain and Italy to be compared within this research 
design, due to the similarities found in both countries, “the chosen pair of cases is similar on all 
the measured independent variables independent variables” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 
304). Indeed, the most similar method is one of the most recognized qualitative analysis techniques 
(ibid.). Both countries belong to an area which used to be assessed as pro-EU, Spain revealing to 
be in the group of the most supportive towards the EU before the 2008 crisis and Italy experiencing 
the same kind of support during the 1970s and 1980s (Leconte, 2010). Also, there has been 
wearisome of Southern European democracies and their support for the EU (Matthijs, 2014). 
However, by 2010 the failure of the promises of Maastricht was exposed to the sovereign-debt 
crisis, which reached Spain and Italy just one year later, forcing economic adjustments (ibid). 
Finally, there has been a steady increase since 1987 of outgoing Erasmus students from Spain 
and Italy (Figure 6) year in which they joined the exchange programme; also participants of the 
exchange programme from both countries appear to prefer them as Erasmus destinations 
(Pumares, González-Martín, Montanari, and Staniscia, 2018).  
 
Structure of Dissertation 
The outline of the present dissertation will be divided into four parts. As one of the central 
parts of our analysis is the Erasmus Programme, Chapter 1 goes through the history of the 
exchange programme. In the first part of this chapter (1.1), we have focused on the origins of 
Erasmus Programme and the different decisions and set of events that lead to the official launch 
of the exchange programme in 1987 in Brussels. Following Erasmus's origins, we go through the 
different versions of the mobility programme from Socrates (1995 to 2007) to its most recent one, 
Erasmus+ (2014 to 2020). Here we examined the expansions the programme went through with 
updates in scope, actions, budget, and increasing participants. On the third part of Chapter 1, we 
analysed how Erasmus became a concept known worldwide with its Mundus facet, extending the 
Erasmus Programme to promote higher education, intercultural understanding with third countries, 




In Chapters 2 and 3, we approach our case studies Spain and Italy on the Erasmus 
Programme's history and the youth political participation in each country. Chapter 2 is dedicated 
to the Spanish case, in the first section of the chapter (2.1) we go through the evolution of the 
Erasmus Programme within the country from the end to the ’80s and start of ’90s to Erasmus+, 
we also look into the increase in participants (incoming and outgoing) and the possible explanations 
behind this. Moreover, we examine why students decide to join Erasmus and their perspective on 
the exchange programme once they do. From an analysis of the Erasmus Programme and its role 
in Spain's education field, we move towards youth political participation and public attitudes in a 
changing context (2.2), which means from the end of Franco’s dictatorship in 1975 until the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Here we assess how after a prosperous economic period in 
the 1990s, Spain suffers a considerable blow with the crisis of 2008 which lead to austerity 
measures being taken by the government and Spain having harsher economic and social conditions 
which had a substantial impact on the youth. In the last section of this chapter, we analyse how 
was the political participation of Spanish youth during this specific context and events, from 
participation in protests movements to higher levels of abstention in elections. We also go through 
Erasmus students' political participation; they show a higher interest in EP elections and higher 
voter turnout. Nonetheless, they also engage in other forms of participation, such as protests and 
public debates.  
In Chapter 3, we follow the same logic of the previous one; this time, we dedicate ourselves 
to the Italian case. We go through the role of the Erasmus Programme in Italy’s education sector 
(3.1). Indeed, Italy has proven to be an important player in international student mobility with 
steady growth in incoming and outgoing students. We also look at the role Italian universities play 
in fostering international mobility and Erasmus's influence on students’ lives. From the Erasmus 
Programme in Italy, we look to the Italian youth political participation and public attitudes (3.2). In 
this part of the dissertation, we examine Italy's political and economic context from the 1990’s to 
the period that followed the crisis of 2008 marked by high youth unemployment, government 
instability, the migrant crisis, and the rise of populist parties. We analyse that the Italian youth 
political participation during this time was described as low engagement in conventional forms, 
such as party membership, and show greater participation in demonstrations, political debates, 
and rallies. We observed that this was a similar tendency in Italian Erasmus students who 
demonstrate higher engagement in non-conventional forms of participation. They also have a higher 
interest in elections which is translated in greater voter turnout in EU elections. In general, young 
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Italians appear to have a greater interest in politics than other young Europeans but are critical of 
their political incumbents.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, we operationalize the comparison between Spain and Italy youth on 
their political participation and attitudes towards the EU. In the first part (4.1), we use Gabel’s 
(1998) work to understand public attitudes towards the EU and look into the available data on 
Erasmus students to understand what increased their positive views on the EU; their answers went 
from the ability to live anywhere in the EU from the European emergency services. We also tackle 
how the global financial crisis of 2008 significantly affected young people in a period of their lives 
in which they are sensitive to this sort of events. Thus, young people started to seek more 
transparency in politics and more opportunities for direct democracy; in this search, they moved 
away from conventional forms of politics and opted for new social and protest movements. This 
disengagement from formal politics created some concerns on the legitimacy of democratic 
systems. We conclude the Chapter to answer our research question (4.2) by understanding the 
significance of the evolution of the Erasmus Programme and youth public attitudes and political 
participation in Spain and Italy. We analyse youth voter turnout in EU elections and look into 
Erasmus students' available data on their political participation. In general, youth tend towards 
non-institutionalized forms of participation and higher levels of abstention in elections. As for 
Erasmus students, they tend to have positive associations with the EU, higher interest in EU 
elections and higher voter turnout in them. Nevertheless, they do still engage in considerable 
numbers in other forms of political participation. Thus, we have studied that youth shows a 
tendency to move away from mainstream politics, focusing on single issues and policies and 
actively seeking to exercise their mobility throughout Europe, and in this way, they might be leading 
into a new form of politics in Europe.  
This, as stressed in the Conclusion of this dissertation, the research made concludes that 
youth reactions in Italy and Spain to the financial crisis through anti-austerity protests gained a 
wider audience during this period (Zamponi and González, 2016) showing young people’s search 
for a different direction in politics (Sloam, 2014) and this seeking can also be perceived in Erasmus 
participants who want more rights as EU citizens (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 
2019). Moreover, youth appears to be inclined to join non-institutionalized forms of political 





The Erasmus Programme from 1987 to 2019 
 
Learning to live together, finally, by developing an understanding of others, of their history, their 
traditions and their spirituality. This would provide a basis for the creation of a new spirit which, 
guided by recognition of our growing interdependence and a common analysis of the risks and 
challenges of the future, would induce people to implement common projects or to manage the 
inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful way. Some might say that this is utopian; and yet it is 
a necessary utopia, indeed a vital one if we are to escape from the dangerous cycle sustained by 
cynicism and complacency. 
- Jacques Delors, Education for Tomorrow, Extract from The UNESCO Courier (April 1996)  
 
1.1 The Erasmus Programme: origins  
In May 1968 it became clear there was general dissatisfaction with the university system, 
so in an attempt to improve this, one year later the EP called for a Europeanisation of universities 
and the French Minister of Education, Olivier Guichard, proposed for the creation of a European 
Centre for the Development of Education (Pépin, 2007). The difficult economic conditions of the 
1970s (for instance, the oil crisis), created an ideal momentum for a greater action in European 
Communities in the field of education, which was an opportunity for cooperation among the 
Member States (ibid.). Thus, education matters were slowly introduced into the European 
Communities policy domain and only acquired momentum during the 1970s (Klose, 2013). Five 
main moments of decisions can be identified regarding the education area in European 
Communities: The Treaty of Rome (1957) which laid the ground for the creation of the European 
University Institute in Florence; the communiqué of Heads of State and Government meeting in 
Bonn (1961); the 1971 Resolution of Ministers of Education meeting with the Council regarding 
cooperation in education; the 1976 Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education 
responsible for shaping an action programme of education; and the launching of the Erasmus 
Programme (the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) on 
the 15th of June 1987 (Corbett, 2003).  
In the early 1980s, Europe was going through a period that was marked by economic 
stagnation and a low turnout of voters in the direct elections to the EP in 1984 of 59% (in 1979 it 
was 61.8%) (European Parliament, 2014). There was mostly a lack of support among young people 
for the European Communities (Feyen, 2013). Until this point in history, the EC had been a project 
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mostly handled by governments and political elites, but in 1984 this was about to change with the 
European Council meeting at Fontainebleau in June (ibidem.). As a result, the Heads of State and 
government of the EC Member States decided to create a Committee which was formed by 
representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Italian Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Pietro Adonnino, later on, this Committee became known as the Adonnino 
Committee.  
After one year working, several political and symbolic ideas were developed to make the 
EC closer to its citizens (Feyen, 2013.). In June 1985 in the Milan European Council, it became 
clear that further development of the European project required young people's involvement, so 
the Adonnino Committee put forward proposals to deal with issues related to European youth, such 
as the lack of support recently felt (ibid.). Regarding higher education, the Adonnino Committee 
stated in its final report submitted in Milan that, “University cooperation and mobility in higher 
education are obviously of paramount importance.” (Report by the Committee on a People’s 
Europe submitted to the Milan European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 June 1985), 1985, p. 15). 
Taking this into consideration, several recommendations on the field of education were presented, 
such as that students should be able to continue their studies in a university from another Member 
State, implement a European programme of exchanges and studies, create a European system of 
academic credits, a European award for recognition of achievements in higher education and finally 
recognition of certificates and diplomas throughout Europe (Feyen, 2013). The Adonnino 
Committee viewed it when it came to exchanges of young people, that it was a way to build a 
deeper connection between its youngest generation and the European project, “Action at 
Community level to encourage exchanges of young people between different Member States helps 
to promote the identity of Europe for young Europeans.” (Report by the Committee on a People’s 
Europe submitted to the Milan European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 June 1985), 1985, p. 17). The 
recommendations previously mentioned laid the framework for the later development of the 
Erasmus Programme, which would be launched two years later (Feyen, 2013).  
While the political impetus of the Council was essential to move Erasmus forward, the 
ground had already been laid by the EC(Feyen, 2013). Firstly, even before the meeting at 
Fontainebleau, the EC was making preparations for creating an exchange programme, also in 1984 
the EP had called for closer cooperation between the Member States in the field of education (ibid.). 
In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) did pioneer work with the 
ruling of the so-called ‘Gravier case’ from the 13th February 1985, sentencing that, “The imposition 
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on students who are nationals of the other Member States of a charge, a registration fee or the so-
called 'minervai' as a condition of access to vocational training, where the same fee is not imposed 
on students who are nationals of the host Member State, constitutes discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality contrary to Article 7 of the Treaty” (Judgement of 13. 2. 1985 — Case 293/83, 1985). 
Lastly, the EC during this time was under the Presidency of Jacques Delors and had as a 
Commissioner of Education, Peter Sutherland, who increased the activities in the field of higher 
education and reunited the conditions to officially launch the Erasmus Programme (Feyen, 2013).  
Before the Erasmus Programme, there was the Action Programme in 1976, which can be 
considered the first development towards a higher involvement of the supranational level in 
European education policy (Feyen, 2013). The Action Programme from 1976 had, all in all, the 
following six distinctive scopes divided into twenty-two different actions: (I) Better facilities for the 
education and training of nationals and the children of nationals of the other Member States of the 
Communities and non-member countries; (II) Promotion of closer relations between educational 
systems in Europe; (III) Compilation of the up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; 
(IV) Cooperation in the field of higher education; (V) Teaching of foreign languages; (VI) 
Achievement of equal opportunity for free access to all forms of education (Resolution of the Council 
and of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council of 9 February 1976, comprising an 
action programme in the field of education, 1976). In particular, it was stated in the document of 
the Action Programme, “It is necessary to promote cooperation in the field of higher education.” 
(ibid.: p.3) this led to creation of the Joint Study Programmes (JSP) which aimed at distributing 
grants, “intended to foster the development of cooperation between higher education institutions 
in different Member States.” (Smith, 1985, p. 2). The creation of the JSP can be seen as the 
predecessor of the Erasmus Programme (Feyen, 2013), and was considered a success by the EC, 
“cooperation in higher education within the European Community, a sphere of activity which has 
seen notable successes for the Commission since the introduction of the 1976 Action Programme. 
These successes include the establishment of more than 400 Joint Study Programmes” (Smith, 
1985, p. 0).  
In December 1985 the EC published and adopted its “Proposal for a Council Decision 
adopting the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students 
(Erasmus)” making it ready to begin its journey through the political institutions of the European 
Communities (Feyen, 2013). The EC made it clear from the start the primary goal of Erasmus, 
“The purpose of Erasmus is to stimulate greater mobility of students between universities in the 
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Community.” (Proposal for a Council Decision adopting the European Community Action Scheme 
for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus), 1986, p. 6). While the EP and the Economic and 
Social Committee rallied behind the EC’s proposal, perceiving the benefits of it, the situation was 
different with some Member States; even though they generally supported the implementation of 
the Erasmus Programme, but disagreed on the budget and legal basis of the proposed student 
exchange programme (Feyen, 2013).  
Concerning the legal basis, the EC believed it was sufficient to use article 128 of the Treaty 
of Rome (ibid.) which stated: “The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing 
a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both 
of the national economies and of the common market.” (Treaty of Rome , 1957, p. 45). However, 
some of the Member States required the addition of another article from the Treaty, to create a 
solid legal basis for the Erasmus Programme (Feyen, 2013), “If action by the Community should 
prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly 
[European Parliament], take the appropriate measures.” (Treaty of Rome , 1957, p. 78). The 
fundamental difference was that article 128 required a simple majority to make decisions. Aicle 
235 meant acting unanimously, which would give each Member State more power over the 
development of the Erasmus Programme, including its budget (Feyen, 2013).  
Ten months of negotiations followed, and a proposal was presented to the Ministers of 
Education, who were responsible for achieving a compromise to move forward with the 
implementation and launching of the Erasmus Programme, which they were able to accomplish 
on their meeting in November 1986, adopting both articles 128 and 235, cutting the proposed 
budget (from 175 million to 50 million European Currency Unit) (ibid.). Nevertheless, according to 
Feyen, the EC found itself unsatisfied with this resolution which would make the Erasmus 
Programme a simple network of European universities and it would not be able to reach the goal 
of having as participants 10% of the student population by 1992 (Proposal for a Council Decision 
adopting the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students 
(Erasmus), 1986). Considering this, the Commissioner, Manuel Marín, decided to withdraw the 
proposal as a whole, which led to the public having a negative reaction towards the Ministers’ 
decisions and supporting the EC (Feyen, 2013). With public pressure in December 1986 at the 
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European Council in London the following decision was reached, “The European Council called for 
further consideration of the Erasmus student mobility programme with a view to reaching a decision 
at an early Council.” (London European Council, 1986, p. 10). Moreover, the Association des États 
Généraux des Étudiants de l’Europe (AEGEE) established in 1985 with the purpose to promote 
youth mobility and a European identity1, played an important role during this period, when in 1987 
it was able to persuade the French President, François Mitterrand, to support funding for the 
Erasmus Programme (Asderaki and Maragkos, 2014). Five more months of negotiations followed, 
and a compromise was reached in which both articles 128 and 235 of the Treaty of Rome were 
used as a legal basis of the Erasmus Programme, it was agreed a budget of 85 million ECU for 
three years I.E.  between 1 July 1987 and 30 June 1990 (Smith, Erasmus newsletter)and the 
students grants were included (Feyen, 2013).  
On the 14th of May 1987 in Brussels, the twelve Education Ministers within the Council 
agreed on the adoption of the Erasmus Programme, which was later launched on the 15th of June 
1987 and came into effect on the 1st of July 1987 (Feyen, 2013). The programme, on its initial 
phase, comprehended four different actions: (I) European University Network, which assured grants 
to higher education institutions, to their staff when they were teaching in another Member State 
and also grants to enable teachers and members of university administration to travel to other 
Member States; (II) Student grants, which covered the mobility costs of students who joined the 
Erasmus Programme for a period of three to twelve months (the grants could go to 5000 ECU per 
year); (III) Academic recognition, which meant the establishment of a pilot scheme for the 
recognition of university degrees named European Community Course Credit Transfer System 
(ECTS), and consolidation of the EC Network of National Academic Recognition Information Centres 
(NARIC); (IV) Additional measures, which comprised grants for ‘Intensive Teaching Programmes’, 
for university associations, support for top specialists to give lectures in different Member States, 
publications and more information on studying and teaching in another Member State and finally 
prizes for students and higher education staff members who make exceptional contributions for 
deeper cooperation within the European Communities (Smith, Erasmus newsletter).  
When the negotiations for the implementation of the Erasmus Programme ended, with the 
Education Ministers meeting, the Commission Vice-President Manuel Marín declared, “ERASMUS 
is a programme of hope for the young people of Europe”, marking a moment which was 
considered, “a milestone in the development of the Community as a whole (ibid.: p.1).  
 




1.2 From Socrates to Erasmus+ 
Erasmus meant a great change in the way student international mobility was conducted, 
being an important element of its student exchange on equal terms and mutual trust between 
higher education institutions (Teichler, 2002). By the late 1980s-early 1990s the EU counted with 
eight programmes in education and training listed below (Ertl, 2003): 
1) Arion (1991-92); 
2) Comett (1990-94); 
3) Erasmus (1990-94); 
4) Eurotecnet (1990-94); 
5) Force (1991-94); 
6) Lingua (1990-94); 
7) Petra (1988-92); 
8) Yes (1988-91).  
 
This first generation of programmes had the goal to boost, amongst other things, learning 
prospects and it did this by promoting the exchange of participants, common pilot projects, the 
exchange of information on educational practices and the application of comparative studies (ibid.).  
After the first phase of execution of the Erasmus Programme during the period of 1987 and 
1995, upgraded and broader educational programmes were developed in Europe: Socrates I 
(1995-2000), Socrates II (2000-2007) and Lifelong Learning (2007-2013) (Azevedo Leitão and 
Maria Freitas Valente, 2018). The second generation of programmes was based on a new treaty, 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Article 127 replaced the 128 from the Treaty of Rome, 
which meant that a new legal basis was established for vocational training education (Ertl, 2003). 
In 1995 the programmes Socrates and Leonardo Da Vinci were launched with the ratification of 
TEU and in due course, replaced all the first generation programmes (ibid.). According to Ertl, 
Socrates was introduced based on Article 126 from TEU, and it focused on higher education. Not 
only did they have a new legal framework, but also came with unique characteristics which differed 
them from the previous programmes: there was an emphasis on cooperation in the area of lifelong 
learning and multimedia; one of the priorities was the implementation of a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
with those involved in the programmes; the member States and representatives of social partners 
became more involved in the programmes; the selection process for projected needing funding 
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was done by public tender, and finally the principle of complementary funding was introduced 
(ibidem.). Thus, the programmes' upgraded structure provided a more consistent framework for 
EU activities in the field of education and training and fostered the reform of these fields in pre-
accession countries in central and Eastern Europe (ibidem.). Although these modifications and 
developments were applied it was considered that the programmes had an unsatisfactory impact, 
due to the context in which they were inserted, larger EU countries, such as France and Germany, 
saw themselves as protectors of their education and training systems, whereas smaller EU member 
states, like Portugal and Ireland, used the EU funds to develop and restructure their systems (Sellin, 
1999).  
When it comes to the first version of Socrates, it marked a new chapter in European mobility 
and transborder cooperation of higher education institutions, being implemented in the academic 
year of 1997/98 (Teichler, 2002). With it came a boost on the European dimension in higher 
education and an effort to make non-mobile students benefit from the programme's activities, also 
higher education institutions became responsible for administrating student mobility and 
cooperation through institutional contracts signed with the EC (ibid.). According to Teichler, the 
intention was to achieve an ever-growing student mobility by increasing the responsibility set upon 
higher education institutions, the establishment of bilateral cooperation agreements between 
partner institutions, increasing staff mobility and activities of curricular innovation (this should also 
benefit non-mobile students) and a further spread of the ECTS system.  
Above all, the Socrates programme had as a general objective “to contribute to the 
development of quality education and training and the creation of an open European area for 
cooperation in education” (Decision No 819/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 March 1995 establishing the Community action programme 'Socrates`, p. 3).  
 
Following an initial five-year period between 1995 and 1999, the Socrates and Leonardo 
programmes were prolonged for seven more years with increased funding and expanded actions 
(Ertl, 2003). Although the second phase of these programmes did not come with a radical change, 
both programmes were redesigned based on the deficiencies detected in their first phase (ibid.). 
According to Ertl, these modifications intended to make the Socrates and Leonardo programmes 
more flexible, more straightforward and accessible. These changes in the Socrates and Leonardo 
programmes came with challenging negotiations done between the member States and the EC, 
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the complications found during these talks were due to the public criticism of the management of 
the programmes (ibidem.).  
 
The same author remarks that, between the years of 2000 and 2006 the second stage of 
Socrates was in action, it combined more opportunities in terms of lifelong learning, adult 
education, new ICT and open and distance learning (Socrates II also came with a new set of goals 
for its development, which were to strengthen the European dimension in education in all levels, 
improve knowledge on the languages spoken in Europe, encourage cooperation in mobility in 
education, boost innovation in education and sponsor equal opportunities in all academic areas (In 
addition, the funding for the programme had a considerable increase, from 850 million euros to 
1,850 million euros (Socrates II also counted with the following six action areas (Ertl, 2003). 
1) Comenius: cooperation in school education; 
2) Erasmus: actions for mobility in higher education; 
3) Grundtvig: activities in other educational pathways; 
4) Lingua: promotion of teaching and learning European languages; 
5) Minerva: promotion of ICT in education; 
6) Arion: observation and modernisation of education systems and policies.  
 
The second version of the Leonardo Da Vinci was, as it was its first phase, a programme 
which contributes to the execution of vocational training policy for the EU, being its main priority to 
promote the European dimension and innovation in all stages of vocational training (ibid.). Like 
Socrates II, the second version of Leonardo had among its measures, actions focused on promoting 
mobility and languages skills (ibid.).  
 
It was in 1995 when the EU started playing an important role in lifelong learning, marked by 
the publication in December of the White Paper entitled “Teaching and Learning – Towards the 
Learning Society” (Hake, 1999), being its general aim “to put Europe on the road to the learning 
society” (White Paper on Education and Training, 1995, p. 51). Nevertheless, when the Socrates 
and Leonardo programmes were launched there had been shown some concern with the notion of 
lifelong learning, which was also stimulated by the context Europe was facing with the continuous 
development of the single internal market, high levels of unemployment, the underdevelopment of 
education and training in Europe and the growing competition in the global market (Hake, 1999). 
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Therefore, the policy became gradually focused on the competitive threat from the economies of 
the Pacific Rim and the need of Europe to innovate in terms of knowledge and technology, and this 
issue was pressed in official publications of the EU such as ‘Growth, competitiveness, employment 
- The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century: White paper’ in 1993 in which was stated, 
“All measures must therefore necessarily be based on the concept of developing, generalizing and 
systematizing lifelong learning and continuing training.” (European Commission, 1993, p. 136).  
It is between the years of 2007 and 2013 that the concept of lifelong learning becomes the 
name of the programme in the field of education and training, the successor of Socrates and 
Leonardo, the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP) became the first of its kind to cover learning 
opportunities from childhood to old age (‘Lifelong learning’: a new education and training 
programme to build the Knowledge Society, 2006). It counted with a budget of 7 billion euros to 
support and ensure that its activities were carried out (ibid.). According to the same source, the 
LLP is built on four pillars, which guaranteed the development of projects which promoted 
transnational mobility of individuals, bilateral and multilateral partnerships and quality in education, 
they are the following: 
1) The Comenius with a budget of 1,047 million euros which focused on learning in 
pre-school and school education; 
2) The Erasmus Programme which counted with the budget of 3,114 million euros 
addressing the learning needs in higher education; 
3) The Leonardo Da Vinci programme with a budget of 1,725 million euros which kept 
its engagement in vocational education and training; 
4) The Grundtvig programme with funds of 358 million euros dedicated to adult 
education.  
 
These four sub-programmes were also accompanied by a ‘transversal programme’ 
responsible to ensure policy cooperation and innovation in lifelong learning, promotion of learning 
languages, development of ICT in lifelong learning and finally diffusion of the results of the activities 
support by the LLP (ibid.). The programme proved to be another success story for the EU as it was 
shown in the report, for instance, of the Ministry of Culture and Education of Finland in 2010, 
where it was stated, “The relevance of the implemented LLP projects has, as well, been good, as 
they have promoted both the national policy goals as well as the EU horizontal goals well.” (Puukko, 
Roisko, and Sallinen, 2010, p. 36).  
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In 2017 the Erasmus Programme celebrated its 30th anniversary, welcoming in 2014 its 
newest version, the Erasmus+, its accomplishments were highlighted by the President of the EC, 
Jean-Claude Juncker in such historical date, “Every euro that we invest in Erasmus+ is an 
investment in the future — in the future of a young person and of our European idea. I cannot 
imagine anything more worthy of our investment than these leaders of tomorrow.” (30 years of 
'Erasmus' exchanges abroad: Commission launches mobile application to mark anniversary, 
2017).  
Following the LLP, the Erasmus+ is, then, the EU programme dedicated to the areas of 
education, training, youth and sport for the period between 2014 and 2020, hoping to ensure 
equity, prosperity and social inclusion not only in Europe but also beyond its borders (Erasmus+ 
Programme Guide, 2019). Erasmus+ integrates previous programmes, building upon their 
achievements to develop further on such as the following (ibid.): 
• The Lifelong Learning Programme; 
• The Youth in Action Programme; 




• Programmes of cooperation with industrialised countries in the field of higher 
education. 
 
Even though the goal was to have a strong brand name, easily recognised by many, titles of 
specific Actions were maintained so that former participants can understand better Erasmus+. 
Some examples can be the “Erasmus+ Comenius”, and the “Erasmus+ Leonardo Da Vinci” 
Erasmus+ presents itself with six main goals it hopes to achieve by 2020 (ibid.): 
• The education target of the Europe 2020 strategy; 
• The objectives set on the ET 2020; 
• The sustainable growth of Partner Countries in the field of higher education; 
• The aims set in the framework of European cooperation in the youth field; 
• The goals of the EU work plan for sport; 




According to the same source, to achieve the above objectives, Erasmus+ applies three key 
Actions: The first one focused on the mobility of individuals, learners and staff, the Erasmus 
Mundus Joint Master Degrees and the Master Loans. The second Key Action centred on the 
cooperation for innovation and the exchange of good practices, being responsible for supporting 
the Strategic Partnerships, the Knowledge Alliances, the Capacity-building projects and the IT 
support platforms, such as the eTwinning. The third and final Key Action is in charge of assisting 
policy reform through promoting knowledge in the fields of education, training and youth, initiatives 
for policy innovation, support for European policy tools, cooperation with international organisations 
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and stakeholder 
dialogue, policy and Programme promotion. As stated by the Erasmus Programme Guide of 2019, 
besides these three key actions, Erasmus+ also counts to accomplish its goals with the Jean 
Monnet activities, like the policy debate with the academic world, and actions in the field of sport, 
for instance, the not-for-profit European sports events. Other entities are also involved in the 
implementation of the Erasmus+ programme, such as the Eurydice Network and the EPALE. In 
addition, the programme also has thirty-four programme countries, the EU Member States and 
Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein (EFTA countries), North Macedonia, Turkey and Serbia. There are 
also the partner countries which can take part in specific Actions of the Programme, some of them 
are Albania, Yemen, Tunisia, Brazil and Oman, among many others from all over the world (ibid.).  
Erasmus+ has shown some positive mid-term results analysed by the EC, during the 
academic year of 2012-13, for instance, new records were achieved in terms of participants with 
a total of 268 143 students benefitting from Erasmus grants to go abroad to study and train 
(European Commission, 2014). All in all, Erasmus students increased in almost all countries during 
this academic year, being the highest increases in Malta (40%), Cyprus (36%), Croatia (27%) and 
finally Turkey (22%) (ibid.). Moreover, there was a 16% increase in Erasmus job placements 
(traineeships), this meant that 55 621 out of 268 143 students chose to gain work experience 
abroad either in companies or other organisations connected to their field of study (ibid.). As 
reported an evaluation done by the EC later in 2018, the beneficiaries of Erasmus present 
satisfaction rates above 90%. Also, the outcomes of the programme actions show a European 
added value, according to the EC this is due to, “the high volume and broad scope of the activities 
funded, together with fairer access to learning mobility, mainstreamed best practices, deeper EU 
integration and a clear international dimension” (Mid-term evaluation of the Erasmus+ programme 
(2014-2020), p. 4). Furthermore, the results show coherence between the Erasmus+ and other 
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EU policies, for example, the European Social Fund and the Horizon 2020 Lastly, the programme 
proves itself to be cost-effective, especially learners' mobility (15 euros a day per learner) (ibidem.).  
Since the Erasmus Programme's creationn 1987, 4,4 million higher education students have 
joined, this meant studying in another country, broadening their horizons in an international 
environment and understanding more deeply the EU (Pinto, et al., 2018). Taking part in the 
Erasmus Programme increases the employability of its participants and contributes to making 
Erasmus students more active citizens (ibid.). As Erasmus+ is approaching its end, “The Erasmus 
Generation expects the next programme to live up to its potential and continue catering to the 
needs of young Europeans and Europe” (ibid.: 5). 
 
1.3 From Europe to the world  
In the “#ErasmusUpgrade Manifesto” it is stated that:, “Despite being an EU programme, 
Erasmus is now a concept known worldwide.” (Pinto, et al., 2018, p. 5). This could be deemed to 
the Mundus facet of the programme, being the main aim of Erasmus Mundus: “(…) to promote 
European higher education, to help improve and enhance the career prospects of students and to 
promote intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries, in accordance with 
EU external policy objectives in order to contribute to the sustainable development of third countries 
in the field of higher education.” (European Commission, 2013, p. 5). The Erasmus Mundus 
programme goals are mainly connected with increasing the quality of the EU higher education, 
mobility of individuals and promoting all of this throughout the world, being equity, human rights 
and social justice on the base of the application of the programme (Lloyd, 2013). Moreover, the 
implementation of Erasmus Mundus searches, as an outcome, to challenge and transform 
participants and their respective practices, so the practice-based experience is the core criteria of 
putting the programme into action, which should lead to reflective practice and practice-oriented 
enquiry and additionally to the creation and further development of international networks (ibid.).  
Inserted in the Erasmus+ programme (2014-2020), the Erasmus Mundus has adopted the 
form of ‘Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees’ (EMJMD), having as an additional objective to 
enhance the competences and skills of Master graduates and Joint Masters for the labour market, 
through greater involvement of employers (Erasmus+ Programme Guide, 2019). EMJMD has 
become a high-level integrated international study programme of sixty, ninety or hundred and 
twenty ECTS credits, given by a consortium of Higher Education Institutions from different 
countries, being also participants non-educational partners (ibid.). The unique feature of the joint 
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programmes lies in the high degree of integration of them and their first-rate academic content and 
methodology, and once the programme is completed, the participant is awarded either a joint 
degree or multiple degrees (ibidem.). Furthermore, according to the Erasmus Programme Guide 
of 2019 selected EMJMDs receive high funding levels, which allows them to expand their worldwide 
visibility and have sustainable development.   
According to the Erasmus+ Programme Guide (2019), when it comes to students who intend 
to join the EMJMD, there are additional scholarships for those who come from targeted regions of 
the world, Partner countries of the EU, this extra funding is awarded through some EU external 
funding instruments: 
• Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA); 
• Development Cooperation Instruments (DCI); 
• European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); 
• Partnership instrument (PI); 
• European Development Fund (EDF).  
 
The previously mentioned scholarships are offered to contribute to the fulfilment of the EU 
priorities in terms of the external policy in regard of higher education, the levels of economic and 
social development of the Partner Countries are taken into consideration when awarding them as 
well as the available budget and the ranking of them, which, according to the same source, are as 
it follows:  
• Region 1: Western Balkans; 
• Region 2: Eastern Partnership countries; 
• Region 3: South-Mediterranean countries; 
• Region 6: Asia with a specific scholarship allocation to the Least Developed 
Countries; 
• Region 7: Central Asia with a specific scholarship allocation to the Low and Lower 
Middle-Income Countries; 
• Region 8: Latin America with a specific scholarship allocation to the Low and Lower 
Middle-Income Countries and a maximum allocation to Brazil and Mexico; 
• Region 10: South Africa; 
• Region 11: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; 
• Region 12: Gulf Cooperation countries.  
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• Region 13: Industrialised countries 
• Region 14: Switzerland and Faroe Islands 
 
This facet of the Erasmus Programme also counts with success stories. A study conducted 
by the Erasmus Mundus Association in 2017 reveals that 51.6% of students who joined Erasmus 
Mundus during that year were “mostly satisfied”, also participants admitted that the greatest 
impact of Erasmus Mundus was, firstly, in their international competencies (58.7%), followed by 
career (40.1%) and subject related expertise (33.3%) (Krüger, Klein, Pinkas, Höpfner, and Kuske, 
2017). In addition, the majority of successful job-seekers found a job in one of their three preferred 
job locations (89.2%) and just after six months of graduating (79.3%); also participants felt that 
joining Erasmus Mundus made them feel very well or well prepared for the labour market (66.8%) 
(ibid.). As stated by the same source, when choosing EMJMD, participants' main reasons were the 
scholarship and the possibility to live and study in Europe, followed by the well-regarded reputation 
of it. Overall, through the EMJMD the EU reveals itself to be an “attractive place to work, study and 





The Erasmus Programme and the Spanish youth political participation in a 
changing context 
 
Our Europe is one such island; let us welcome the fact that Greece, Spain and Portugal, with 
traditions as old as our own, have joined the ranks of the free countries. 
The Community will be happy to receive them. Here too, the European dimension should help to 
strengthen that freedom whose value is too often not realized until it has been lost. 
- Simone Veil on the 17th of July 1979 in Strasbourg 
 
2.1 The evolution of Erasmus in Spain 
In May of 1998, the Ministers of Education from France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom met in the University of Sorbonne to kick-start the process which intended to build a 
European Higher Education Area (EHEA), basing their work on the Delors Report from 1996 (Gil, 
Rojas, and Carpio, 2010). Until today, this is still considered one of the most ambitious European 
projects, even with its limitations (ibid.). The intention in building the EHEA was to adapt them to 
Europe's new social reality, denominated knowledge society, in which knowledge is considered the 
most important source of productivity, growth, and social inequalities (Curiel, 2010). Also, there 
was a need to increase the job opportunities for European graduates and to create a competitive 
educational space that would attract students and professors from all over the world (Gil, Rojas, 
and Carpio, 2010).  
In the early 2000s, another of the great initiatives started by the EU in the field of education 
and mobility (Erasmus Programme) showed one of the most significant difficulties facing the EHEA: 
students would travel to foreign universities where they were able to continue their studies and 
lived unique personal experiences, but when they returned to their home university they faced a 
complicated problem, their studies done in another university were not officially recognised (Gil, 
Rojas, and Carpio, 2010). This meant that the further development of the European project, which 
should count on citizens who consciously felt Europeans, had to deeply reform the countries' 
educational systems that were a part of the EHEA (ibid.). On the 19th of June in 1999, the Bologna 
Declaration is signed by twenty-nine countries, becoming the most significant push for European 
universities to take on needed changes which would allow them to fulfil their role as pioneers in 
developing a knowledge society (Curiel, 2010). The Bologna Declaration (1999) was intended to 
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foster cooperation between universities and the flexibility of the educational systems within a 
globalised world.  
 
The Ministers of Education met once more in Prague on the 19th of May 2001, where they 
created a document in which they showcased the actions which would accomplish the goals set in 
the Bologna Declaration (Andrés, 2008/2009) and where they adopted an official definition of the 
concept of lifelong learning (Curiel, 2010). One year later, in Zurich, another meeting took place in 
which the ECTS was given a clearer and precise definition and scope (Andrés, 2008/2009). Also 
in 2002 the summit between heads of State in Barcelona in March there was given great attention 
to the efforts which had to be made to eliminate the obstacles for mobility of students, teachers 
who wished to study, research and innovate (Curiel, 2010); in 2003 in Berlin, with forty ministers 
of Education present, all the aspects, goals and frameworks formerly discussed, such as the ECTS, 
were reinforced (Andrés, 2008/2009). Later on, in the summit of Dublin in 2004, the three cycles 
of higher education studies were defined for all European students: the bachelor, the master and 
finally the doctorate; one year later in Bergen the ministers of Education made official plans and 
adopted the ECTS, the three studying cycles previously mentioned and the methods and criteria 
which would ensure the quality of the EHEA (ibid.).  
The academic year of 2010/2011 was the last date to adopt and adapt to the EHEA officially. 
Until this point, profound changes happened in the universities throughout the countries that 
choose to join (Curiel, 2010). In Spain, this led to intense and long debates and served as an 
opportunity to reform the Spanish universities (Gil, Rojas, and Carpio, 2010). Before the EHEA, 
Spain had a traditional duality in the university system the cycles of three years (diplomaturas) and 
cycles of five years (licenciaturas), the first type of studies had a professional orientation and scope, 
and the second type was seen as a more ‘prestigious’ course of education within the higher 
education level, with the introduction of the framework of readable and comparable degrees this 
way a great step in the further training of former students from diplomaturas (ibid.). As stated by 
the same source, the first cycle of studies was the Bachelor and it has as goal the achievement of 
general and specific knowledge, which should allow the graduate to access the labour market and 
continue professional training; the second one is the Master degree which enables students to 
research and accomplish academic or professional specialization; finally, there is the doctorate 
which did not suffer profound changes as it was before in the Spanish universities, being divided 
into a period of learning and training and another for research.  
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After the full adaptation by the Spanish educational system to the goals set by the Bologna 
Declaration and further developed in what is commonly known as the Bologna Process, universities 
became the entities responsible to propose study plans which are more suited to the needs of new 
students in terms of employability and training, also the Autonomous Communities of Spain have 
now a greater and more decisive role in the distribution of the new cycles of studies as well as their 
application, all under their supervision (Curiel, 2010). This radical transformation faced by the 
Spanish higher education system had four main difficulties, which once they were surpassed it 
meant the full success of the adaptation of the Spanish university model to the new frameworks 
and objectives established by the Bologna Process: structural change, methodological change 
which entailed the development of new mindsets, adaptation to a system based on learning and 
lastly, understanding the ECTS entirely and knowing how to properly apply it in study plans (ibid.).  
In fact, the ECTS focused on the value of the total work of students in universities (i.e. 
theoretical, practical and individual work), this led to changes in the way professors taught, on what 
was expected of students and university administration (Curiel, 2010). The new teaching 
methodologies could be defined as case studies, learning by problem-solving, project creation and 
teamwork/co-work (Andrés, 2008/2009). As far as the Spanish universities are concerned, by 
joining the EHEA a new set of strategies were implemented, such as the program-contract; the 
innovation projects for professors; the programmes for training and support in the area of teaching; 
seminars for new incoming professors or for learning new teaching methodologies; and crash 
courses to learn how to use technological devices and tools in university classes - all of these 
actions helped to stimulate a new generation of professors (ibid.). As a matter of fact, the Bologna 
Process is responsible for having opened a debate, which still goes on today, about teaching 
methods (ibid.). Furthermore, the vision that came with the Bologna Declaration meant a new 
perception within higher education systems, and the curricular structure became based on the 
development of competencies which would allow students to face the challenges of the new society 
they were inserted in (Curiel, 2010). There were now two types of competencies: general, which 
are common to all university courses, and specific, which enable the student to practice a certain 
profession (ibid.).  
The Bologna Process and the EHEA generated a debate amongst Spanish university 
students. Even though they viewed both positively, in March 2008 student’s protests were 
organised all over the country to go against the Bologna Process, intensifying in April and May with 
the occupation of some university buildings (Elias, 2010). The Spanish newspaper El País reported 
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on the 13th of November of that year on one of the protests that happened in Madrid, in which the 
union leader of students during that time, described some of the reasons for thousands of students 
being on the streets, “We are here to defend public education, so it is not privatised, because that 
is what they are doing in all the cycles: Kindergarten, high school, professional training and 
university. The Bologna Plan will lead to the privatisation of the higher education system”2 (El País 
- agencias, 2008). Throughout time, the criticism of Spanish students towards the EHEA and the 
Bologna Process became clearer and amongst them the following points should be stressed (Elias, 
2010):  
1) The European funds will not be enough for universities which will inevitably lead 
them to seek private funding, from companies for instance, and this will mean the 
end of education as a public service and as an independent area; 
2) The bachelor degree and its general character will require students to achieve 
specialization on their field through the master’s degree, and not all students will 
have the financial capacity to do so; also some will choose not to enrol in a master 
due to the concerns in entering later the labour market; 
3) The Bologna Process privileges economic factors; 
4) Absence of student participation in the Bologna Process; 
5) Increase in the workload of students because of the ECTS and the new model of 
teaching focused on the students.  
 
However, there were also noticed advantages that came with the execution of the Bologna 
Process in Spain, such as the increase of student mobility; the support and expansion of language 
learning; the final grade of students became a product of continuous work; the facilitation of the 
access to the labour market; the credentials with which students conclude their studies in Europe 
became more similar which lead to the growth of international mobility and of job offers; lastly 
university education focus on better preparing students for the labour market (González-Serrano, 
2011). Still, there are specific characteristics of the Spanish higher education system that 
worsened with the Bologna Process, for instance, the assessments’ quality decreased, the 
classrooms did not change to fit the new teaching methodologies; additionally students still spend 
 
2 Original version, “En defensa de la educación pública, para que no se privatice, porque es lo que se están haciendo en todas las etapas: Infantil, 
Secundaria, Formación Profesional y Universidad. El Plan Bolonia implicará la privatización de la universidad” Source: Miles de estudiantes salen 
a la calle contra el Plan Bolonia, 2008, El País  
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many hours in the universities which does not allow them to fully accomplish the goals that came 
with the ECTS (Elias, 2010).  
When it comes to international mobility, one of the priorities of the Bologna Process, Europe 
reveals itself to be a great case of international experience, where the social relations of individuals 
transcend national borders (Raffini, 2014). Indeed, international mobility is considered an 
important instrument in the building of European society since nowadays, it is not limited to only a 
few (ibid.). According to Raffini, mobility is regarded as an instrument of Europeanization from 
down to top (horizontal Europeanization); this is accompanied by a Europeanization by institutional 
tools (vertical Europeanization). It is in this context that the Erasmus Programme distinguishes 
itself by being an initiative by the EU, which combines both types of Europeanization, vertical and 
horizontal, since the young people who join it not only identify themselves with Europe but also 
have built social relations that transcend national borders (ibid.). Therefore, the Erasmus 
Programme is inserted in the general European context of free movement, being the right of 
university students to conduct their studies in another Member State supervised by the Directive 
90/366/EEC (Reche, 1998).  
Contemporary to the Bologna Process, there was the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) which 
was agreed by the European Council, being this the first time that a direct call was made to develop 
and modernise the education systems throughout the EU by one of its highest bodies (Pépin, 
2007). In the Lisbon Strategy, EU leaders recognised that the future of the economic prosperity of 
the EU and social development lied extensively on lifelong learning. Hence, investments in 
education and training had to be made. To accomplish this, three strategic goals were set: assuring 
quality and efficiency in the education and training systems, access to education to all and 
openness to the world (ibid.).   
Erasmus in this period was a sub-programme in the Lifelong Learning Programme. Being 
considered the most emblematic and popular one, it gave origin to the latest version of the EU 
programme on education, training, youth and sports, entitled Erasmus+ (2014-2020) (López and 
Martos, 2014). The Erasmus Programme had had a steady evolution, when it was launched in 
1987 to 1990, 32.614 students joined from eleven countries, among them Spain, by 1995, 
251.683 students had participated. At the beginning of the new century the programme counted 
with 455.782 students (Socrates I), and by the academic year of 2006/2007, almost one million 
students had joined the then called Socrates II Programme (943.849 students) (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2010).  
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In its most recent version, Erasmus+ has allowed nine million people to study, train, 
volunteer and acquire professional experience abroad (De Erasmus a Erasmus+: treinta años de 
historia, 2017). This positive evolution and success could be traced to some characteristics of the 
mobility programme, such as the its broad and flexible concept, the management based on trust 
on the institutions and the Erasmus coordinators, as well as giving the universities great 
independence in managing it (Sánchez, 2015). Furthermore, ECTS ensures that once the 
programme is completed the studies conducted should be recognised, more Erasmus is based 
upon an active dialogue and relation between professors and pupils, as well as the support is given 
from the university coordinators to international students (ibid.).  
The Erasmus+ was developed within the strategy of ‘Europe 2020’ which created a forum 
on European cooperation in education and training (“ET 2020”) that has four common EU goals 
(European Policy Cooperation (ET2020 framework)):  
1) Turn lifelong learning and mobility into a reality; 
2) Working on the improvement of the quality of education and training systems; 
3) Promote equity, social cohesion, and active citizenship; 
4) Boost creativity and innovation in all education and training levels, together with 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Taking the above objectives into consideration, from 2013 on specific recommendations 
were made to Spain to achieve the vision set for the EU and tackle the post-crisis consequences 
(ibid.). The 2013 NRP also highlights the importance of a swift implementation of the reform of the 
educational system and improving the overall quality of education and training.” (European 
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Spain’s 2013 national reform 
programme and delivering a Council opinion on Spain’s stability programme for 2012-2016 
{SWD(2013) 359 final}, 2013, p. 5). One of the main targets set by the strategy ‘Europe 2020’ 
was to reduce the early leavers (18 to 24 years old) from education and training below 10% 
(European Policy Cooperation (ET2020 framework), 2019). The evolution of this trend can be seen 
in the following graphic published by Eurostat, which shows that it has had a steady decrease since 
the year of 2002, being close to the goal set (Eurostat, 2018): 
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In the Spanish case, the early school leavers from education and training kept being in 2018 
above the EU average and so reducing this phenomenon was present in one of three final 
recommendations by the EC, even though it has been lowered in the last decade, “Reduce early 
school leaving and regional disparities in educational outcomes, in particular by better supporting 
students and teachers.” (European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation 
on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the 2018 
Stability Programme of Spain, 2018, p. 8). According to Eurostat, Spain had in 2018 the highest 
rate of early school leaving in the EU counted at 17.9%, being the EU average at that time of 10.6% 
(Eurostat, 2019). Looking specifically at higher education, Spain has had a high early dropout rate, 
with 21.8% of students leaving during their first year of bachelor’s programme and 8.3% changing 
their degrees, also only 34.9% graduate in the programmed length of a bachelor’s degree (four 
years) (Education and Training Monitor 2018 Spain, 2018). Additionally, less than 10% of Spanish 
higher education graduates have joined mobility programmes abroad (ibid.).  
Figure 1 Early leavers from education and training, EU-28, 2002-2007, source: Eurostat 
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While only 7.6% of higher education students joined international mobility programmes such 
as Erasmus (Education and Training Monitor 2018 Spain, 2018), the evolution of the students who 
have participated specifically in this programme has been overall stable and positive can be noted 
on Figure 2. Nevertheless, there have been some academic years in which there was a decrease, 
such as from 2008/2009 to 2009/2010 and from 2012/2013 to 2013/2014, this could be 
explained by the financial and economic crisis which affected mainly the lower-middle-class from 
where a significant amount of Erasmus students come from; also there was distrust on the actions 
of the former Minister of Education, Culture and Sport, José Ignacio Wert (from 2011 to 2015, 
when the Minister resigned) (Sánchez, 2015), which, amongst other things, provoked student 
strikes in Spain with adhesion of 90% according to the newspaper El País (El Sindicato de 
Estudiantes amenaza con huelga indefinida si Wert no se va, 2013). Moreover, there was a 
reduction on grants and changes on the access and participation of the Erasmus Programme 
(Sánchez, 2015).  
 
Looking over where all most outgoing students choose to do their Erasmus, since the 
academic year of 2004/2005, Italy has been the most popular destination, followed by France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom; also most incoming Erasmus students Spain received came 
from the same countries mentioned before (Erasmus statistics, 2004-2017). Andalucía, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Madrid and Cataluña are some of the regions that concentrate most 
incoming and outgoing Erasmus students (65% between 1995 and 2006), it is also where there 
Figure 2 Erasmus students & trainees: Spanish case, source: Erasmus statistics by the European Commission 
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can be found the biggest university systems in the country (López, Esparrells, and García, 2009). 
Spanish regions have taken on a role to help financially the students who decide to study abroad, 
and every region has different criteria and methods to do this, some award grants based on 
academic merit, others based the amount on being given on the country of destination (ibid.). Aa 
stated by the same source, the most internationally active higher education institutions in Spain 
are usually the ones located in regions with a higher income per capita, recently established, and 
public or private universities.  
The flows of Erasmus students from and to Spain could be explained by the difference 
between receiving and sending country when it comes to the quality and cost of living and the 
cultural bonds, which might exist (López and Martos, 2014). Furthermore, warmer climates and 
cultural traditions that are more well-known internationally could pose as more attractive when 
students decide which universities they will apply, though the language spoken reveals itself to be 
a factor with weight when deciding (ibid.). Moreover, Spanish universities have been investing in 
their internationalisation, which entailed signing dynamic international conventions that lead to 
more support for outgoing students and increasing Spanish universities' worldwide attractiveness 
(Valle and Garrido, Movilidad de estudandiantes universitarios: es España atractivo para los 
estudiantes Erasmus?, 2009). All these factors could clarify why Spain is a popular Erasmus 
destination (López and Martos, 2014), occupying the first place in 2017 as the country which 
received more Erasmus students in the sector of higher education, a total of 48,595, this also 
came with an increase in financing and grants (España consolida su liderazgo en el programa 
europeo Erasmus+, 2019). Spain proves itself to be an “importer” country for the Erasmus 
Programme (Valle and Garrido, La asimetría en los flujos de movilidad , 2009).   
There could be considered several reasons why Spanish students choose in the first place 
to partake on mobility programmes, like Erasmus, being personal motives the ones that are more 
relevant for them; students search for new experiences, personal growth, and independence 
(Herrero, Andrés, and Pons, 2008). Specifically, Erasmus students ally these personal reasons to 
professional and academic ones, connected to improving and learning a different language and 
hoping to increase their probabilities to enter the labour market; also a third motive is the desire 
to travel, followed by the hope in obtaining positive references and finally the assurance of financial 
help during the mobility time (ibid.). There are factors that directly influence student opportunities 
in joining mobility programmes, such as their parents’ work situation, the better it is than there are 
increasing probabilities for a student going abroad (Ariño, Soler, and Llopis, 2014). Indeed, 
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economic determinants have a considerable influence for international student mobility, and they 
condition the destination based on the grant they receive, one of the worries for students is to find 
it hard to live with the income they receive (ibidem.). According to the same authors, even though 
there are also language determinants, they do not refrain students from participating in mobility 
programmes, but they can increase the international experience, reducing obstacles that might be 
felt.  
Considering now, the overall satisfaction outgoing Spanish students feel in relation to their 
Erasmus period, the motives which could explain it are academic environment and appraisal, the 
personal appraisal and the European integration perception (Urquía-Grande and Campo, 2016). 
Students coming from Central European countries3 students perceive a high academic 
environment, which could be explained by the effort the universities in this area have made to 
receive foreign students, such as creating international degrees and teaching in English (ibid.). In 
general, students who go abroad develop skills to study and work in culturally diverse and different 
environments, feeling more international and European, also they increase their opportunities to 
enter a European common labour market (ibid.). Throughout their university path, the decision and 
intention to join international mobility programmes tends to appear in students before even taking 
the decision to join a specific programme, as Erasmus+ or Erasmus Mundus (Ariño, Soler, and 
Llopis, 2014). When looking at Erasmus students and not just Spanish ones specifically, mobile 
and future mobile students feel more cosmopolitan and European than the non-mobile ones, also 
these same students are better informed about the EU and show more interest in international and 
European politics (Fellinger, Escrivá, Kalantzi, Oborune, and Stasiukaityte, 2013).  
As the most recent version of the Erasmus Programme approaches its end, the Minister for 
Science, Innovation and Universities of Spain, Pedro Duque, announced in 2018 additional eleven 
million euros of investment in Erasmus+ so that the country reaches the record sum of 217 million 
euros for a programme which, according to the Minister, promotes the international dimension of 
Spanish education (Rubio, 2018). Furthermore, for the next edition of the Erasmus Programme 
(from 2021 to 2027), the Ministry for Science, Innovation and Universities to support the EHEA 
has announced the financial initiative of thirty million euros. Thus, the Deputy Secretary for Science, 
Innovation and Universities, Pablo Martín González, recognised the success of the Erasmus 
 
3 Composed by Slovenia, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland. Source: Regions of the European Union, A statistical portrait 
— 2009 edition, 2008, Eurostat Statistical books 
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Programme in Spain and in the EU during the ‘Day for the Promotion of Erasmus+”, by identifying 
the inclusiveness of the exchange programme and its promotion of European values.  
While Erasmus took over a greater role in education, the context post-2008 crisis presented 
a ‘risk society’ with a volatile labour market. Facing this challenging scenario, the youth felt unheard 
by its democratic representatives, and this led many to choose non-institutionalized forms of 
political participation and to low levels of youth turnout (Sloam, 2014).  
 
2.2 Spanish youth political participation in an ever-changing context 
From the end of the dictatorship in 1975, Spain has gone into a deep transformation (Golsch, 
2003). The economy was open to international competition, industries were modernised, and the 
labour market was reformed due to the educational expansion the increase in female participation 
in the labour force (ibid.) However, between 1975 and 1985, Spain suffered from a severe crisis, 
which provoked a high unemployment rate that mostly affected the youth and female workers 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, later, in the 1990s until 2007 Spain had incredible economic growth, 
reversing the previously mentioned state, even with a recession in the start of the 1990s, which 
caused high public deficits (Élteto, 2011). Spain has always had a considerably high unemployment 
rate, which decreased during this period to a percentage below ten, even with a migrant’s inflow 
into the country, reaching in 2010 12.2% of the population (ibid.). This economic growth was based 
on an enormous housing boom, a sector that became oversized and led to the increasing 
importance of low capital human sectors, which ultimately transformed the Spanish economy's 
production outlines (Corujo, 2014). During this period, houses were built in great numbers, and 
big projects were taken in, and in 2003 the government liberalised the use of constructible land, 
increasing its value considerably (Élteto, 2011). The development of this ‘construction bubble’ was 
supported by bank loans, which became cheap, mostly due to Spain's joining to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) an event responsible for declining interest rates (ibid.).  
Furthermore, also during this time, specifically in 2007 the deficit of Spain reached ten per 
cent of the GDP, mostly a consequence of trade deficit and the lack of factors to compensate it 
(ibid.); when the crisis stroke Spain the fiscal deficit became unsustainable, a countercyclical 
stance of fiscal policy and coordinate management of budgetary and monetary policies (Ferreiro, 
Gómez, and Serrano, 2013). The previously described ‘Golden Decade’ of the Spanish economy 
reached an end with the international financial crisis, and previous positive trends were reversed 
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(Élteto, 2011). The slowdown that followed brought on an increase in unemployment, only in the 
construction sector and all related areas (Corujo, 2014).  
First of all, the debt that afflicted the country was not the sovereign one, but one of the 
households and non-financial corporations, this provoked high levels of external indebtedness (Neal 
and García-Iglesias, 2013). Thus, to mitigate the damaging effects of the crisis that erupted in 
2008, public finances were used for this purpose; consequently, the budget deficit increased 
exponentially, from 4.2% of GDP in 2008 to 11% in 2009 (Élteto, 2011). As a result, the government 
had to change its fiscal policy in 2010, at the same time, international markets lost their confidence 
in Spain and other Southern European countries (ibid.). As stated by Élteto, austerity packages had 
to be implemented as well as a labour market reform, which led to a general strike in September 
2010; this was also the year in which agreements had to be struck to save Spanish banks, with 
funds counting to nine billion Euros. The government lead by Zapatero had to also respond to high 
the unemployment rate; his administration attempted to conclude agreements with trade unions 
and employer’s organisations so that measures to fight the effects of the crisis would be applied 
by all (Corujo, 2014). However, the compromise between these institutions was not reached, since 
the Minister of Labour and Immigration had very little influence to reach a deal amongst all the 
parts involved (ibid.). In the start of the crisis, the Spanish labour market could be characterised 
by internal flexibility so that employees would be maintained, and adjustment costs would be 
lowered (ibid.). As stated by Corujo, between 2010 and 2011, the government introduced the 
second stage of labour reform, pressured by the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
since during that period over 20% of the population was unemployed, so the urgency for a solution 
also came from the population.  
In fact, it is in May 2011 that a social movement known as 15-M erupted in Spain, which 
protested the political elites, the economic situation and how Spanish democracy operated (Puig, 
2011). In general, the lack of ability to be employed and afford housing created a culture of 
indignation (Cameron, 2014). The movement, inspired by the piece entitled ‘Indignez-vous!’ (2010) 
by the French diplomat, Stéphane Hessel, was successful in exposing the complicity between 
politics and the bank system and challenging institutional politics (ibid.). The movement was able 
to unite a big heterogenous group of people, due to the excellent communication and organisation 
of it, based on the spread of information on the web (Puig, 2011). This excellent share of 
information and the ‘snow-ball effect’ it provoked, made the movement extend from Madrid to 
many Spanish cities (ibid.). The Spanish newspaper ‘El País’ reported in August 2011 a news 
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article highlighting the high support citizens gave to 15-M and some of their perspectives on it, “On 
the other hand, from the percentage of people who know about the movement, 76% considers that 
“their claims are more than reasonable, and they have the democratic right to fight for them.”4 (El 
País, 2011). 
Indeed, several groups of workers were affected by the employment crisis which undertook 
Spain, amongst them were those with temporary contracts; young workers who had this type of 
contracts and those who were newcomers in the labour market; immigrants who tended to have 
this temporary working status and to work for the construction sector which was deeply affected 
by the eruption of the crisis; those with lower qualification which in general worked for the 
construction sector and are less competitive in a labour market with excess in supply (Llorente and 
Pérez, 2011). Faced with this context of high unemployment the government of that time extended 
unemployment benefits to protect workers; this went together with the common intense intra-family 
transfers and a certain level of employability, despite the crisis (ibid.).  
Focusing now on the reaction of youth to the crisis that started in 2008, the NEET appeared 
(“Not in education, employment or training”), by 2011 20% of Spanish citizens between the ages 
of 15 and 29 belonged to it, even those with a higher education increased their numbers in this 
generational group by 69% (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). Furthermore, school-to-work 
transitions are often indirect through unemployment, leading to great job insecurity; also, the youth 
tends to have precarious work, increasing the risk of unemployment (Golsch, 2003). Youth 
unemployment rates in the EU are generally higher than the adult ones, but they were even higher 
due to the crisis, reaching 23.5% in 2013 (Ghoshray, Ordóñez, and Sala, 2016). Nevertheless, as 
(adult) unemployment, youth unemployment responds to the following drivers: business cycles, 
institutional setup, and characteristics of the labour market (ibid.). According to the same source, 
this is because youth joins sensitive industries and medium-small size enterprises; also, when they 
begin their career, they have low human capital, which makes their productivity inferior; finally, the 
features of the institutional framework, such as temporary jobs and unionization shape the 
navigation of youth in the labour market. Over the last two decades, the rise of unemployment 
youth rates has been concentrated in less-educated individuals but has also affected higher 
educated ones; indeed the effects produced by education attainment on the employment rate are 
not large (Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno, 2000). Furthermore, there is a downgrading in the 
 
4 Original version, “Por otro lado, del porcentaje de personas que afirma saber del movimiento, el 76% considera que "sus reivindicaciones son 
más que razonables y que tienen el derecho democrático de luchar por ellas”. Source: Hasta 8,5 millones de españoles apoyan el Movimiento 
15-M, 2011, El País 
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entry-jobs5 market, affecting workers from ages 16 to 27 years old, there is also a slowing-down in 
the going back to schooling. According to the same source, the training provided by firms is 
relatively low, decreasing future opportunities for young workers.  
Youth unemployment is “embedded in a multidimensional and extremely complex field of 
social and mental interactions” (Dietrich, 2012, p. 8). Throughout Europe, disconnected youth, a 
concept related to the beforehand mentioned NEET, tend to lack employment and networks to 
support the emotional and financial support; also unemployment generates more of it and creates 
career complexities over the life course of individuals (ibid.). Financial worries and lack of social 
support are associated with mental health, even though job centres tend not to be prepared to 
identify psychotic behaviour or personality disorders (ibid.). This phenomenon has been considered 
one of the main malfunctions of the Spanish economy, being education one of the factors that have 
shaped it in time (García, 2011). Spain has had an early high school leaving rate6 in the last two 
decades, and this complicates the transition from education to the labour market, because of lack 
of knowledge and most of the times, little training, the repercussions of this have been strongly felt 
during the so-called Great Recession (ibid.). A stated by García, much of the training that has taken 
place focused on those who joined the university, which creates an imbalance at the different levels 
of education and even creates a drop on the education wage premium. Moreover, and partially 
connected to the economic conditions described, late leaving from the family home has been a 
feature of Spain’s society since the 1980s (Mínguez, 2016). The crisis was responsible for 
changing the relation of Spanish youth with housing arrangements, from then on, they have 
preferred renting instead of ownership since residential emancipation makes it easier to find a job 
and families have fewer means to sustain youngsters in the ‘wait period’ for a permanent job (ibid.).  
There are other trends which affected and changed Spain throughout time; such is the case 
of migration; during the 20th century, the country was characterised by emigration (Izquierdo, 
Jimeno, and Lacuesta, 2015). In the start of the century, there were high outflows to Latin America, 
mainly Argentina, this was due to the free movement laws enacted by Spain and growing 
population, this came to an end with the First World War, the global crisis of the 1930s and finally 
with the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) (ibid.). Until 1989 emigration remained consistent, except 
with a small break in the mid-1960s with Spain's first economic growth (ibid.). By the mid-1980s 
there was a substantial rise in immigration; most immigrants came from Europe and South America 
 
5 According to Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno (2000), “the type of jobs that youth workers take after completing a given educational level and which 
are supposed to provide training and promotion possibilities in the future” (Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno, 2000, p. 947)  
6 According to Gracía (2011), “the percentage of the population between 18 and 24 that has not completed higher secondary education and that is 
not participating in any kind of training.” (García, 2011, p. 4) 
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and by the end of the decade immigration from Africa increased considerably (Bover and Velilla, 
1999). The destinations where they chose to establish themselves were mainly Madrid and 
Catalonia, followed by Valencia and Andalusia (ibid.). Also, during this period and in the early 1990s 
it was registered a return migration, this means that Spaniards who were born in Spain were 
coming back to their home country (Izquierdo, Jimeno, and Lacuesta, 2015).  
Between 1995 and 2007 the Spanish economy grew rapidly, as it was described before, 
one of the two fundamental factors that contributed to this was the demographic growth caused by 
the arrival of immigrants (Domínguez-Mujica, Guerra-Talavera, and Parreño-Castellano, 2014). This 
also caused a quick transformation of Spanish society in terms of national, ethnic and religious 
diversity (López-Sala, 2013). The positive economic context shaped immigration in Spain, for many 
that went there were looking for work, which they found in tourism, services, intensive agriculture, 
and construction (ibid.). For quite some time, Spain became the most important destination in 
Europe in absolute terms (ibid.). However, it should be noted that also during this time, illegal 
immigration was stimulated by the creation of non-skilled and informal jobs (Domínguez-Mujica, 
Guerra-Talavera, and Parreño-Castellano, 2014). In economic terms, immigration contributed to 
Spain’s GDP by 7% between 1996 and 2000, and 40% from 2001 and 2006 (ibid.). 
Furthermore, Spain recovered its population growth thanks to the inflow of migrants and 
Spanish women who entered in force in the labour market, which lead to the externalisation of 
domestic activities to, very often, foreign workers (ibid.). However, the ‘Great Recession’ ended this 
astonishing migration cycle in Spain; in the first years of the crisis, new laws were applied to restrict 
migrants’ entrance and sponsor returns, amongst other actions (Pérez, 2014). In fact, the crisis 
was responsible for destabilising the integration process of migrants, who had a higher rate of 
unemployment than natives (36% more in the fourth trimester of 2013), leading to more precarious 
homes and a reduction of inflows to Spain (ibid.). Faced with tough conditions in Spain, many 
migrants decide to bet once more in transitional relocation, 88% of Latin Americans returned to 
their home countries, others chose to go to another European country or the United States of 
America (USA) (ibid.). Still, there were important initiatives to support resident migrants in the 
Spanish labour market, such as unemployment benefits and sponsoring geographical and sectorial 
mobility, so they could work in different parts of the country and change more easily their economic 
activity (López-Sala, 2013). In 2011, faced with a challenging economic climate, the government 
approved the ‘Aliens Law’, which included modifications in the regulation of how foreign workers 
entered the Spanish labour market (ibid.).  
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In addition, few immigrants took advantage of the voluntary return programmes that were 
established, since their countries of origin had inacceptable living conditions and the benefits 
contemplated in the ‘Spanish Voluntary Return Programme’ were not enough to convince resident 
migrants to leave Spain (Domínguez-Mujica, Guerra-Talavera, and Parreño-Castellano, 2014). 
There was also a drop in irregular migration arriving by sea or intercepted at the border or at airport 
control points with the crisis. This was caused mostly because of the impoverishment of those 
already established in Spain, who could not offer them support (ibid.). Furthermore, maritime 
controls in the Atlantic have increased, and repatriation agreements were signed with twenty-nine 
countries, these were tools to discourage attempts of arriving in Spain by sea (ibid.). All in all, the 
policies of austerity, the cuts in social benefits and the growing tendencies towards an unequal 
society, leads to a more precarious situation of migrants which can provoke ethnic tensions that 
may test the democratic pillars of Spanish society (Pérez, 2014).  
It is also pertinent to mention that since the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001 
there has been an ongoing effort to fight terrorism in the international political agenda; even though 
Spain had been for some years struggling with the Basque terrorist group ETA (Woodworth, 2004). 
ETA began with a nationalist youth group of the Basque National Party (PNV), responsible for 
publishing a bulletin named EKIN; thus ETA had its origin as a faction within this political party 
(Barros, 2003). It is on the 31st of July 1959 that this faction abandoned PNV and formed ETA 
(Basque Homeland and Liberty), their first military action came in 1961 with an unsuccessful 
attempt to disrupt a train where civil war veterans were on board, from this moment on ETA 
continued their terrorist activity (ibid.). As a response to the actions of the terrorist group, the 
Spanish government established the GAL (‘Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación’) which operated 
between 1983 and 1987 (Woodworth, 2004).  
Considering the electoral impact of ETA’s activity, the support for their actions declined 
considerably in the 2001 Basque elections; these ballot results were a political statement against 
the killings carried out by ETA and their overall strategy to achieve independence (Moreno, 2004). 
Moreover, with the attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda on March 11th in 2004 in Madrid and the 
outrage and shock that followed, ETA has kept a low profile by suffering quite a setback with arrests 
of some of its leaders by the French police on October 2004 (ibid.).  
 During the 1980s the terrorist activity was perpetrated by non-residents, but this changed 
in the following decade when Jihadist networks emerged directly in Spain (Jordan and Horsburgh, 
2005). Nevertheless, the attack on the 11th of March 2004 on Madrid’s trains, signified an 
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unprecedented act in Spain and even Europe (ibidem.). These attacks came three days before the 
elections, generating a frenzy in the media and destabilising Spanish society and political 
leadership (Bali, 2007).  
Before this happened, the Aznar government had supported military intervention in Iraq by 
the USA in the aftermath of 9/11, as a way to get support for his own effort against ETA; thus 
thousands of Spanish citizens went to streets in 2003 to display their opposition towards the war 
(Torcal and Rico, 2004). In this political context, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(PSOE), Rodríguez Zapatero, emerged, promising to change the course of Spain’s foreign policy 
(ibid.). Nonetheless, during the campaign of March 2004, nobody questioned the upcoming victory 
of PP, now being led by Mariano Rajoy instead of José María Aznar (ibid.). The campaign managed 
by PP highlighted the government's economic achievements, but ETA terrorism and the territorial 
issue of Catalonia were taken as a priority of debate (ibid.). On the aftermath of the traumatic M-
11 terrorist attacks, public outrage was felt immediately, through public demonstrations across the 
country the day after and concerns with terrorism rising significantly (Bali, 2007). In an unexpected 
turn, Zapatero's PSOE party won the elections with 42.6% of the votes. The popular explanations 
that quickly followed were that voters were unhappy with Spain's participation in Iraq, frustration 
on the way the government dealt with the investigation of the M-11 attacks and the increase in 
turnout which gave space for the expression of discontent (ibid.).  
Even though the Madrid bombings generated a heated public debate, it is difficult to evaluate 
if they would not have happened, if the Socialist Party would have won or not the March elections 
(Montalvo, 2011). In fact, before the M-11 attacks, the polls pointed to a ‘technical tie’ between 
PSOE and PP; also the direction that the vote took could be interpreted as an evaluation of the 
government’s action in the previous four years (Lago and Montero, 2006). Younger and less 
educated voters were more likely to have been influenced by the dramatic events in Madrid and 
those placed in the middle and left of the ideological spectrum (Bali, 2007). All in all, “the vote 
became the decisive instrument used by citizens to control and, in this case, punish the 
government.” (Lago and Montero, 2006, p. 24).  
Additionally, to what has been explored previously, voters' behaviour throughout time in 
national and European elections should be taken into consideration to fully understand the social, 
political and economic context in Spain in the last years and youth political behaviour choices. 
Spain belongs to the so-called ‘third wave’ of worldwide democratization, joining the trend in 1975, 
and after holding its first democratic elections, an EP election soon followed (Freire and Teperoglou, 
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2007). Firstly, what happens in the domestic arena, for instance, a party losing votes, shapes what 
happens in other power levels, like the European one (ibid.). Moreover, the indifference felt in the 
EP elections has had a minor effect in national politics and the European arena, since 
Euroscepticism has reduced levels of expression within EU institutions (ibid.). Furthermore, 
economic integration within EU Member-States has shaped voting choices, and EP election results 
have even become markers regarding electoral prospects of national governing parties; thus the 
EP elections have the potential to create a new electoral cleavage (Gabel, 2000). Nevertheless, 
parties have proven to be less able to represent their voters, and this became even more acute 
after the start of the crisis of 2008, in which government parties had to satisfy voters’ demands, 
EU partners, EU institutions and international financial organizations, such as the IMF (Bosco and 
Verney, 2012).  
The disruption in the political scene on the aftermath of the crisis made the PP the dominant 
party in Spain by the end of 2011, and even the United Left saw its electoral strength increase as 
well as growing support of regional nationalist parties, mainly in the Basque Country and Catalonia 
(Bosco and Verney, 2012). It is also during this period that the Indignados movement rose in Spain, 
but its impact was more substantial on the public agenda than on the electoral results, not being 
very representative of Spanish youth in general (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012). One of the 
reasons that made Zapatero an unpopular figure on the campaign period as well in Spanish’s 
citizens' imagery, was the fact that his administration denied the seriousness of the crisis in 2008; 
so the vote of May 2011 was used to punish the incumbent government (ibid.). These specific 
economic ingredients were also fundamental for the appearance of emerging parties in Spanish’s 
political scene in the general election of 2015; such were the case of Podemos and Ciudadanos, 
which became alternatives to PSOE and PP, respectively (Bosch and Durán, 2019). However, 
certain political issues also played a role for voters choosing emerging parties, such as corruption 
and ideological beliefs (ibid.). This new situation may bring further fragmentation into the Spanish 
party system, which can complicate governability (ibid.) Recently Spain faced political instability 
which made the country’s position in the ‘Good government index’ drop, according to ‘El País’ this 
could be attributed to, “the crisis in Catalonia, where an independence movement has divided the 
region, and to the repeat elections in 2016.” (González, 2019). Moreover, the leader of PSOE, 
Pedro Sánchez, failed to win the investiture bid in Parliament as prime minister after the general 
election in April 2019, being also unable to form a coalition government with Podemos and the 
United Left (González, Ahrens, and Díez, 2019).  
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Due to the recession, as was mentioned before, there have been high unemployment rates, 
which mostly affected middle class Spaniards who either lost their job or saw a considerable 
reduction of their income, this created a climate of indignation (Indignados movement) simply 
because of the corruption in politics and the financial system (Zarzalejos, 2016). This proved to be 
an ideal scenario for populism to navigate Spain by spreading simple solutions for complex 
problems without showing if these resolutions were effective or not, all by using social media as a 
powerful tool (ibid.). However, the success of populist parties could also be attributed to the fact 
that traditional and established parties have been incapable of finding consensus in European 
societies or reducing the generation gap which has been dividing politics, “commitment to 
traditional parties is all but unknown among younger generations” (ibid.:188). It is in this context 
that a new radical left party appeared in Spanish’s political scene in January 2014, Podemos, 
which aimed to join the EP elections in May of that year (Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). This party 
was promoted by a group of university lecturers and activists based in Madrid, who took the 
opportunity presented by the economic and political crisis to create a big socio-political change, 
which was not being achieved by the established left-wing actors (ibid.). At the core of Podemos’ 
discourse is the antagonism between the social majority and the privileged minority, defending that 
‘el pueblo’ was excluded from democracy, which had been hijacked by the elites (Kioupkiolis, 
2016). The goal of the party, led by the charismatic figure of Pablo Iglesias, is “to achieve an 
identification of the ‘plebs’ with the universal ‘populus’ of the country.” (ibid.: 103). Finally, 
Podemos was able to attract less ideologically radicalised groups, who were dissatisfied with the 
current state of politics and were deeply affected by the crisis (Ramiro and Gomez, 2016).  
Concerning populism radical right (PRR), no PRR party had been able to achieve more than 
one per cent in any national, regional or European election until 2019 (Alonso and Kaltwasser, 
2015). This was due to the conflict between marginal and state nationalisms, making very hard for 
PRR parties to use the nativist card; also PP was never able to mobilise far-right voters leaving little 
space for the establishment of these type of parties (ibid.). However, in December 2018, a new 
PRR party named VOX entered the regional parliament of Andalusia, playing a fundamental role in 
the changes which took place in the region (Rubio-Pueyo, 2019). Fearing the rise of VOX, the 
members of PP attempted to turn more to the right political spectrum but failed, and in the general 
elections of April 2019, VOX entered for the first time in the Spanish Parliament with 10,3% of the 
votes, becoming a part of the political future of Spain (ibid.). According to the same author, voters 
who voted for this party, found themselves concerned about the immigration, refused PSOE 
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leadership and were worried about Spain’s unity; thus VOX was able to divide the traditional voting 
base of PP and achieved its best results in white-majority neighbourhoods and areas with a strong 
military presence.  
To understand Spain's most recent political and social context, it is also pertinent to mention 
the Catalonian crisis. Since 2000, Catalonia demanded greater devolution, either opposed or 
ignored by the Spanish state, which transformed into secessionism in Catalonia (Guibernau, 2014). 
Madrid’s politicians underestimated the alienation, which later turned into indignation and a social 
movement in favour of Catalan independence (ibid.). On the 1st of October 2017 an independence 
referendum took place in Catalonia, even though Spain's Constitutional Court declared it illegal; 
there was a 43% turnout and 90% of these voters backed independence, the election was disturbed 
by unexpected violence by the police, which infuriated the local population; thus by the 27th of 
October the Catalan government declared independence from Spain (BBC, 2019). As a response, 
the government evoked Article 155 of the Constitution and imposed direct rule in Catalonia, 
dissolving the regional government (ibid.). As reported by the BBC, in June 2018, a new 
government was sworn in, which meant that Catalan nationalists regained control of the region. 
When understanding the current state of Western democracies, including Spain, one should 
consider that “Politics used to behave like a pendulum. When the right made mistakes the left won 
its turn, before power swung back rightward again. Now it looks more like a helter-skelter. Cynicism 
drags democracy down. Parties fracture and head for extremes. Populists persuade voters that the 
system is serving them ill, and undermine it further. (…) Fortunately (…) democracies can renew 
themselves.” (The Economist, 2019, p. 11).  
The protest and social unrest that erupted in Spain in 2011 could be seen as young people's 
response to a difficult period in the country (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). In fact, 
Spanish people participation ted in demonstrations at higher rates than other EU countries and 
“these protests became intertwined with the political fate of the governing parties” (Sloam, 2014, 
p. 222). Their negative assessment on the socio-economic context shaped their political action and 
in Spain people who were between 18 and 24 years old showed to have the highest abstention 
rate, being the main motive the lack of trust in the incumbent politicians; so abstention became an 
expression of discontent (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). It should be noted that Spanish 
youth has shown more outrage and distrust towards institutional politics than actually indifference, 
as it is sometimes read, thus “the response has not been so much political abstention as seeking 
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out an alternative, which was found in what became known as the 15-M movement.” (ibidem.: 
p.10). 
In fact, for some time, there has been empirical evidence that voter participation of young 
people in many Western democracies has decreased and they show higher levels of distrust in 
their governments and lower interest in politics, as well as less knowledge of political institutions 
and the democratic process, this has also been the case in Spain (García-Albacate, 2008). 
Nevertheless, according to García-Albacate, support of Spanish youth towards democracy and 
increased interest in politics tend to come as they grow up. Even as young, they appear to be active 
participants in political discussions. Still, Spanish youth has appeared to reject political parties and 
their role in political participation. Concerning their participation as voters, it should be pointed 
beforehand that voting is the most common political activity carried out by citizens and a required 
element to elect governments, it is a way to legitimize the political system. During past general 
elections, young people appear they went to the ballot less, but as they grow up, their participation 
increased too (ibid.).  
Focusing on Erasmus students, the ESN Survey of 2019 assessed the political participation 
and voter behaviour of young people who joined the exchange programme7. The results showed 
that 60% of the respondents stated that for them EU elections were of high importance, for people 
who had studied abroad the percentage was of 60,68% and for those who were at that time abroad 
it was of 52,08% (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). In the 2019 EU elections, 
from the respondents of the survey, 68,77% voted in them, 47,27% were exchange students and 
71,68% were exchange alumni (ibid.). Regarding abstention, the reasons for that were multiple, for 
students who were at that time in another country practical reasons such as lack of money to go 
back to their home country or issues with voter registration were responsible for them not 
participating, other groups (mobile and non-mobile students), stated lack of time and other 
commitments (ibid.). As stated by the same source, it should also be noted that 78,02% of the 
survey respondents stated they have participated in public debates (19% and 21% were studying 
abroad at the time or had done so, respectively) and 44,84% had joined public demonstrations 
(ibid.). Moreover, 66,41% of the survey participants affirmed they had signed a petition, and 35,02% 
expressed their views on public issues on the internet or social media (ibid.). Overall, young people 
engaged in politics, but the non-electoral forms of participation showed an increase of importance. 
As Sloam observed: “When citizens do engage, they increasingly participate in personally 
 
7 Concerning the characteristics of the participants of the ESN Survey 2019, 827 (5,52%) had Spain as their country of citizenship.  
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The Erasmus Programme and the Italian youth political participation in a changing 
context 
 
Ora sarà proprio questa nostra Assemblea che, nel corso dei prossimi dibattiti, si sforzerà di 
trovare i princìpi di una sintesi politica, sociale, economica e morale in base alla quale gli Stati sovrani 
possano decidere di edificare la casa comune. 
- Alcide De Gasperi on the 21st of April 1954 in Rome 
 
3.1 The evolution of Erasmus in Italy 
Education has played a vital role since the late 19th century in nation-building, though these 
traditional rules are being challenged nowadays due to the emergence of the EU and the 
consequent attempt in constructing a European framework for Higher Education (HE) (Woolf, 
2003). In fact, HE in Italy has an old and august tradition, but when looking at the Italian youth in 
1960, less than 10% of 19 years old had access to university education, being its system 
considered ‘unitary’, which meant that higher education was exclusively in the hands of universities 
(Ballarino and Perotti, 2012). It is during the late 1960s that the increase in the enrolled students 
in Italian universities started to pressure institutional structures to change and adapt to a new 
reality. Thus, in 1969 the government abolished the rules, which restricted the access to 
universities that were introduced during the Fascist period, this meant that all students who 
completed five years of higher secondary education and passed a national exam (‘esame di 
maturità’) could continue their studies in a university of their choice (ibid.). The increase and 
diversity of university students did not lead to new teaching methods, which resulted in a higher 
dropout rate, so new professors had to be recruited on a contingent basis, without often the 
selection method based on scientific merit (ibid.).  
A second major reform was launched in 1980 due to conflicts erupting in Italian universities 
connected to the high level of militancy of students and young professors; this one was responsible 
for changing the basic organisational structures of the universities (Ballarino and Perotti, 2012). 
This reform introduced new institutional layers to the Italian higher education system, such as the 
PhD title as the first step of an academic career and the position of associate professor and the 
departments (ibid.). Later, in 1987, a new national government created the Ministry of University 
and Scientific Research, which was established to unify all programmes of scientific research 
supported by public entities and to maximise the efficiency and productivity of the country in the 
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fields in which international competition was harsher (Moscati, 2009). Between 1989 and 1991, 
another reform was carried out by the Minister of Education, Antonio Ruberti, which entailed to 
decentralise the HE system to make it more flexible and adaptable to society’s needs (Ballarino 
and Perotti, 2012). This meant that universities were now formally autonomous. They could take 
strategic decisions, introduce new study programmes and curricula without the endorsement on 
the part of the Ministry, and new vocationally oriented programmes were launched named ‘diploma 
universitario’ (ibid.). Although, the governing bodies of universities remained the same, they were 
given new roles due to the acquired autonomy, this also enabled HE institutions to expand their 
offer and increase enrolments, based on greater equality of opportunity (ibid.). Two years later, in 
1993, the state general financial law partly changed, and the Ministry of the University and 
Scientific Research would now give a sum to each university according to certain parameters, and 
each one of them would decide how to apply this money (Moscati, 2009). On the event of the 1996 
general election, a political coalition came into power that gave high priority to education, so a 
comprehensive reform, known as ‘legge quadro’ was started from pre-elementary school to 
university (ibid.). The two main goals of it were to establish prerequisites for competence in 
professional activities and to identify the values of the acquired credits for admission in university 
courses (ibid.). Considering HE modifications, there were established better links between 
secondary schools and universities, such as orientation for students in their last two years in school, 
counselling during their entire university course, improved teacher/student ration and development 
of teaching methods more focused on students (ibid.). Furthermore, according to the same source, 
the autonomy previously given to universities was improved, which meant the offer of external 
services responsible in raising additional financial support; also each university attempted to 
establish a ‘brand name’ to be more attractive and well-known to prospect students.  
On the 19th June of 1999, the Ministers of Education from twenty-nine countries, including 
the Italian counterpart, Ortensio Zecchino, published a joint declaration – the Bologna Declaration 
- in which they compromised to adopt the following changes in their HE systems: “ a system of 
easily readable and comparable degrees”, “a system essentially based on two main cycles, 
undergraduate and graduate”, “a system of credits” and lastly they agreed on the “promotion of 
mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free movement” (Ministerial 
Conference Bologna 1999). The combination of the internal educational reforms and the new 
international policy aimed at creating a European HE system, accelerated the already ongoing 
process of modernisation of the education system in Italy; the political context was also favourable 
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to this as well as the academic one, since professors were aware of the need to keep up with other 
HE systems (Moscati, 2009). Consequently, the proposed reforms were approved in a short period 
of time, without extensive debates (ibid.).  
Following the Bologna Declaration, the signatories worked on the harmonization of their 
academic degrees by establishing a two-tier system of first- and second-cycle degrees, this led to 
deep changes in the Italian HE system (Pietro, The Bologna Process and widening participation in 
university education: new evidence from Italy, 2012). In fact, Italy’s HE system was amongst those 
deeply influenced by the Bologna Process, since it led to the introduction of a more transparent 
and equivalent structure of university degrees, fostered academic mobility, promoted employability 
of graduates, guaranteed quality in the education given as well as making sure there was a 
considerable European dimension in HE (Cammelli, Antonelli, Francia, Gasperoni, and Sgarzi, 
2011). Considering the changes in university degrees, two cycles were created, the first one, the 
bachelor’s degree (‘laurea’) with a duration of at least three years, followed by a second cycle, the 
master degree (‘laurea magistrale’) which could one be accessed by completing the first one (ibid.). 
To assure the Bologna Process was duly implemented, two legislative measures were adopted: the 
Ministerial Decree number 509 of 1999 responsible for introducing in the academic year of 
2001/2002 the ‘3+2’ system, which was not only aimed to establish the Bologna Process but also 
to tackle weaknesses of Italian universities, such as the low rate of graduates, a high rate of drop-
outs from universities and the discrepancy between the time courses required to be completed and 
the actual duration of the studies (ibid.). As stated by the same source, later on there was the 
Ministerial Decree number 270 of 2004 which aimed at reducing the number of study programmes 
and exams in each of them, also budget constraints were introduced as well as the “laurea 
magistrale” with 120 ECTS.  
The reform that took place is associated with an increase in university enrolments, simply in 
those individuals whose parents did not have a university degree or came from a less advantaged 
background in comparison to their peers (Pietro, The Bologna Process and widening participation 
in university education: new evidence from Italy, 2012). Since the take-off of the Bologna Process 
other positive effects were felt in Italy, like the reduction of graduation age, class attendance 
improved, there were more internships experiences; also the earnings of graduates did not 
decrease even though more people were getting qualified (Cammelli, Antonelli, Francia, Gasperoni, 
and Sgarzi, 2011). Additionally, one of the objectives of the Bologna Process was to remove some 
of the obstacles that still existed in student mobility; this kind of mobility in Italian universities was 
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mostly connected to the Erasmus Programme, which lead to the increase of the number of students 
going abroad due to the new and easier credit transfer system and the match between subjects in 
the home university with the ones in the exchange one (Aittola, et al., 2009).  
Nevertheless, some flaws persisted even after the implementation of the reform, such as a 
high dropout rate during the first year; negative performance in reducing the age students graduate; 
the rigidity of the syllabus of subjects did not change considerably; there were fewer education 
offers for adults and working students; little geographical mobility; hesitant reasons to continue 
studies; and low international openness of Italian universities (Cammelli, Antonelli, Francia, 
Gasperoni, and Sgarzi, 2011). Internationalization of Italian universities shows a dependency on 
personal interests and contacts, even though this is considered a trait of higher education 
institutions responsible for making them more attractive for both students and staff and marketing 
them as a modern university (Aittola, et al., 2009). Considering internationalization, private HE 
institutions have been showing better performances in this field and productivity than public 
universities (Raponi, Martella, and Maruotti, 2016). Furthermore, highly qualified human resources 
still have low wages in Italy, mostly connected to the country's production structurend not 
necessarily to the higher education system (Cammelli, Antonelli, Francia, Gasperoni, and Sgarzi, 
2011). In fact, in 2017 there was an increased number of unemployed young people between the 
ages of 15 and 24 (20.1% of the Italian population), being during this year the highest share within 
the EU (Education and Training Monitor 2018 Italy, 2018). It is also important to notice that the 
quality of research and teaching in Italian universities is one of the factors, which can explain 
domestic migration fluxes, if students live in a region with a high quality HE institution it is less 
likely that they will move during their studies and after graduation (Ciriaci, 2014). Recently, it has 
been evaluated that Italy’s investment in education is below EU average, simply in higher education, 
as a proportion of GDP there was a 3.9% investment in 2016, being the EU average of 4.7%; also 
by 2028 Italy is projected to have a reduction of their student population of one million, 




Figure 3 Erasmus students & trainees: Italian case, source: Erasmus statistics by the European Commission 
Improving the conditions in Italian universities could be considered relevant to boost 
international mobility, since students with poor academic performance are less likely to join the 
Erasmus Programme than their peers with better academic results (Pietro and Page, 2008). With 
a constant increase of the number of outgoing students, as shown in the following Figure 3, which 
has been higher than the number of spots available to join Erasmus, universities set up selection 
processes based on the previous academic performance of students (ibid.).  
  
 
Still, Italy proves to be one of the major players in intra-EU student mobility (Pietro and Page, 
2008), with a steady growth of both incoming and outgoing individuals, reaching in the academic 
year of 2016/2017 a total of 35666 students and trainees leaving the country to pursue their 
education abroad (Figure 3). The student mobility inside the EU has a tight link with the Erasmus 
Programme and the Bologna Process (França and Padilla, 2018), both responsible for facilitating, 
boost and assure one of the citizen’s rights of the EU: personal mobility (Pumares, González-Martín, 
Montanari, and Staniscia, 2018). Additionally, the European exchange programmes like Erasmus, 
enable a first international experience during which contacts are made, and new relationships are 
made, including romantic ones (ibid.). In the Italian case, there is a combination of factors that 
make this country desirable as an Erasmus destination, such as geographical location, climate, 
culture, and lower cost of living compared to other Member States, like Germany (França and 
Padilla, 2018). It should be noticed that Italy’s investment in the internationalization of its HE 
system kicked-off in the late 1990s by attracting, firstly, students from outside of the EU with 
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actions such as establishing a local centre of the University of Bologna in Buenos Aires in 1999 
and later in 2006 a Chinese-Italian university was created in Shanghai (ibidem.).  
Italy’s HE system was one of the most traditional in Europe appearing not to create great 
incentives for student mobility for this in comparison to other countries, like Finland and Germany; 
also this phenomenon is concentrated in specific academic fields, the social sciences, law and 
business (Lindberg, 2009). Moreover, with an increasing number of students joining the Erasmus 
Programme to expand their horizons in terms of education, training and culture, special needs 
have arisen, simply for those students who decide to go to an institution where they will have to 
attend lessons or perform activities in English (Camiciottoli, 2010). In the situation of Italian 
students, there has been noticed little experience in academic writing both in Italian and in English, 
since oral assessments have been the enrooted tradition (ibid.). By participating in mobility 
exchange programmes, as Erasmus, Italian young people are more likely to work abroad, showing 
that the student mobility plays a role in the outcomes of the labour market for graduates, so 
“international student exchange programs help individuals, especially those from less advantaged 
backgrounds, in fulfilling their own aspirations.” (Pietro, Does studying abroad cause international 
labor mobility? Evidence from Italy, 2012, p. 634).  
However, due to the high level of labour market regulation in Italy, the transition from 
university studies to the first job can take a long time, diminishing the incentives to finish their HE 
education quickly (Lindberg, 2009). In addition, in the case of Italian students, their parents’ level 
of education seems to influence whether or not they study for a period of time abroad (Pietro and 
Page, 2008). Still, studying in another country is increasingly perceived by employers, universities 
and students themselves as a key competence that graduates should possess, having the Erasmus 
Programme the potential to help to develop this competence and skills associated to it (Holmes, 
Bavieri, and Ganassin, 2015). In fact, in ‘The Erasmus Impact Study’ (2014) it was stated that 
“61% of the employers included in the EIS considered international experience important for 
employability” (The Erasmus Impact Study, 2014, p. 136). In the Italian case, it could be 
considered that there is also the need for the educational system to adapt to global competition 
and markets, as well as for companies to assure the ‘lifelong learning’ of their employees in the 
matters which mostly concern people today, like environmental issues (Macron, 2012).  
The LLP and more recently, the Erasmus+ are essential in Italy to support the 
implementation of the EU goals and a forum to share good transversal practices (Amatucci, et al., 
2017). These programmes have been particularly effective when it comes to individuals' 
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international mobility, which has allowed, amongst other things, personal growth and 
internationalization of different environments (ibidem.). Considering the Erasmus+ in Programme, 
introduced in 2014, it has ten goals to be achieved in Italy’s HE area (Erasmus+ - Il programma 
europeo per l'istruzione, la formazione, i giovani e lo sport): 
1) Promote the modernization and internationalization of the HE institutions; 
2) Increase labour market and career opportunities for students; 
3) Improve the individual skills of the staff in HE institutions and the quality of 
education; 
4) Reinforce the individual initiative of students and their entrepreneurship; 
5) Amplify the knowledge and understanding on policies and educational practices of 
other European countries; 
6) Increase intercultural conscience and participation in societal activities; 
7) Rise the number of opportunities for personal and career growth of HE’s staff; 
8) Support the continuation of education and training following an international mobility 
period; 
9) Increase the level of inclusion; 
10) Improve linguistic and technological competences.  
 
In particular, the mobility activities contemplated in the Erasmus+ Programme help promote 
universities' internationalization supporting students to have active participation in the labour 
market and in society (Erasmus+ - Il programma europeo per l'istruzione, la formazione, i giovani 
e lo sport). For each studying cycle (bachelor, master or Phd) students can benefit of twelve months 
of studying or training abroad or twenty-four months in the case of a bachelor’s degree with only 
one cycle (ibid.). Greater efficiency has also been partially achieved with the Erasmus+ in Italy, by 
the simplification of some measures through new digital solutions responsible for project 
management, but still, poor communication is still detected among the actors responsible for the 
implementation of the Program in Italy EC and the National Authorities), being the greatest synergy 
in the international sector of HE (Amatucci, et al., 2017). Moreover, with the continuous impact of 
the economic crisis and youth unemployment - by the first of July in 2019 it was registered at 
30,5%, surpassed by Spain (31,7%) and Greece (40,4%) (ANSA, 2019) – there is the need to 
reinforce the role the Erasmus Programme can have in increasing youth employability and 
supporting informal learning experiences (Amatucci, et al., 2017). Erasmus+ in Italy has ultimately 
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created what has been called an ‘added value’ translated in the internationalization of the 
organizations involved in projects sponsored by the Programme (ibidem.), such as the project of 
mobility of young entertainers (‘Mobilità degli animatori giovanili’) in which for instance, 
international visits would allow the young pupils to acquire knowledge and experience in their field 
















In the tables 1 and 2 provided previously, it is possible to assess partially the evolution of 
the Erasmus+ Programme in the area of HE and Youth, where it is noticeable, for instance, the 
increase of the financial investment through grants since the launching of Erasmus+, from 2014 
to 2017 the funds for grants increased in 26 713 220 Euros. Furthermore, the ESN Surveys8, held 
from 2005 until 2016, can give some evidence on the Erasmus Programme's general progress in 
Italy. Firstly, Italy has proven to be amongst the most chosen Erasmus destinations and in 2010 
accounted for 20,2% of all outgoing international students (Alfranseder, Fellinger, Taivere, 
Krzaklewska, and Rosa, 2011). Nevertheless, according to three ESN Surveys from the years of 
2007, 2009 and 2014, in Italy, fewer universities had programmes held in English, some of the 
 
8 The ESN Surveys represent “the biggest regular European research project planned and carried out entirely by students for students. It is conducted 
annually and surveys students at higher education institutions. ESN shares the results with the main stakeholders in higher education and mobility 
programmes.” Source: Erasmus Student Network website, https://esn.org/esnsurvey/2016 
 
Table 1 Erasmus+ in Higher Education in Italy, source Erasmus Statistics 
Table 2 Erasmus+ in Youth in Italy, source Erasmus Statistics 
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least multilingual students were Italian, and it was also assessed a poor management in sharing 
information with exchange students. 
Since its launching in 1987, the Erasmus Programme has also become one of the most 
inclusive exchange programmes for students, including those from a lower socio-economic 
background and those who are career-oriented and experience-oriented (Krzaklewska and Krupnik, 
2008). However, it has been considered there is still space for improvement in this area, for 
instance in research conducted, in which Italy was one of the case studies, it was found that even 
though mobile and non-mobile students attended the same university, those who joined Erasmus 
usually had parents who had higher socioeconomic status; and by joining the exchange 
programme, they came back with more significant advantages than non-mobile colleagues and so 
“Erasmus may be viewed as a continuation of an already elevated life trajectory.” (Ballatore and 
Ferede, 2013, p. 531).  
Those students who have participated in the Erasmus Programme describe it as a period in 
which they matured, explored, and experimented different things, meditate on new opportunities; 
thus, for them, Erasmus is interpreted as a rite of passage, responsible for altering what it means 
being an ‘adult’, who should be someone with intercultural skills (Krzaklewska and Krupnik, 2008). 
Italian students are among those who not only experienced what has been described before but 
also seem to develop a global identity, which translated as identifying themselves as European and 
world citizens (ibid.). 
Looking over to the records of the Erasmus Programme in Italy, since its start has allowed 
half-million Italian students to travel in Europe and spend a period of their education in a foreign 
university, in 2017 a peak was reached of a total of 60,000 Erasmus exchanges (INDIRE, 2018). 
In fact, during the academic year of 2017/2018, Indire, Italy’s National Agency Erasmus+, 
allocated funds for the mobility of 32,109 Italian students and in the previous academic year over 
104 million euros were assigned for mobility and cooperation projects, from those 72 million euros 
were for HE institutions (INDIRE, indireinforma, 2017). Between 2015 and 2016, 21,915 
European students were hosted in Italian universities, making Italy the fifth most popular 
destination among Erasmus students (ibid.). Considering internships sponsored by the Erasmus 
Programme, Italy has had an increase on this area of 20% just in the academic year of 2015/2016, 
in which 34,6% of the cases it was led as a part of the curriculum, 42,4% chose it, even though it 
was not mandatory, and 23% of traineeships went for newly graduates (INDIRE, Erasmus 
placements, Italy at third place in Europe, 2017). In the academic year of 2016/2017, Italy had 
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an increase of incoming Erasmus students, 10,2% more than the previous academic year, the 
19,386 students who chose Italy to continue their studies decided an HE institution in Lombardy, 
followed by Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Veneto and Tuscany (Silvestri, 2019). In addition, in 2017 Italy 
proved to be, according to Indire’s director Flaminio Galli, a popular destination for non-European 
partners, 2,156 incoming mobility students, professors and academic staff were from Tunisia 
(190), Albania (174), Serbia (167), Russia (135) and Ukraine (129), being the Polytechnic 
University of Turin the institution which would receive most of them (INDIRE, Erasmus+, the 
seminar of the Universities of Southern Mediterranean countries, 2017). In terms of outgoing 
mobility, 1,230 chose Extra-European countries, apart from Serbia, which has recently become a 
member of the Erasmus Programme, mainly Albania (143), followed by the Russian Federation 
(108), Serbia (103), Tunisia (94) and Georgia (61) (ibid.).  
Already in 2018, the EC presented a proposal for a new version of Erasmus, which is 
supposed to be more ambitious and inclusive from 2021 to 2027, with a predicted budget of 30 
billion euros which would allow 12 million people to join the Erasmus Programme, three times 
more than Erasmus+ (Maddalena, 2019). The former Minister of Education, University and 
Research, Valeria Fedeli, declared in 2017 the commitment of Italy in the Educational field in 
Europe; pointing that her country would have a key role in building by 2025 and European Area of 
Education and in assuring that Erasmus becomes ever more inclusive to all (Fedeli: “Bene proposta 
Commissione UE su spazio europeo dell’istruzione entro il 2025. Italia avrà ruolo da protagonista”, 
2017). For the celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Erasmus Programme it was presented in 
Florence the ‘Letter of the Erasmus Generation’, a political and cultural document created by 
former participants of the Programme, in which the Erasmus Student Network of Italy and the 
Erasmus Foundation, stated some of the priorities for the future of the Programme they serve (30 
years of Erasmus - States General, The Charter of the Erasmus Generation, 2017): 
• Bottom-up policies which would involve local populations, this would have an 
influence on a European level; 
• Stressing the importance of European citizenship and the History of the EU through 
school and university education; 
• Guarantee paid traineeships; 




• Promotion of the implementation of various types of European-level exchange 
programmes, such as in public administration and compulsory school education; 
• Creating agencies responsible for applying the proposals given; 
• Implementation of economic measures which would increase the trust of citizens in 
European institutions; 
 
One of the participants of the conference ‘Erasmus+ the future of Europe’ held in Florence 
in which the former document was presented, was Sandro Gozi, an Italian politician, member of 
the Parliament, who published a year before a book in which he appealed exactly to the youngest 
generation who joined the Erasmus Programme; highlighting its relevance for the future of Europe, 
“It will be precisely from the Erasmus generation that in Europe it will finally be the time of the 
newly founder sons of the Union, who have to be the protagonists of a new European integration 
process.”9 (Gozi, Il percorso necessario, 2016, p. 181). In a similar tone, the former Minister Valeria 
Fedeli, in the same conference stressed the accomplishments of the Erasmus Programme, 
remarking that “Erasmus is one of the most beautiful expressions of the Europe that we wish for.”10 
and that politicians must answer the difficulties that trouble the youth, making sure that Europe 
takes care of them, the young people who believe in the European project (Fedeli, 2017, p. 4).  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that young Europeans have distanced themselves from 
parties and politicians and have engaged more in issue-based forms of participation, this could be 
because parties and politicians have been unable to change with time and answer to the needs of 
younger generations (Sloam, 2013).  
 
3.2 Italian youth political participation and public attitudes in an ever-changing context 
The crisis which erupted in the start of the 2000’s represented for Italy the final step of a 
decline which began after the recession 1992-93 (Tridico, 2012). Following the recession of 1992, 
Italy started a robust de-regulation process. With less involvement of the State in the economy, this 
was connected to corruption scandals responsible for making the Italian public disbelieve State-
owned companies (ibid.).  
The beginning of the 1990s was particularly marked by the Operation “Clean Hands” 
(February 1992), a judicial inquiry in Milan, which started by arresting Mario Chiesa, a socialist 
 
9 Original version, “Sarà proprio a partire dalla generazione Erasmus che in Europa verrà finalmente il tempo dei figli rifodantori dell’Unione, 
coloro che dovranno essere protagonisti del nuovo processo di integrazione europea”. Source: Gozi, 2016 
10 Original version, “L’Erasmus è una delle più belle espressioni dell’Europa che vogliamo.” Source: Fedeli, 2017 
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manager of a public hospice, this investigation continued for years involving several politicians, 
including former prime ministers, and hundreds of public servants, the operation led to an abysmal 
crisis of the political system (Vannucci, 2009). Furthermore, the year of 1992 also saw the open 
defiance of the Mafia towards state authorities, “In July 1992, the Sicilian Mafia sent a loud and 
gruesome message to those who would challenge it when it killed a prosecutor named Paolo 
Borsellino with a car bomb in Palermo. He was the second prosecutor to meet that fate in two 
months; in May, another bomb had killed Giovanni Falcone” (Genzlinger, 2018).  
Taking these series of events into account, an economy with minimum intervention of the 
state appeared necessary for the political leadership at the time; thus a process of liberalization 
and privatization began in Italy (Tridico, 2012). The governments of this time were aware of the 
unsustainability of the traditional economic model of which Italy relied upon, but the political crisis 
of the time and the near bankruptcy of the Italian state created considerable challenges to establish 
a completely new model of development (Quirico, 2010). Nevertheless, Italy started working to 
build a very market-oriented economic model also to meet the Maastricht criteria; the new 
economic vision provoked, on one side, a higher income inequality, lower consumption, industrial 
decline and weaker aggregate demand (Tridico, 2012). Decades of political turmoil and economic 
decline made the global crisis of 2008 quite impactful in Italy (Quirico, 2010), which has suffered 
more recently from a negative combination of a low productivity, low employment and low dynamics 
of the GDP (Tridico, 2012). Thus, all these forces combined led ultimately to a general economic 
decline characterized for a loss for the Italian GDP of more than 20% compared to the average of 
the EU (ibid.).  
The government led by Silvio Berlusconi as prime minister (he served during the beginning 
of the 2000’s until 2011), tackled the crisis largely by assisting banks and big firms and cutting 
public spending (Quirico, 2010). Following the initial financial instability of the crisis, there were 
felt deprivations in the Italian households due to the austerity measures, such as the lack of ability 
to take holidays far away from home, afford a private car or even a proper meal twice a day 
(D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia, 2011). In fact, the global economic crisis hit Italy harder than was 
predicted even by Berlusconi’s government. According to the IMF, the real output growth in Italy 
shrank by 1% in 2008.1% the following year (Jones, 2009).  
However, it was not only the Italian economy which suffered due to the crisis, public 
confidence was also negatively affected, simply concerning the EU and the effectiveness of the 
euro as currency, as a consequence trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) also saw a decline 
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(Jones, 2009). The Italian public debt proved to be another factor of instability, even with the 
measures put in place to manage it by the government of Romano Prodi (2006-2008), in 2008 the 
international financial crisis swept away the work done and by 2011 the public debt was at 120% 
of GDP (Hopkin, 2012). Furthermore, the Italian political scene has been marked by an instable 
national party system suffering of corruption and scandals together with an increase of power of 
populist forces, which have been questioning the European project; not offering EU policymakers 
and international investors the confidence required to support development in Italy (ibid.).  
All these factors combined created uncertainty concerning the future of Italy as a member 
of the eurozone (Hopkin, 2012); there was a study conducted in this time which inquired Italian 
citizens whether they would ride out the crisis better with their previous currency the lira than with 
the euro, 53% agreed with this statement (Jones, 2009). Nevertheless, it appears that Italians still 
see the euro as a currency as a symbol of European integration and by choosing to be a part of 
the Eurozone the country protected itself from exchange rate volatility (ibid.).  
The crisis also had a decisive stroke in youth employment in Italy, since 2011, more than 
40% of young workers have spent more than one year unemployed (Dolado J. J., 2015). Southern 
European countries, being amongst them Italy, were hit hardest by the crisis and consequently 
have suffered the highest youth unemployment rates in Europe, this could be explained by the 
segmentation of the labour market, lack of aggregate demand and inadequate vocational training 
(ibid.).  
Focusing on Italy, the high youth unemployment rate could be related to several factors, 
being one of them the considerable difficulty young people face to enter the labour market after 
their studies, since there is an experience gap that they have to fill themselves (Pastore, 2012). In 
fact, according to the OECD in some of the most recent collected data in 2019, “Italy has the third 
highest share of youth who are neither employed nor in education or training (NEET) among OECD 
countries: 26% of 18-24 year-olds are NEET, compared with the OECD average of 14%” (Semeraro 
and Borlizzi, 2019, p. 3). In comparison to their European same-age peers, the activity rate of 
young Italians has been low, in 2008 it was of 30.9% (compared to an average of 44% recorded in 
EU27) and the employment rate was at 24.4% (compared to an average rate of 37.5% in EU27) 
(Dota, 2011). Italian youth was at risk of falling out of work three times higher than the rest of the 
population and twice higher than the risk faced by their European peers (ibid.). According to the 
Financial Times (2019), Italy has currently one of the highest levels amongst the youth of NEET, 
“The proportion of Italy’s population aged between 15 and 24 not in education or employment was 
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19 per cent in the third quarter of 2018” (Romei, 2019). One of the ways this situation could have 
been effectively tackled was with the full implementation of programmes such as the Youth 
Guarantee, which would have targeted the youth and provided reform into structural problems 
(Dolado J. J., 2015). The instability, which has been felt in the labour market in general throughout 
Italy, has led to an increase in the emigration flow of the Italian youth (Gallo and Staniscia, 2016).  
 
Migration is not a new phenomenon in Europe; over the past three decades, several streams 
of migrants, amongst them, refugees have become a part of European societies (Gattinara, 2017). 
The Mediterranean Sea has become one of the main migrant routes, with increasing numbers of 
drowned or missing people who cannot safely secure passage to land; the first stop for many 
though is the small island of Lampedusa which has had to strain its capacity in its centre to receive 
all the refugees arriving (Migration Policy Centre Europe, 2019). Many of those arriving in Italy want 
to continue their journey towards Northern Europe, which has created distress in the Italian-French 
border (ibid.). The Italian governments have acted on the migration crisis in compliance to EU-level 
policies, and have demanded from their EU partners common crisis management actions 
(Gattinara, 2017); as for Italy between 2013 and 2014 it has run the search-and-rescue Operation 
‘Mare Nostrum’ in the Mediterranean sea (Migration Policy Centre Europe, 2019). This Operation 
had as its goals, “safeguarding human life at sea, and bringing to justice human traffickers and 
migrant smuggler” (Ministero della Difesa, 2018). A year later, in 2015 over two hundred Frontex 
agents and eighteen European Asylum Support Office (EASO) agents were deployed to support 
border management and asylum applications (Managing the Refugee Crisis - Italy: state of play 
report, 2015). In this year, over 150,000 migrants were smuggled by sea or land to Italy, making 
the country one of the main passages towards the EU (ibid.); this contributed to changes in Italian 
public opinion fuelled by the political approach taken and media attention, almost one in three 
Italians declared in this time that immigration was one of the main issues in the country (Migration 
Policy Centre Europe, 2019).  
Indeed, Italy has transitioned to an immigration country, while Italian governments have had 
to deal with the various requirements of the Schengen system (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), this 
included, “take responsibility for controlling the external borders on behalf of the other Schengen 
States and for issuing uniform Schengen visas; efficiently cooperate with law enforcement agencies 
in other Schengen States in order to maintain a high level of security once border controls between 
Schengen countries are abolished; apply the common set of Schengen rules (the so-called 
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"Schengen acquis"), such as controls of land, sea and air borders (airports), issuing of visas, police 
cooperation and protection of personal data; and connect to and use the SIS.” (Schengen Area, 
2020). Since joining the Schengen Area, Italian governments have assumed the need for an active 
labour migration policy, but encountered several challenges in doing so, such as monitoring new 
entries, establishing effective internal controls and the growth of irregular migration; this is 
connected to a strong informal economy and expansion of a common visa policy (Finotelli and 
Sciortino, 2009). Although Italian policymakers tried more repressive measures, no success has 
been met in controlling irregular migration (ibid.). 
 During this time, radical-right politicians and the solidarity movements have competed with 
one another on how to cope with migrants inflow to Europe (Gattinara, 2017). In fact, antimigrant 
populist leaders and parties denounced the failure of the EU to manage its borders; this crisis 
became even more acute when in 2015 media attention turned to the publication of the 
photographs of a boy lying lifeless on a Turkish beach in September (Guiraudon, 2017). Some EU 
circles blamed South and Eastern European Member States, which were, in their perspective, 
either unwilling or unable to tackle the migration crisis; so they were proposing a two-speed Europe 
with only a few Schengen states moving forward on immigration, asylum and borders issues (ibid.). 
Concerning Italy, the migrant crisis created in its society a widespread panic, fed in existing 
problems related to the economic recession and the constant ongoing crisis of the Italian political 
system; facing this scenario, governments found it difficult to deflect from anti-immigration public 
opinion and populist propaganda (Gattinara, 2017).  
Thus, in the last decades, Italy has been tackling its own dynamic economic demand for a 
growing migrant population and implementing policies that in principle, there were attempts to 
block the entrance and slow down the multi-ethnic transformation of its society (Ambrosini, 2013). 
Nevertheless, in its richer regions and cities, Italy is becoming an ever more multi-ethnic place in 
terms of the number of foreign residents and their participation in the labour market, as well as 
the joining of immigrant students in the educational system (ibid.). Still, Italian citizens would rather 
not recognise this new reality, being concerned with the visible formation of multi-ethnic 
communities (ibid.). According to a news article from BBC in 2016, Italian tolerance of its migrants’ 
communities started to weaken following the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, combined with 
government concerns with the refugee crisis expressed back then by the Finance Minister, Pier 
Carlo Padoan, “We are worried first of all from a humanitarian point of view, from a security point 
of view, and then of course from a financial point of view. The cost of migration has been 
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substantial.” (Adler, 2016). As reported by the United Nations Refugee Agency in 2015, 153,842 
people arrived in Italy by sea, and over 2,000 perished trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. This 
number increased the next year, the number of deaths doubled to 4,578 (Mediterrean Situation - 
Italy, 2020). In the following Figure 4, the United Nations Refugee Agency showed in 2015 where 
most refugees came from and where they went in Europe, the four main destinies were Italy, 
Greece, Malta and Spain and they originated from Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Turkey. 
Generally, Southern Europe has faced a constant inflow of refugees and migrants due to different 
conflicts, such as the Syrian war, climate change consequences and demographic change and lack 
of economic development in parts of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Bolani, 
Gemi, and Skleparis, 2015).  
Facing this scenario, the EP set out to change the Dublin System11, recognising that it is 
necessary to ensure safe ways for asylum seekers to reach Europe, in this way, several reforms 
might be applied, such as, for instance, the creation of an EU Migration, Asylum and Protection 
Agency (EMAPA), eliminating incentives to non-rescue or increasing security capacity of the EU 
(Guild, Costello, Garlick, and Moreno-Lax, 2015). Regardless of the path, the EU and its institutions 
choose to follow, “the dignity and agency of all migrants, asylum seekers and refugees should be 
respected” (ibid, pg.6). 
 
 



















Overall, the migrant crisis in Europe has been managed based upon a state of emergency, 
which could lead to, “dramatic consequences for future action, shaping the way European societies 
cope with forthcoming crises, transforming the relationship between states and citizens, and 
contributing to the progressive erosion of fundamental democratic rights.” (Gattinara, 2017, p. 
328).  
It should be noticed that different variation of crises, such as political, economic and cultural, 
tend to increase populist support, Italy being no exception to this (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). These 
crises tend to weaken the legitimacy of the existing political forces, giving space for new political 
players who claim that they truly represent the people's interests and do not identify themselves 
with the established elites (ibid.). The swept that populist forces had in Italy and other European 
countries from the mid-1980s could be traced to deep transformations that have taken place, 
starting with the diminish of weight in economies of large-scale industries, giving way to new forms 
of production linked to globalisation (Tarchi, 2002). Furthermore, the nation-state slowly lost its 
relevance in the international stage, the economy was financed, and a shift was noticed between 
poorer and wealthier countries (ibid.). Because of all these events, it was seen that there ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ of globalization, creating feelings of anger and bitterness amongst people, sentiments 
Figure 4: Sea arrivals 1 Jan – 24 Aug 2015 Creation date: 27 Aug 2015 Sources: UNHCR, UNCS 
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swiftly capitalize by populist parties who pushed for protests against the established political class, 
seen as responsible for the negative effects of globalization (ibidem.).  
Considering the Italian case, the country proved to be a something like ‘paradise’ for populist 
forces since the late 1990s, represented by the Berlusconi governments’ coalition composed of 
Forza Italia (FI), Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (UDC) 
and the Lega Nord (LN) which ruled from 2001 to 2006; the press often characterized this 
government as a populist one (Tarchi, 2008). According to an article by ‘Foreign Policy’, “In the 
1990s, Berlusconi, along with the regionalist Lega Nord party, were the only real populists in town” 
and Berlusconi being himself a figure which represented populism, “the man who more or less 
invented modern populism in the West” (Foot, 2018). In general, these governments matched a 
description of a populist one since their leaders expressed themselves as being extraordinary and 
showed intolerance towards the formal rules of democracy, which they believed delayed reforms 
for the good of the ‘ordinary people’, a group which they often reference in their speeches (Tarchi, 
2008). Finally, these politicians became known for attacking other class of politicians, trade unions 
and intellectuals, since they saw them as a factor of division in society (ibid.).  
This long political cycle represented by Berlusconi’s centre-right governments came to an 
end in 2011 with his resignation, after years of activities which were considered inefficient and 
corrupt, being accused of almost taking Italy to bankruptcy (Fella and Ruzza, 2013). However, 
Italian populism has taken many forms with different values and ideologies throughout time (ibid.). 
It was with the Common Man’s Front and with the Northern League that populist movements 
appeared in Italy as mass ones, more recently this happened with the Five Star Movement (FSM) 
led by Beppe Grillo; in all these occasions these movements expressed political and cultural 
tendencies which found a voice in their representatives (Tarchi, 2015). When it comes to right-wing 
populism, this wing of populist forces in Italy has addressed certain issues such as migration and 
law and order finding resonance in the electorate concerned about them (Ruzza and Fella, 2011). 
It was not just the issues that the populist right addressed that made its representatives popular, 
but also the ownership they took of them, arising new electoral topics, like the stiff bureaucracy of 
the public system, the clash of interests between political elites and the population and the 
supranational entities, such as the EU, risking to void the legitimacy of Italian democracy (Tarchi, 
2015). In fact, after Berlusconi’s governments, populist forces became an inevitable component 
of Italy’s political system, allowing for space for other populist forces to appear, such as the FSM 
(Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016). In 2013 parliamentary elections, 50% of voters chose parties which 
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could be labelled as populists; they were the FSM mentioned previously, Lega Nord, now known 
as Lega, and the Popolo della Libertà from Silvio Berlusconi (ibidem.). Generally, populist forces 
tend to be considered a threat to democracy, but it should be considered that both Lega and the 
FSM have attempted to unblock and reform Italy’s political system (ibidem.).  
Regarding the FSM, it is key to know the main characteristics of its type of populism which 
focus on the common people and the ‘wickedness’ of the political elites, not just the national ones, 
but also the supranational ones from EU institutions, which they observed as holding control over 
Italy; in this way they took advantage of the frustrations expressed by the electorate (Franzosi, 
Marone, and Salvati, 2015). This strategy bear fruits in the elections of 2013 being one of the most 
voted parties in the country reaching 25.6% in the Camera dei Deputati (Italy’s Lower Chamber) 
(ibid.). The FSM appealed mainly to the youth explained by the fact that they, “are drawn to the 
Five-Star Movement because of its anti-establishment messages and ability to organize online” 
(Schultheis, 2018). Furthermore, the party through its promises of universal basic income for all 
Italians, reduce short-term contracts and investment of 2 billion euros in the labour market spoke 
directly to the concerns of the Italian youth who felt that traditional parties could not address their 
concerns (ibid.). On the other side of the political spectrum, the right-wing forces and their 
stronghold perspectives regarding law and order and migration found appeal in the electorate 
(Ruzza and Fella, 2011). The general characteristics of the Italian populist right could be traced as 
the following, “evocative rhetorical language and symbolic policies emphasising belonging and 
drawing boundaries, and antipolitics, directed at Rome-based politicians.” (ibid.: p. 7).  
When speaking about the Italian populist right, it should be touched upon the story of Lega, 
a party initially ruled by Umberto Bossi, which placed the Northern Italian people against Rome 
and its elites which, according to Lega, took advantage of the wealthiest area of Italy (Brunazzo 
and Gilbert, 2017). The target switched once Matteo Salvini became the party-leader, now 
antagonism towards the EU and its institutions became a part of the political speech; in 2019, as 
reported by ‘The Atlantic’, Salvini expressed how, “he wanted Italy to return “to what our 
grandparents left us”—apparently meaning the postwar economic-boom years before the euro.” 
(Donadio, 2019). The abilities of Salvini did not stop in seizing power within his party, in 2014 
during the EU elections he appealed to voters in areas in which traditionally the party did not find 
much support, applying an overall strategy like the one of Marie LePen in France, marking the 
transformation of Lega from a regional party to a populist insurgent (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017). 
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Lega's ideology sets people against the elites, who have been robbed of their identity, rights and 
prosperity (ibid.).  
Notably, the Italian populist forces have been mutating throughout time as a reaction to the 
success of other populist actors in power and their institutionalization; these populist forces were 
a part of the changes in the Italian political system between the 1980’s and the 1990’s, since they 
supported to bring down the Christian Democratic rule during the First Republic (1942-1992) 
(Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016). All these changes happened during the end of the Cold War, 
corruption scandals and pressure coming for further European integration (ibid.). Thus, since the 
early 1990s, populist parties started to consolidate and establish their positions in the Italian 
political structure, from Berlusconi governments (ibid.) and Lega’s and FSM’s ascending into power 
in 2018, with Giuseppe Conte as prime minister (Stille, 2018). Their success in climbing to power 
can be traced to the effects of the Eurozone crisis in Italy, the high youth unemployment, growing 
poverty and inequality, and rising austerity measures coming from the EU (Fabbrini and Lazar, 
2013).  
Overall, the rise of these populist forces to power has compromised an equilibrium in Italian 
democracy, which cannot be described any longer as a consensual one based on a proportional 
representation of the electoral system (Fabbrini and Lazar, 2013). This became particularly 
noticeable following the elections of 2013 in which neither of the two logics of democracy 
consensual or competitive was available. The future of Italian democracy will likely depend on main 
party leaders' ability to reshape the entire democratic system by making it more effective and 
legitimate with new forged institutions (ibid.). Considering the ability of the populist coalition formed 
by Lega and the FSM to govern the country between 2018 and 2019, it was described back then 
that, “Neither party has much executive experience, and while the two may be able to paper over 
policy differences temporarily, neither group has ever needed to compromise their relatively 
extreme positions for an extended period. It’s a precarious time in the Italian economy to be trying 
such political experiments” (Bremmer, 2018). 
Ever going shifts in Italian democracy started right after 1945-1947 once it was re-
established, being two key concepts when observing the turn of events crisis and change (Morlino, 
1996). The party Democrazia Cristiana (DC) led the country until entering a crisis period in 1992 
and breaking down later in 1994; during their time in government with centre-left cabinets, the DC 
proved to be a vital part, because when a crisis erupted it only precipitated the Socialist members 
to leave the leadership, but the existing government could go on (ibidem.). Throughout Berlusconi 
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time in government the situation proved to be different when its partners in the cabinet resigned it 
would lead to tremendous instability and compromise the continuity of the government (ibidem.), 
this did not change when Lega and the FSM joined in a cabinet which lasted for fourteen months 
(Custodero and Rubino, 2019).  
In the current Italian political context, it has been more challenging to maintain a coalition 
in government, and the cabinets are increasingly unstable and fragmented, making it more difficult 
to lead the country (Morlino, 1996). As mentioned before, other factors have contributed to the 
instability of Italian cabinets. T recent economic crisis has considerably affected the political system 
simply when regarding the transformations between 2011 and 2013 (Marangoni and Verzichelli, 
2015). What emerged during this time was the breaking apart of the parliamentary model 
established from the past two decades and a beginning of a leadership turnover period (ibid.). The 
crisis reached its climax when a technocrat government lead by Mario Monti took over in 2011; 
this cabinet solution was supported by the European partners and the President of the Italian 
Republic (ibid.), his technical government would kick-off reforms in a package named “Save Italy”, 
(The Economist, 2012). Although many Italians found almost unbelievable that a figure as 
Berlusconi had left the political sphere, “Some young Italians, who increasingly feel shut out by a 
labour market that protects older workers, considered his departure to be good sign.” (Donadio, 
2011).  
The economic crisis did not only provoke changes in the political spectrum but also modified 
the perceptions on the economy by Italian voters, by the 2013 elections half of the electorate lived 
with some type of job difficulty; almost all considered the state of the economy ‘bad’ and many 
expressed a negative view on the future of their country, allocating the blame of it all in their political 
representatives (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014). The economic crisis coincided with the end of the 
Second Republic in Italy and the rise of a technocratic government; these circumstances led to a 
decline in voter turnout, abstention became a way to show discontent; also embedded in alienation 
and indifference, but those who perceived their political incumbents “negatively were more likely 
to have chosen Beppe Grillo’s movement” seen as, “an alternative for many citizens unhappy with 
the economy” (ibid.: p.155). Furthermore, since 2013 EU integration became an axis of 
competition, economic and migration policies became less relevant and EU authority topics gained 
relevance within the electorate, this is also related to the appearance in the political scenery of 
parties like the FSM (Giannetti, Pedrazzani, and Pinto, 2017). The electoral protest present in Italy 
and the demand for radical solutions for complex domestic problems, increased the already 
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complex circumstances in Italy (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014). By 2014, ‘The Spectator’ described 
Italy as, “the sick man of Europe — and it is also the dying man of Europe.” (Farrell, 2014).  
Thus, the economic crisis has weakened democratic institutions in the EU Member States 
such as Italy where the negative economic performance has endured through time, compromising 
the trust in politics and parties, which has led to governing instability (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014). 
During this time, abstention served an exit way for the discontented electorate, which by not voting 
expressed their antipathy towards the political establishment and their negative evaluation of the 
country’s economy (ibid.). However, many displeased people preferred to vote in radical parties 
such as the Five-Star Movement, simply young people, instead of abstaining (ibid.) Indeed, the 
government austerity measures that were implemented on the aftermath of the crisis placed a 
heavier burden on the young, with lower budgets for education, higher university tuition fees and 
fewer services as youth centres (Sloam, 2013). During this time, mass youth protests swept Europe 
(ibid.). This also included Italy, wherein 2010, the capital was filled with students protesting the 
educational reform package supported by the Berlusconi government (Jennings, 2010). For 
decades, young people have been excluded from Italian politics by its elite, a system which has 
been saturated with corruption and nepotism (Sloam, 2014). Overall, according to Passarelli and 
Tuorto, the “emergence of a new, radically anti-establishment party on the Italian political scene 
reflects a more complex need for a political ‘exit’ that is supported by many voters who are 
responsive to (and ready to vote for) an alternative instead of abstaining” (Passarelli and Tuorto, 
2014, pp. 156-157). 
Moreover, the effects of the financial and economic crisis, changed the Italian view on 
Europe, breaking the trust Italians had in Europe as a source of assured prosperity and economic 
growth, this change of perception was quite noticeable in the centre-left electorate, while the right-
wing voters kept being critical on the subject (Mauro, 2014). In fact, the adverse economic situation 
increased diffuse opposition (attitudes directed to the whole system) towards Europe, in particular 
against the national government and created doubts of the benefits connected to be a Member 
State, but it did not affect the sense of belonging in Europe in Italians (ibid.). Linked to this, there 
has also been a concern of lack of civic and political engagement amongst the Italian youth, when 
overlooking this topic into more detailed, it is noticed that young people prefer other forms of 
participation, since they do not see concrete results coming from direct political participation 
(Villano and Bertocchi, 2014). When it comes to the EU, young people still feel its values and 
institutions are distant from them, which compromises civic and political engagement, this could 
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be blamed on the inability of the EU to promote itself amongst this group, thus it is necessary “an 
improvement of communication between the political representatives and young people” (ibid.: 
97). Indeed, in the ESN Survey in 2019, most respondents12 admitted that they did not feel informed 
enough about the work of the EP (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). 
Nonetheless, when it comes to European elections, most respondents (60%) stated it was important 
for them to vote on those elections (ibid.). This high interest was translated in considerable voter 
turnout in the elections that year with 68,77% among Erasmus students (ibid.).  
In general terms, young Italians tend to show a higher interest for politics than their European 
counterparts; this does not mean that they do not have a critical judgement on the practices of 
some members of the political establishment (Bontempi, 2008). Italian youth engages in politics 
both by showing up in the ballot and by challenging the traditional limits of political participation 
and choosing different types of it to express their views; with the combination of the two different 
types of practices, there has been a change in Italy of what it means to be politically active (ibid.). 
Among the several causes affecting youth political participation in Italy, difficulties entering and 
participating in the labour market are amongst them (Baglioni, Colloca, and Theiss, 2015). Indeed, 
“young people facing difficult circumstances, such as unemployment, can generate a resilient 
attitude and engage in political mobilization.” (ibid.: p. 771). Youth political activism is nurtured by 
several goals which support disadvantaged groups and the meeting of the needs of people involved 
in these movements and/or groups, even when facing economic uncertainties, youth attempts by 
non-conventional political acts to start building a more equitable and resilient socio-economic 
system and try to do so together, “participation becomes a means of social change” (Luigi, Martelli, 
and Pitti, 2018, p. 267). Membership in associations and groups can foster young people’s political 
participation in vulnerable situations, such as unemployment, in this way political engagement is 
facilitated, avoiding some consequences associated with lack of employment such as apathy 
towards politics (Baglioni, Colloca, and Theiss, 2015).  
The crisis of political participation among Italian youth, concerning during the 1990s, has 
been replaced in a higher involvement in specific spheres that exclude conventional participation, 
such as party membership and voting (Gozzo, 2014). In fact, youth involvement has been 
increasing in demonstrations, rallies, and political debates, which has been partially fuelled by web 
usage and strong reactions to economic inequalities (ibid.). On the other side, according to Gozzo, 
party membership and voting have remained stable or decreased. What has been observed is that 
 
12 Concerning the characteristics of the participants of the ESN Survey 2019, 4,729 (31,57%) had Italy as their country of citizenship. 
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“Young people opt for direct involvement thanks also to the encouragement of adults and, in a 
tense political climate, they ask for answers or work to improve their condition”, there is a similar 
tendency when university students are analysed, who show a greater tendency towards acts of self-
determined participation (ibidem.: p. 221). According to the same source, young Italian voters 
appear to acquire more skills as political participants.  
Indeed, when looking at data which focus on Italian Erasmus students’ political participation 
in the European sphere, more than half have confirmed they have participated in political debates, 
44,84% had joined public demonstrations, 66,41% had signed a petition and 35% had expressed 
their views on public matters on the internet or in social media platforms (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, 
Rousou, and Katava, 2019). Concerning their views on the EU, Italian Erasmus students show to 
be the amongst the most protective of it and that feeling of support expresses itself into higher 
interest on the European project, higher intentions to vote and higher voter participation in 
European elections when compared to the European average, viewing their vote as a way to 
influence politics (ibid.). In short, a possible way to actively involve more Italian young people in 
politics in the future would be for Europe not to appear as a ‘restrain jacket’ or an ‘absent 
protagonist’, which could help to bring back politics to the core of Europe and EU as the main topic 





Youth public attitudes and political participation in Spain and Italy 
Nationalism and egotism should no longer have a position in Europe tolerance and solidarity 
represent our common future. And colleagues it is well well worth fighting for them. 
- Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor on the Future of Europe during the plenary session in 
Strasbourg (12-15/11/2018) 
 
4.1 Public attitudes of young people towards the EU in Spain and Italy: a comparison on what 
might have affected youth political participation 
There have been conducted other studies on two mechanisms that build the inside 
dynamic of the European public sphere. The first one is a rise in communication within 
European political institutions, this meaning institutional actors, experts and representatives of 
civil society. The second one is an increase in the public’s attention and awareness of European 
political communication when considering governance (Trenz and Eder, 2004). The new path 
towards political integration, which began with the Maastricht Treaty cultivated the search for 
public legitimacy as a source of European power; thus political actors had to consider the 
possible public reactions to their strategies and actions (ibid.). However, in the case the public 
remains indifferent, collective actors in Europe must seek ways to capture their attention for 
their activities, thus “the principal objective of a European communication policy is not to 
improve information, but to present it.” (ibid.: p.16).  
Generally, the conventional wisdom presents political elites as more favourable to 
European integration than it is the public opinion, but when looking into this matter concretely 
elites and the public seek for different things from Europe (Hooghe, 2003). Elites look for an 
EU with the capability of governing a competitive market and show political strength, while the 
public seeks an EU which would protect them from the fluctuations of capitalist markets, being 
more of their interest policies regarding employment, social and cohesion improvements, 
environment and industry (ibid.). Moreover, “The growing public perception of the EU appears 
to be important to this democratic expansion and convergence, as is the role of the institutions 
in performing European governance and encouraging communication and discourse.”, even 
with developments that might not always be perceived as positive and criticisms that might 
arise from it, it also comes with an increase of communication which fosters democratic 
mechanisms, being this “a process that unfolds in the course of deepening integration.” (Trenz 
and Eder, 2004, p. 20).  
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Indeed, public attitudes over mass political behaviour are responsible for shaping and 
building European integration, one example of this could be the Danish referendum in 1992 
over the Maastricht Treaty which ultimately changed the institutional reform the EU went 
through (Gabel, 1998). There have been studied five explanations for public support of 
European integration (ibid.):  
1) Cognitive mobilization, which argued that high cognitive mobilization led to 
political awareness and good skills in political communication allowing for 
citizens to identify themselves with a supranational political community such 
as the EU; 
2) Political Values, according to this theory citizens’ political attitudes are moulded 
by the socioeconomic conditions which they have during their formative years; 
3) Utilitarian model, EU citizens through their unique socioeconomic experiences, 
perceive the EU’s costs and benefits of integration differently, thus their support 
for further integration is connected to their possible welfare gains that arise 
with it; 
4) Class partisanship, which defends that left parties supporters were more 
sceptical towards European integration than the ones from right-wing parties; 
5) Support for government, citizens project their evaluations of the national party 
leaders towards the supranational levels.  
 
When analysing all the previous described theories there are differences in their significance, 
but the utilitarian one proves to be the most robust in predicting support for European integration, 
nonetheless, it is important to notice that, “citizen's support for integration is (at least potentially) 
flexible.” (ibid.: p. 352). In fact, the selected respondents of the ESN Survey 2019 when questioned 
what strengthened their feeling of being European citizen, the top five replies were: the fact they 
could live anywhere in the EU after retirement and being able to get their pension; a European 
social welfare system harmonised amongst the Member States; the recognition of academic 
studies throughout the EU; European civic education classes which begin in the early years of 
education; and finally the European emergency services (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and 
Katava, 2019).  
Focusing now on the topic of youth political participation, the turnout in general elections 
has declined and the same trend has been followed by membership of political parties; some 
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studies have even described the youth as politically apathetic or inactive (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, 
Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). This lack of political participation of youth could be linked to the 
incapacity of the political representatives and structures to tackle the issues which concern young 
people or even to find a way to make politics an essential part of their lives, “The problem, however, 
may not merely be that young people no longer listen to politicians, but that young people perceive 
that politicians do not listen to them” (ibid.: p. 59). Moreover, the youth may avoid formal politics 
since they do not see what it has to offer them, choosing instead to participate in other ways, for 
instance, through demonstrations (ibid.). Nevertheless, according to the same source, it is vital 
when evaluating the lack of youth political participation not basing it entirely on lack of interest in 
politics, but also extend our analysis beyond this and search for other possible reasons. Indeed, 
we should be aware that in a report from 2019 produced by the EC showed that in those elections 
young and first-time voters drove turnout figures to the record high; this was also the most digital 
to-date elections in which almost half of EU citizens now rely on online news as their primary source 
for information about national and European politics (Commission reports on 2019 European 
elections: fostering European debates, 2020).  
The wearing out of Southern European democracies and their support for the EU could be 
traced for the way the euro was implemented, with the clear goals of allowing EU member states 
to more easily converge their national interests, eventually grow into a greater political union, and 
finally form a liberal-democratic zone of stability (Matthijs, 2014). Until the start of the crisis in 
2010, Spain had a strong employment growth which accounted for more than 40% of all jobs 
created in the Eurozone until 2007 and in the case of Italy the decline of the employment rate in 
this period was less than 1% until 2009 (Perez, 2013-2014). Many viewed later the negative 
consequences of the crisis in Italy and Spain as a shortcoming of their labour market systems and 
social protection and the supposed excesses committed within them (ibid.). 
 However, by 2010 the disappointment on the promises of Maastricht were exposed with 
the sovereign-debt crisis, which reached Spain and Italy just one year later, forcing economic 
adjustments (Matthijs, 2014). These economic regulations showed the unequal grounds in which 
Southern European countries and Northern European countries stood and their clashing interests, 
creating a unique opportunity for protest politics and extremists throughout the political spectrum 
to appear and strive (ibid.). Moreover, it exposed the macro-institutional defects of the Eurozone, 
“These flaws include the absence of a confirmed lender of last resort for governments and banks, 
the lack of real time banking union (including a common resolution fund and deposit guarantee), 
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and the absence of mutualizing public debt instruments with a collective guarantee that could 
redress the perception of sovereign default and/or redenomination risks,” (Perez, 2013-2014, p. 
41). Considered too large to simply be bailed out, governments had to implement harsh austerity 
measures, recommended by Brussels to appease the bond markets this ultimately led to spending 
cuts directed mostly to education, health care and other public investments and substantial fiscal 
adjustment efforts were required (ibid.). Until that point, there had not been such a massive fiscal 
adjustment in democracies guided by a supranational organization such as the EU, together with 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank (Matthijs, 2014). This damaged 
the domestic political legitimacy both in Spain and Italy since they could not control major 
economic-political choices, exposing the inability of their traditional parties to tackle the challenges 
presented (ibid.). The governments which followed in Spain and Italy were mostly incapable of 
acting long-lasting reforms in the labour market and social spending to support economic recovery, 
short-term solutions for keeping employment and increasing productivity were preferred; all this in 
a Eurozone context which has not available tools to prevent similar financial crisis, creating a risk 
of political instability and social discontent (Perez, 2013-2014).  
In fact, student movements in Italy and Spain arose between 2008 and 2010 around the 
concepts of precarity, youth and anti-austerity discourse, and they influenced the neoliberal trend 
during the time of economic crisis (Zamponi and González, 2016). These student movements, 
which could already be traced before the economic crisis, contributed for anti-austerity protests in 
Italy and Spain, which gained a wider audience during this time and mobilised more people than 
before (ibid.). There were differences between these protest movements, in Spain youth mostly 
united to the 15-M joining transversal anti-austerity movements, while in Italy they joined different 
type of mobilisations; with the platform ‘Juventud Sin Futuro’, which appeared in 2011 thousands 
of young people flooded the streets of Madrid with the slogan behind them of ‘no house, no job, 
no pension, no fear’, in the Italian case more scattered anti-austerity movements appeared in which 
the youth joined (ibid.). Overall, the way these movements progressed and adapted during the time 
of crisis was mostly influenced by the different experiences of it lived by the youth in public 
discourse, “the influence of a dissenting youth was also key in order to open the field of 
opportunities for broader mobilisations.” (ibid.: p. 77).  
Generally, young people have been disappointed with the traditional forms of politics and 
there have been debates and concerns on youth’s apathetic attitudes towards their participation 
within the established political system (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 2010). Beyond this, it must be 
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recognized how even though there are some young people, as there are adults, who do not have 
any kind of interest in politics, but many among the youth started forging new protest techniques 
other still used more common individualized ways, showing youth participation as a complex 
subject (ibidem.). Furthermore, youth still searches for recognition by state actors and value 
democracy, seeming to prefer ‘ordinary’ daily political practices, what might be called, “doing their 
part” (ibidem.). It is possible then to say that “Young Europeans have become increasingly 
alienated from parties and politicians, but are active in ‘politics’ in a broader sense.” (Sloam, 2013, 
p. 850). This could be a reflection of the times which have changed together with young people’s 
values and lifestyle, and politics proved unable to accompany this (ibid.). Youth participation in 
politics has changed, they prefer issue-based forms of engagement and have little contact with 
decision-makers, they would instead sign public petitions and join demonstrations (ibid.), as was 
also observed in reports such as the ESN Survey 2019. 
Undeniably, we should tackle political marginalisation in youth, simply when comparing 
differences between unemployed youth and employed youth, those who hold a job have a greater 
disposition to discuss political matters, even though both employed and unemployed show a low 
interest in EU political topics (Bay and Blekesaune, 2003). Moreover, those who do not have a job 
tend to have more radical political attitudes; they particularly differentiate themselves from 
employed youth by their lack of political confidence and their dissatisfaction on the function of 
democracy, this is related to the inaction of public authorities regarding their state of unemployment 
(ibid.). In Italy's case, for instance, where high youth unemployment can be found, the situation 
between those who have a job and those who do not becomes somewhat normalised, being those 
satisfied with the present state of politics the exceptional group (ibid.). It should then be noted that 
social inequalities could determine political participation with factors such as educational 
attainment and household income, for instance, young people from poorer backgrounds tend to 
have higher levels of political participation through, for example, working for a party or joining a 
boycott  (Sloam, 2013). Overall, youth participation in democracy within the EU is diverse and 
expresses itself in different ways, but two dangers could be traced, which are the disconnection 
from young people from electoral politics and the lack of contact with public activities that affect 
their daily lives, on top of all of this if the socio-economic inequalities are allowed to grow they will 
provoke greater unbalances in political participation (ibid.).  
Young people have been disproportionally affected by the 2008 global financial crisis, and 
due to the particular time in their lives they are, the so-called ‘impressionable years’ and entering 
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for the first time the labour market, it can be said that a considerable mark was made on them 
(Grasso, 2018). In fact, the crisis made the Spanish and Italian labour market experience high 
levels of unemployment; also there has been a reduction in equivalized household income, worse 
levels of inequality, higher levels of poverty connected to the increased unemployment rate 
(Addabbo, García-Fernández, Llorca-Rodríguez, and Maccagnan, 2011). In general, Southern 
Europe has been in the frontline of the Eurozone debt crisis, which represented the most significant 
existential crisis for the European Monetary Union until that point (Hopkin, 2015). The response 
which followed focused mostly on the supposed policy errors and historical institutional 
vulnerabilities of Southern Europe, so an austere fiscal policy was set as a road for solution, but 
even if countries like Italy impose all the structural reforms prescribed growth would be unlikely 
(ibid.).  
Before the eruption of the crisis certain conditions were being built that made countries such 
as Italy and Spain more vulnerable to it; amongst these were the high unit labour costs in 
comparison to countries like Germany, but without a real rise on wages (ibid.). According to the 
same source, in Italy with the Berlusconi government labour protection diminished, in the Spanish 
case a housing bubble provoked over-investments, leading to an increase in demand for low-skilled 
workers, this translated in a rise in immigration and low need of high levels of education. Moreover, 
the crisis also meant a new political scenario in Southern Europe, “the elections held since the 
crisis began have brought major transformations to what were relatively settled patterns of citizen 
representation and party competition” (ibid.: p. 21). There was the desire for something distinct, 
“more transparent forms of politics and greater use of direct democracy; an end to austerity and 
an investment in measures to boost youth employment; government regulation of ‘corporate 
greed’; and, the implementation of measures to address socio-economic inequalities” (Sloam, 
2014, p. 221).  
With the shifts and changes that have happened in Southern Europe, simply in Italy and 
Spain, there have also been raising concerns with the low number of young people voting in the 
EP elections or even local elections, the lack of youth membership in political parties, trade unions 
or youth organisations (Kovacheva, 2005). It should be acknowledged that political participation is 
not a static concept, it has changed together with society and scientific research on it, and more 
recent developments are strongly linked with youth behaviour and values (ibid.). Thus, political 
participation involves, “all those political activities that citizen can become involved in as they to 
attempt to influence political decision-making” (Grasso, 2018, p. 181). Concerning this, several 
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transformations have occurred in recent times which have shaped youth political participation. 
When youth feels democracy being threatened they go in high numbers to vote, this high inflow in 
the ballot boxes tends to be connected unconventional and civic activities focused on single issues, 
like the protests against the war in Iraq or environmental concerns (Kovacheva, 2005). Also, the 
high spread of consumerism poses a challenge to civic participation since it creates a distance to 
collective solidarity and ideological engagement (ibid.). According to Kovachea, the spread of 
individualisation as a trend has also been seen as an impediment to formal youth participation in 
youth organisations with regularity. Finally, mobility within Europe tends to provoke civic 
engagement in youth, but while urban areas experience an increase of multiculturalism, rural areas 
remain more isolated (ibid.). Indeed, political participation is a fundamental part of democracy and 
for effective representation, but some scholars have argued that young people have turned away 
from formal politics, such as voting and party membership, and have shown a preference for new 
social movements and protest (Grasso, 2018). This is also connected to the value change provoked 
by social and economic transformation, so we have seen a rise of postmaterialist values and politics 
of young Europeans has become more diverse, “because postmaterialists tend towards lifestyle 
politics, and are much more likely than materialists to engage in non-electoral, non-institutionalised 
forms of politics, such as signing a petition, joining a boycott and participating in a demonstration” 
(Sloam, 2013, p. 841). 
In fact, when approached about what should be the priorities for the EU for the next decade, 
young people (15-30 years old) have placed protecting the environment and tackling climate 
change as the priority, followed by improvement of education and training, the fight of poverty and 
economic and social inequalities, and lastly increasing employment (European Commission, 
2019). Concerning social and civic participation 72% of the young people inquired say they have 
voted in local, national, and European elections and three in four of them actively engaged in some 
form of organised movement or volunteering, for instance, strikes or student organisations (ibid.). 
Indeed, youth political participation could be described as, “not only the action structured through 
political institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) but also involvement in less 
structured, looser networks and friendship circles, and even individual action, such as political 
consumerism.” (Kovacheva, 2005, p. 27).  
When questioning young people (15-30 years old) about how to build a stronger and more 
united Europe, almost half pointed how education systems should prepare them for employment, 
45% believed that everyone should have a chance to succeed, to contribute to this critical thinking, 
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media, democracy, climate change and environmental topics, as well as, entrepreneurship and 
financial abilities should be taught in schools (Flash Eurobarometer 478 – “How do we build a 
stronger more united Europe? The views of young people”., 2019). Among youth, 31% have stayed 
abroad for some amount of time, this is more likely if they possess higher levels of education, live 
in large cities or are involved in volunteer activities when questioning those who did not do this lack 
of finances, personal issues, low interest and information; also insufficient language skills were 
presents as reasons (ibid.). In fact, financial burdens remain the main obstacle to mobility, those 
who have lower education levels perceive the barriers for mobility to be even higher, but more than 
half who chose to continue their studies in another country used EU funding programmes 
(Hauschildt, Voegtle, and Gwosc, 2018).  
Taking what has been put forward, it can be said that youth political participation and 
engagement is a complex subject with many facets, “In political activities other than voting, college-
educated citizens participate at approximately double the rate of those who left school with no 
formal qualification (…) young people from the poorest households are relatively engaged in these 
(mostly) protest activities (…) youth participation in democracy (…) be both vibrant and diverse.” 
(Sloam, 2013, p. 852). Even though it has been a concern the lack of showing up of youth in voting 
ballots, it does not translate, even in times of crisis necessarily a lack of general interest, but instead 
an, “eschew traditional participation because they do not feel heard.” (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 
2010, p. 28). Nonetheless, the disengagement of young people from formal politics has created 
some concerns, since their lack of political participation threatens the legitimacy of democratic 
systems; still, voting remains the most common mode of participation (Grasso, 2018). On the other 
hand, some young people have gone for non-mainstream forms of participation, such as boycotts 
and protests, and with the rise of digital technology and social media the ways youth expresses 
itself politically and even participates has changed considerably, “the rise of lifestyle politics 
twinned with the popularity of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter has encouraged 
young people to construct their own sense of community through the internet often based around 
identity politics” (ibid.: p. 189). Finally, we should safeguard the possibility that as young people 
grow up, they might become more politically active and increase their turnout in elections (ibid.).  
 
4.2 The Erasmus Programme and youth public attitudes and political participation in Spain and 
Italy 
It should be recognised that student mobility is not a new phenomenon it happened both in 
medieval and in the 20th century, students conducted their studies in foreign universities and 
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travelled throughout Europe, the Erasmus Programme, however changed this by overcoming 
obstacles associated with international student mobility and creating a more secure environment 
to do so (Teichler, 1996). The programme was officially launched in 1987, and this symbolised 
the start of a new chapter for internationalisation in HE; this was done to have experienced 
university students in cooperation within Europe, to strengthen the interaction between Member 
States, to build up on the concept of People’s Europe and, finally, to increase cooperation amongst 
higher education institutions (Maiworm, 2001). Globalisation has been responsible for changes in 
many sectors of our lives, such as the economy, international business, social relationships, 
culture, and politics (Aktan and Sari, 2010). Education has been no exception to this. Global politics 
principles have been in the core of the Erasmus project's development, responsible for providing 
exchanges for students and professors within universities and recognise their studies and work 
officially (ibid.). Briefly, the main characteristics of the Erasmus Programme could be described as 
it follows it follows (Maiworm, 2001):  
• The support of regional mobility between European countries; 
• Promotion of temporary study abroad with, for example, giving grants to applicants; 
• Sponsors mobility and cooperation within educational institutions;  
• Supports curricular integration; 
• Recognition of academic achievements done abroad.  
 
Furthermore, the Erasmus Programme intends to improve its participants' skills and 
competences to have a higher qualified workforce, further develop a modern educational system 
and settle Europe’s position as a knowledge base economy (Breznik, Skrbinjek, Law, and Đaković, 
2013). To achieve all of this, the Programme has been expanding throughout the years in scope 
and contribution, always creating new ways to stimulate cooperation and support in higher 
education (ibid.). In fact, Europe has given considerable boosts and set many transformations to 
successive Erasmus programmes, which have come throughout time (González, Mesanza, and 
Mariel, 2011). 
Besides the central role of the Programme which focus on student mobility, there has been 
some evidence that by studying abroad young people are better at coping with the constant 
changes of an international world, in addition to this the Erasmus Programme supports the creation 
of a sense of European identity and citizenship (ibid.).  
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Generally, most students who join the Programme have as their main reasons to do so the 
experience to live in another country, meet new people, learn, or improve a foreign language and 
develop soft skills, but it is essential to acknowledge that an Erasmus grant plays a relevant role, 
simply in Southern Europe where 53% of students admit that lack of financial support prevents 
them from being a part of the Erasmus Programme (Brandenburg and Petrova, 2016). Moreover, 
by joining the programme students increase their employability rates, foster their entrepreneurship 
spirit, also mobile students are more likely to hold in the future a management position after five 
to ten years of graduating (ibid.). Besides this, Erasmus students also notice a positive change in 
personality traits and feel closer and more related to Europe than their non-mobile counterparts, 
interestingly 32% of students admit having a partner of a different nationality of their own (ibid.). 
Finally, according to Brandenburg and Petrova, European attitudes are reinforced during mobility; 
this is particularly noticeable in Southern Europe with a percentage of 85%.  
The Erasmus Programme has succeeded in inspiring students all over Europe to proceed 
their studies in different countries and learn other languages (Teichler, 1996). Indeed, one of the 
programme's greatest achievements has been, “in creating or reinforcing a favourable climate for 
temporary study abroad” (ibid.: p. 177).  
 
Even with the developments of the Erasmus Programme that have happened through the 
years it is challenging to assess the programme's impact as a whole and simply in the voting 
behaviours of their young participants. It is precisely this facet of the Programme being ever 
changing and the different actors with multiple priorities who built it that makes it a difficult object 
to evaluate, “certain level of vagueness about what exactly it is expected to achieve” (Wilson, 2011, 
p. 1128). In trying to change the future behaviour of its participants and their views and attitudes 
towards the EU, it is important that they generate an impact, some sort of material benefits that is 
hard to guarantee (ibid.). Being a part of the Erasmus Programme does not necessarily produce a 
significant shift throughout time and make its students more pro-European, there were not detected 
revolutionary changes in their system of beliefs from the start to the end of their international 
experience; but it is important to be careful in generalizing these results since they might not 
represent the long-term results of the Erasmus Programme or the majority of the student 
community who joins it (ibid.). Additional to this, there is no concrete evidence that being emerged 
in an international environment leads to change in identification patterns within Erasmus 
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participants, “higher education students already are a positively selected group regarding their 
identification with Europe” (Mol, 2018, p. 461). 
Nevertheless, one should not put aside the Erasmus Programme all altogether since it 
fosters the learning of foreign languages, awareness of different cultures, the spread of policy and 
entrepreneur ideas, as well as access to learning opportunities unavailable in one’s home country 
(Wilson, 2011). A study conducted from a Spanish University empirical point of view, showed that 
students who studied in another country develop skills to study and work in a culturally diverse and 
different environment (Urquía-Grande and Campo, 2016). Regarding Italy, the country follows a 
similar trend, a work conducted in 2019 indicated that international student mobility does support 
greater career progression (Schnepf and D’Hombres, 2019). In fact, three to four years after 
graduation, Italian postgraduates benefit from higher employment compared to their non-mobile 
counterparts (ibid.).  
It should be recognised Erasmus+ students become even more pro-European after 
concluding their mobility period simply if this sentiment is not substantial prior to the mobility 
period, being the most significant gains detected with students from Eastern and Southern Europe 
(Souto-Otero, 2019). Moving forward, at least 90% of young Europeans considered experiences 
abroad important even though a majority saw space for improvement, from the creation of EU 
degrees and the opportunity to work in innovative projects (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, 2018). By joining the Erasmus Programme, its 
young participants also increase their employability; students from Eastern and Southern Europe 
are those who highlight the most the benefits it has brought to their careers; they also tend to be 
more satisfied with their jobs and more open for an international career, being able to find work 
faster than their non-mobile colleagues (Souto-Otero, 2019). In terms of their personalities, 
attitudes and behaviour Erasmus students experience positive personal growth and greater cultural 
and social openness, in general, it can be stated that “Erasmus+ participation was reported as 
enriching academically, socially, personally, and in terms of the development of employability.” 
(ibid.: p. 181).  
Students from Italy and Spain have had the opportunity to experience all this that has been 
described previously, their number of outgoing participants have been similar since the start of the 
Erasmus Programme, which has shown in both countries a tendency to increase as presented in 
the graphic below (Figure 6); also students from Italy and Spain seem to favour these countries as 
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Erasmus destinations several factors influenced their choice such as language and perceived 












Both scholar and policy-makers have put a lot of hopes in the role the Erasmus Programme 
as a way to foster and create a common identity among Europeans as well as increase support 
towards the EU; it was expected that “by living, working and studying together, Europeans become 
aware of their commonalities and develop a supranational identity” (Kuhn, 2012, p. 994). Indeed, 
one of the Erasmus Programme's original goals when it was created was to promote interactions 
among young Europeans (Sigalas, 2010). However, studies have shown that this is not the case 
and that the Erasmus produces little effects on both fronts, the mobility programme appears to be 
‘preaching to the converted’, this meaning that the higher education students for multiple reasons 
tend to be pro-EU and only feel more so when joining the Erasmus Programme (Kuhn, 2012). 
Taking this into account, that a priori Erasmus young participants are more favourable towards the 
EU it makes it difficult to assess the impact of the Programme on students’ views and preferences 
(Mol, 2013).  
On the other hand, low-educated youth is very unlikely to show high support for the EU and 
indeed if they had the opportunity to join a mobility international programme such as Erasmus it 
could be the turning point, but they leave school before many of these programmes take place 
(ibid.). Also, even when joining the Programme, the effects on EU support can remain limited, since 
high quality interactions tend to occur mostly between co-nationals and some students faced 
adaptation problems (Sigalas, 2010). Moreover, when interactions do happen amongst students 
of different nationalities, the results on EU support tend to remain limited (ibid.). It should also be 




considered that these phenomenon’s may have a regional variation, in the Italian case there were 
notable differences between mobile and non-mobile youth, this could be explained by the fact that 
this generation grew in a reality where the EU already existed as such and had always been present 
and everyday they experience the consequences of EU membership (Mol, 2013). It could be viewed 
that “a study period abroad adds new layers to students’ perception of ‘Europe’”, since mobile 
students take the EU as their personal project, turning it into a personal project in which social 
characteristics out win the political ones (ibid.: p. 220).  
In general, support for the European project and youth political participation has been of 
growing importance and received considerable attention in the last years (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, 
Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). In 2014 a study entitled ‘Erasmus Voting Assessment’ (EVA) had 
the goal to evaluate if the Erasmus Programme could lead to greater youth participation in 
European elections and more support for the EU (Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). What 
was assessed was that EVA respondents tended to identify themselves with the EU, 91% see 
themselves as nationals of their countries and as European citizens; they also appeared to connect 
positive views with the EU more than other young people (ibid.). Moreover, they tended to be better 
informed about how European members of Parliament are elected, even though 30% were not 
aware that they were elected directly by citizens, finally they saw the EP as a key element in the 
construction of the EU (ibid.). According to the same study, with regards to the voting intentions 
and behaviour, the level of participation in the EU elections of that year (2014) varied in EVA 
participants in accordance with their Erasmus experience13; those who had had an Erasmus 
experience at the time showed greater levels of participation in EU elections.  
However, how it has been pointed out before we should dwell further on the concept of 
‘political participation’ simply when talking about youth and try to include in our analysis intentions 
of voting and the interpretations of that, an example could be deliberating abstention of voting in 
elections, something which tends to be understood as apathy (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and 
McDonagh, 2003). Indeed, indifference could be theoretically viewed as a simple model of 
behaviour, by this is meant that if voting led to a result, which would not make a difference, and 
assuming that voting involves costs, the rational citizen would choose not to vote (Brody and Page, 
1973). Thus, non-participation can have various reasons which surpasses the simple assumption 
that this happens due to lack of interest in politics, “The problem, however, may not merely be that 
 
13 81% of EVA respondents who were former Erasmus students; 74% of EVA respondents never studied abroad (but would like to do so); and 41% 
of EVA respondents who were back then Erasmus students 
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young people no longer listen to politicians, but that young people perceive that politicians do not 
listen to them”, political literacy should then not just be bottom-up, but also top-down (O'Toole, 
Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003, p. 59). We could also consider that politics not only 
incorporates formal political participation, but it is also about social empowerment (Favell, 2010). 
This empowerment has also with the participation in the Erasmus Programme, “Their mobilities 
increased their technical, interpersonal and inter-cultural skills and competences, as well as their 
self-confidence, ability to achieve goals, and social and cultural openness” (Souto-Otero, 2019, p. 
1).  
Indeed, the crisis might have been in itself a catalyser for youth political action with an 
increase in protest movements against austerity and spending cuts in social services, yet these 
movements seem to attract a small proportion of participants, who are often ignored by 
mainstream political parties since they are viewed as unlikely to vote (Grasso, 2018). Education 
levels (higher education levels tend to be connected to greater political participation), ideological 
identification, and satisfaction with the way democracy works and other political values also play a 
role in the shift of levels of political involvement (ibid.). As for Italy, difficulties entering and 
participating in the labour market are among the causes of influencing youth political participation 
(Baglioni, Colloca, and Theiss, 2015). In Spain youth’s negative evaluation of the socio-economic 
context post-2008 shaped their political action, young people between 18 and 24 years old showed 
to have higher abstention rate levels, being this a way to express their discontent and distrust of 
incumbent politicians (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). 
 
 
We can analyse in Figure 7 that overall turnout in EU elections in Italy and Spain has 
oscillated throughout time with a tendency to have lowered since the ’80s, simply in the Italian 
Figure 7 - Youth voter turnout in EU elections 2009, 2014 & 2019. Source: 
Eurobarometer 




case, Spain presents higher levels of fluctuation, it is noticeable some spikes in participation in 
1999 and 2019.  
On the other hand, when focusing on available data only of youth (18 to 24 years old) voter 
turnout in Spain and Italy in EU elections (Figure 814), for both countries there has been an increase 
in youth political participation simply when putting it in comparison with the total of voter turnout. 
In Spain between 2014 and 2019 there was an increase of 10% (from 27% to 37%) and in Italy a 
similar trend was found with an increment of 8% (from 45% to 53%). It is important to point out 
though that the previously described chart (Figure 8) shows only youth voter turnout in EU elections, 
not the Erasmus students who were eligible to vote those years. In 2019 through the ESN Survey 
we can obtain a view of participation of  Erasmus as voters in the European elections, not only to 
they have a higher interest in these elections, they also show a higher presence in the ballot of that 
year; even if only 30% of respondents admitted feeling very or quite informed about the EP’s work 
(Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). It should be recognized that there is still a 
lack of data on youth’s democratic participation connected to joining the Erasmus Programme. 
Thus, it was attempted for this research to include all relevant election data. Nonetheless, without 
further investigation on the short and long term impact of the Erasmus Programme, it would be 
challenging to make a final statement on the Programme’s ultimate influence on the voting 
behaviour and support of the EU in its young participants in Spain and in Italy.  
Concerning Erasmus students’ political engagement and participation, several studies have 
been conducted to include students from Italy and Spain. In the latest ESN Survey from 2019, 
when respondents were questioned on why they did not vote in the 2019 EU elections, technical 
reasons were mainly presented to justify their abstention, for instance the inability to go back to 
their home country to cast a vote and difficulties with registration and voting while abroad (Banet, 
Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). It is worth noting that students who have participated 
in an EU funded exchange programme, such as the Erasmus+, give higher importance to EU 
elections (60,69%), have greater intentions to vote in them (76,18%) and had greater turnout in 
those elections (71,20% in 2019) when compared to the European average of the younger 
population (18-30 years old) (ibid.). During the previous 2014 European elections, 81% of EVA 
respondents who had completed their stay abroad admitted to voting on those elections (Martínez, 
Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). As pro-European feelings of young people increase, participation 
 
14 It should be noted that the data from 2009 does not examine the turnout rate amongst 18-24 year olds, but rather the share of 18-24 year olds 
on the total voter turnout in the respective country  
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in elections for the EP tend also to be greater; this feeling shows to be linked to a specific interest 
in EU issues and information on the electoral process (Díaz, 2008). Indeed, students who had the 
‘Erasmus experience’ are more positive about the EU and have their participation in the exchange 
programme as the major factor influencing their voting behaviour in EU elections, increasing the 
possibilities of them voting (Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). Moreover, participation in 
various activities and organizations by young people, beside the Erasmus Programme, has an 
impact on interest in politics and elections; on an Eurobarometer study conducted in 2013, 23% 
of the respondents admitted as more likely in being a candidate in a political election and 70% 
shared it was also likely for them to vote in the European elections of 2014 (Flash Eurobarometer 
375 - European Youth: Participation in Democratic Life, 2013).  
Undeniably, young European’s lives have become more precarious due to low growth and 
cuts in public spending simply on the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, they appear to face a ‘risk 
society’, which is best illustrated by the uncertainty of the changing labour market and the 
unlikelihood of having a ‘job for life’ (Sloam, 2014). Regarding this, Erasmus students are more 
likely to identity the EU as ‘a way to create a better future for young people’, as well as ‘a way to 
create jobs’ and in general they tend to feel more optimistic about their future employment status 
(Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). Concerning political participation, the youth shows a 
tendency towards non-institutionalized forms of engagement, and even though voting is still the 
most common form of political participation, lower youth turnout in elections has become a concern 
for both policy-makers and scholars (Sloam, 2014). This is also a tendency with Erasmus 
participants, many admitted in 2019, participating in public debates, public demonstrations, 
signing petitions, and expressing their views on social media or in the web (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, 
Rousou, and Katava, 2019). On the other side, the capacity of representation of mainstream 
politics has diminished over time, and there has been a shift from politics to policy; young people’s 
politics are more individualized and focused on single-issues, which has been a difficult adaptation 
for politics and political institutions faced with an ever more diverse electorate (Sloam, 2013). 
Indeed, in 2017 the most mentioned priority topics for the EU by the European youth were 
education and skills (53%), protection of the environment and the fight against climate change 
(50%), employment (42%) and the management of migratory flows and integration of refugees 
(40%) (Flash Eurobarometer 455 - European Youth, 2018).  
To encourage greater public involvement in politics, “this worthy goal requires citizens who 
have the resources to participate and political and state actors who actively encourage” (ibid.: p. 
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853). On its part, EU has created tools and platforms to empower citizens to facilitate direct 
participation, such as the European Democracy Focus Area which tackles Digital Democracy, 
understanding populism and online disinformation (European Democracy, 2020). This goes 
accordingly with EU students' expectations with an exchange experience who seek more rights as 
EU citizensnd for schools to have more European civic education (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, 
and Katava, 2019). 
Here is what we may say about mobile citizens in general in Europe, the exercise of it could 
be a way to legitimise the ‘post-national’ European project, which has been fuelled by “their 
fulfilment of the notion of freedom of movement” (Favell, 2010, p. 212). The engagement of mobile 
European citizens in other ways besides conventional politics could represent a new way of politics 
(ibid.). What has been seen as ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU could be a consequence of the 
nationalised past of Europe. According to Favell, a new way of political participation through active 
engagement as, for instance, residents and entrepreneurs, suggest that the traditional models to 
assess political engagement might be lacking a part of the whole view on the subject. With the 
evolution of European democracy and with it its increasingly international and mobile youth we 
must consider that a “multi-levelled, multi-scalar governance that might (still) be Europe’s future.” 
(ibid.: p. 213). Whatever happens, it is inevitable not to reflect on the role of this Erasmus 
Generation grown with airplane tickets in their hands, who tend to naturally feel European, and that 
will play a key role in Europe’s future, one which is still on the making (Gozi, Generazione Erasmus 

















Young people were noticeably affected during the 2008 global financial crisis and this made 
a strong impression on them due to the stage they are in their life: concluding their education and 
entering the labour market (Grasso, 2018). In fact, Southern European countries were amongst 
the most affected by the crisis, together with the segmentation of the labour market, lack of 
aggregate demand and deficiency in vocational training, and countries such as Italy and Spain had 
staggering youth unemployment rates (Dolado J. J., 2015). These conditions induced young people 
to look for something different in political leadership, more transparency, direct democracy, and 
policies that supported the youth (Sloam, 2014). Yet during their studies, when young people are 
able to join the Erasmus Programme their views and political behaviour appear to distinguish them 
from their counterparts by their ‘Erasmus experience’, they are more inclined to feel positive about 
the future and the EU, also because they participated in the exchange programme they are more 
eager to vote on EU elections (Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 2014). 
When analysing the Erasmus Programme in both Italy and Spain in the first sections of 
chapters 2 and 3, we understood the increasing role the mobility programme played through time 
in both education systems with their students. In fact, Spain was amongst the first Member States 
to join Erasmus and has kept investing in it throughout time (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Education and Culture, 2010). Since then, Spanish universities have been investing in 
internationalisation, which leads to more support for outgoing students and boosting worldwide 
attractiveness of Spanish higher education institutions (Valle and Garrido, Movilidad de 
estudandiantes universitarios: es España atractivo para los estudiantes Erasmus?, 2009). As 
referred in Chapter 2, in 2018 it was assessed that less than 10% of higher education students 
joined international mobility programmes (Education and Training Monitor 2018 Spain, 2018). One 
of possible reasons for this low participation rate was the financial and economic crisis which 
affected particularly the lower-middle class, from where a considerable number of Erasmus 
students came from (Sánchez, 2015). Generally, Spanish students who go abroad develop skills 
that allow them to study and work in culturally diverse environments, they tend to feel more 
international and European and increase their opportunities to enter the labour market (Urquía-
Grande and Campo, 2016).  
Looking over now over the records of the Erasmus Programme in Italy presented in Chapter 
3 since it kicked-off half a million Italian students have travelled in Europe with the mobility 
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programme (INDIRE, 2018). The higher education system in Italy is one of the most traditional in 
Europe, which appears not to create considerable incentives for student mobility compared to other 
partner countries, like Finland and Germany (Lindberg, 2009). Those students who join the 
Erasmus Programme interpret their time abroad as a ‘rite of passage’ (Krzaklewska and Krupnik, 
2008). They also appear to develop a global identity, making them see themselves as European 
and world citizens (ibid). Moreover, the most recent version of the exchange programme Erasmus+ 
in Italy has created an ‘added value’ translated in the internationalization of the organizations 
involved in projects sponsored by the Programme (ANSA, 2019). Greater efficiency has also been 
partially achieved with the Erasmus+ in Italy, by making some aspects simpler with new digital 
solutions for project management (European Commission and the National Authorities). In line with 
this, Italian Erasmus graduates are more likely to work abroad, proving that their mobility period 
played a part in their achievements in the labour market (Pietro, Does studying abroad cause 
international labor mobility? Evidence from Italy, 2012).  
Concerning youth political participation that were examined in the last section of chapters 2 
and 3, we studied that Spain saw social unrest in 2011 as a reaction of its younger generation to 
the difficult period the global financial crisis (Jover, Belando-Montoro, and Guío, 2014). During this 
time, the NEET (“Not in education, employment or training”) started to receive increased attention 
and by 2011 20% of Spanish citizens between the ages of 15 and 29 belonged to this group, also 
those with a university diploma increased their numbers in it by 69% (ibid.). Due to their negative 
assessment of their socio-economic context, young people between 18 and 24 years old used 
abstention in elections to show their discontent (ibid.). Indeed, according to the same source, young 
people are not actually indifferent to politics but feel outrage and distrust towards their political 
representatives. Moreover, support from Spanish youth for democracy and interest in politics tend 
to come as they grow older and even when they are young, they appear to be active participants 
in political discussions (García-Albacate, 2008). While in Italy, the economic crisis made many 
young people turn their vote for radical parties, such as the Five-Star Movement instability 
(Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014). These radical anti-establishment parties represented a political exit 
for many voters that chose to vote for them instead of abstaining (ibid.). Indeed, young Italians tend 
to be more interested in politics than their European counterparts, but this also comes with 
criticism of the practices of some members of the political establishment (Bontempi, 2008). In a 
similar trend as the Spanish youth, Italian youth's political participation has been shaped by the 
difficulties to enter the labour market (Baglioni, Colloca, and Theiss, 2015). 
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In the last chapter, we started by analysing how public attitudes over mass political behaviour 
have been responsible for shaping and building European integration (Gabel, 1998) and how this 
has also influenced Erasmus students attachment and support towards the EU (Banet, Pinto, 
Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). We moved forward by exploring how there has been an 
increasing detachment of young people from formal politics, this has created some concerns since 
their lack of political participation puts at risk the legitimacy of democratic systems (Grasso, 2018). 
In fact, some young people have turned for non-mainstream forms of political participation, such 
as protests (ibid.). According to Grasso, this was also shaped by the rise of digital technology and 
social media, allowing the youth to express its political views and participate in political 
environments. Concerning the Erasmus Programme's role in shaping the political action, the 
changing and different actors with multiple priorities who built it make the mobility programme a 
difficult object to evaluate (Wilson, 2011). It is felt some vagueness on what it is hoped to achieve 
through Erasmus (ibid). In general, education levels, ideological identification, and satisfaction with 
the way democracy works and other political values influence political involvement (Grasso, 2018).  
Thus, on the Erasmus Programme and the political participation among young people in 
Spain and Italy we analysed a complex and still-evolving narrative. The global financial crisis might 
have pushed young people to political action expressed through protest movements, but these 
seem only to capture a small proportion of participants who are often ignored by mainstream 
politics since they are viewed as unlikely voters (Grasso, 2018). When analysing the existing data 
for Erasmus students on political participation there is a very specific reality, they are interested in 
EU elections and do vote in them, they also participate politically in other less conventional actions, 
such as protests, signing petitions and expressing political views on the web and social media 
(Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). Indeed, in the EU elections of 2014, the 
81% of the respondents of the study EVA who had completed their stay abroad shared they had 
voted, while the total sum of youth participation that year was only of 30% (Martínez, Renner, Gots, 
and Sousa, 2014). In the EU elections of 2019 the same trend was noticed, those who had 
participated in an international exchange programme gave higher importance to these elections 
(60,69%), had greater intentions to vote in them (76,18%) and had greater voter turnout in 
comparison to other young people (71,20% in 2019) (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 
2019). Generally, mainstream politics has been unable to represent this new, more diverse 
electorate; young people’s politics have become more individualized and focused on single-issues 
(Sloam, 2013). An illustration of this was the youth reactions in Italy and Spain to the financial 
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crisis with anti-austerity protests which gained a wider audience during this period and greater 
mobilization (Zamponi and González, 2016). Thus, young people have been searching for a 
different direction in politics (Sloam, 2014) and this seeking could also be perceived in Erasmus 
participants who want more rights as EU citizens (Banet, Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 
2019). Only time and further research on the subject will reveal if with the freedom of movement 
and mobility, incentivised by exchange programmes like Erasmus, there will be a legitimisation of 
the ‘post-national’ European project (Favell, 2010). Moreover, political engagement in non-
conventional forms could represent a signal for a new way of politics (ibid.).  
The present research has attempted to shed light upon youth political participation and the 
Erasmus Programme by exploring the available data. This was made against the background of 
Erasmus's evolution in the education systems of both countries and the possible role the mobility 
programme could have played in the political behaviour of young people. Public attitudes over mass 
political behaviour have been responsible for shaping and building European integration (Gabel, 
1998). This has also influenced Erasmus students' attachment and support towards the EU (Banet, 
Pinto, Japiashvili, Rousou, and Katava, 2019). Indeed, students who had the ‘Erasmus experience’ 
are more positive about the EU and have their participation in the exchange programme as the 
major factor influencing their voting behaviour in EU elections (Martínez, Renner, Gots, and Sousa, 
2014). 
Concerning on our potential contribution to the literature, we opened further venues for 
research and study on Erasmus youth political participation and public attitudes, since there have 
not been until now great concerns on the political behaviour of Erasmus participants. This could of 
course be related to what previous studies have pointed out that those who join the exchange 
programme already feel positive about the EU (Mol, 2018). Nonetheless, attempting to understand 
the Erasmus period's full influence in European youth’s life might help us understand what the 
future for the European project could be. Indeed, with further evolution of European democracy 
and its ever-more international and mobile youth, it could be further explored the possibility of 
multi-levelled, multi-scalar governance for Europe’s future (Favell, 2010).  
Focusing now on avenues for future research, one of the possibilities could be to explore 
how European politics could capture the youth’s attention effectively to vote and re-engage them 
in formal politics. Knowing what we have explored in this research: the particular political behaviour 
of European youth including those who join mobility programmes, such as Erasmus. Moreover, 
understanding that the youth has turned to non-conventional forms of politics and that public 
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attitudes contribute for the evolution of the European project, it could be interesting to understand 
the impact that these forms of political participation such as protests, have on the action of EU 
institutions. Finally, a third possible topic for future research could be understanding the political 
participation and action that is shown by Erasmus students. It could be explored what role Erasmus 
students play on domestic and European politics, also what potential contribution this specific 
group within the youth could make in expanding European integration. All in all, there are still vast 
possibilities to understand the phenomenon that is Erasmus simply on shaping public attitudes 
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